It is tragic that this case continues to be beset with delays peculiarly characteristic of the slow movements of the mechanism of justice and the need to ensure that justice is done and fair hearing given to the parties in the case. The wheels of justice grind slowly but surely till its purpose is achieved.
— Obaseki, JSC. Odi v Osafile (1985) – SC.144/1983
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There is also the view of some counsel that the decision in Okafor v. Nweke had to do with technical justice. I agree that the age of technical justice is gone. The current vogue is substantial justice. See: Dada v. Dosumu (2006) 12 PNJSC 115. But substantial justice can only be attained not by bending the law but by applying it as it is; not as it ought to be. There is nothing technical in applying the provisions of sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act as it is drafted by the Legislature. The law should not be bent to suit the whims and caprices of the parties/counsel. One should not talk of technicality when a substantive provision of the law is rightly invoked.
— J.A. Fabiyi, JSC. FBN v. Maiwada (2012) – SC.269/2005
It would fall far short of ideal justice between man and man if, where no third party had been prejudiced by the omission, a party to a contract could evade his obligations merely be- cause the other party had not gone to a government office and registered the contract, but the courts have to administer the statute law as it stands and since the submission has been made the Court must consider its validity.
— Brett, JSC. Fakoya v Paul (1966) – SC. 238/1964
A court of law cannot ignore provisions of a statute which are mandatory or obligatory and tow the line of justice in the event that the statute has not done justice. Courts of law can only do so in the absence of a mandatory or obligatory provision of a statute. In other words, where the provisions of a statute are mandatory or obligatory, courts of law cannot legitimately brush the provisions aside just because it wants to do justice in the matter. That will be adulterating the provisions of the statute and that is not my function; the Judge that I am. I must say that I will be doing justice only to the appellants if I interpret Sections 22 and 26 of the Land Use Act in the way he has urged. But that will certainly be unjust to the respondent. He too, like the appellants, needs justice: As the independent umpire that I am, I am bound to do justice in the case before me.
– Niki Tobi, JSC. Calabar CC v. Ekpo (2008)
Miscarriage of justice is a failure of justice. There is a miscarriage of justice where there are grave or serious errors in the proceedings as to make the proceedings fundamentally flawed. It means failure of the Court to do justice. See Enawakponmwhem Aigbobahi & Ors v. Edokpayi Aifuwa & Ors (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.976) p.270; Amadi v. NNPC (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt.674) p.76;Kalu O. Irolo & Ors v. Ebe E. Uka & Anor (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.786) p.195. Nnajiofor v. Ukonu (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.36) p.505.
– Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. Nwankwoala v FRN (2018) – SC.783/2015
In our adversarial system of justice, justice is a three way street. It must flow to society, the plaintiff and the defendant in equal parts. It is not the exclusive preserve of any party.
– Ogunwumiju JCA. Awure v. Iledu (2007)
In the latter regard I refer to Halsbury’s Law of England, Vol. 21, page 348 para. “370.Meaning of just or convenient. The words just or convenient in the statutory provision (k) must be read just, as well as convenient (l). They do not mean that the court can grant an injunction simply because the court thinks it convenient, but mean that the court should grant an injunction for protection of rights or the prevention of injury according to legal principles (m). They confer no arbitrary nor unregulated discretion on the court, and do not authorise it to invent new modes of enforcing judgment in substitution for the ordinary modes (o).”
— Agbaje JSC. Okoya & Ors. V. S. Santilli & Ors. ( SC.206/1989, 23 MAR 1990)
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