It is tragic that this case continues to be beset with delays peculiarly characteristic of the slow movements of the mechanism of justice and the need to ensure that justice is done and fair hearing given to the parties in the case. The wheels of justice grind slowly but surely till its purpose is achieved.
— Obaseki, JSC. Odi v Osafile (1985) – SC.144/1983
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Generally, the law is on the side of the successful party, to assist him to reap the benefit(s) of the judgment. See NZERIBE V. DAVE ENGINEERING CO. LTD. (1994) 9 SCNJ 161.
— I.G. Mbaba, JCA. Ogunleye v. Aina (2012) – CA/IL/22/2011
In the latter regard I refer to Halsbury’s Law of England, Vol. 21, page 348 para. “370.Meaning of just or convenient. The words just or convenient in the statutory provision (k) must be read just, as well as convenient (l). They do not mean that the court can grant an injunction simply because the court thinks it convenient, but mean that the court should grant an injunction for protection of rights or the prevention of injury according to legal principles (m). They confer no arbitrary nor unregulated discretion on the court, and do not authorise it to invent new modes of enforcing judgment in substitution for the ordinary modes (o).”
— Agbaje JSC. Okoya & Ors. V. S. Santilli & Ors. ( SC.206/1989, 23 MAR 1990)
It is said that justice delayed is justice denied. The reverse is equally disturbing. Justice rushed is a travesty of justice and a threat to the fabric that binds civilized society together. As if the rushed justice was not bad enough, the panel presented to the Taraba House of Assembly an incomplete and edited report upon which the appellant was removed on the 4th October, 2012, the day following the submission of the report. At least, the respondents did not disclaim the incomplete and edited report.
– Ngwuta, J.S.C. Danladi v. Dangiri (2014)
OLADEJO ADEWUYI AJUWON & ORS VS FADELE AKANNI & ORS (1993) 12 SCNJ 32 AT 52 this Court held “It is not every error of law that is committed by a trial or appellate Court that justifies the reversal of a judgment. An appellant, to secure the reversal of a judgment, must further establish that the error of law complained of did in fact occasion a miscarriage of justice and/or substantially affected the result of the decision. An error in law which has occasioned no miscarriage of justice is immaterial and may not affect the final decision of a Court. This is because what an Appeal Court has to decide is whether the decision of judge was right and not whether his reasons were, and a misdirection that does not occasion injustice is immaterial. The error in law in applying the doctrine of lis pendens complained of did not occasion any miscarriage of justice. The erroneous application of the doctrine of lis pendens notwithstanding, there was no other course that was open to the Court of Appeal in the appeal than to invalidate the sale in issue and to dismiss the appeal before it”.
It would fall far short of ideal justice between man and man if, where no third party had been prejudiced by the omission, a party to a contract could evade his obligations merely be- cause the other party had not gone to a government office and registered the contract, but the courts have to administer the statute law as it stands and since the submission has been made the Court must consider its validity.
— Brett, JSC. Fakoya v Paul (1966) – SC. 238/1964
It is now settled law, that it is not every mistake in a judgment or decision that can warrant the reversal of a decision. To justify a reversal of a decision, the error complained of must be of such a nature to cause real miscarriage of justice. In the instant case, the fact that a breach was considered, even if erroneously, in appeal which does not concern the appellant, cannot be a basis for the appellant to complain.
– Musdapher JSC. Gbadamosi v. Dairo (2007)
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