It would fall far short of ideal justice between man and man if, where no third party had been prejudiced by the omission, a party to a contract could evade his obligations merely be- cause the other party had not gone to a government office and registered the contract, but the courts have to administer the statute law as it stands and since the submission has been made the Court must consider its validity.
— Brett, JSC. Fakoya v Paul (1966) – SC. 238/1964
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Miscarriage of justice is a failure of justice. There is a miscarriage of justice where there are grave or serious errors in the proceedings as to make the proceedings fundamentally flawed. It means failure of the Court to do justice. See Enawakponmwhem Aigbobahi & Ors v. Edokpayi Aifuwa & Ors (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt.976) p.270; Amadi v. NNPC (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt.674) p.76;Kalu O. Irolo & Ors v. Ebe E. Uka & Anor (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.786) p.195. Nnajiofor v. Ukonu (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.36) p.505.
– Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. Nwankwoala v FRN (2018) – SC.783/2015
By our trial process court relies on what parties have lawfully brought before the court and their evidence In support of those matters will dictate where the scale of justice tilts. But under no circumstances will the scale be tilted by virtue of the personalities In a case or importance of a case In the eyes of the public, for cases are not decided by public acclaim, I lathe lawful evidence that influence the fate of every case.
— Belgore, JSC. Foreign Finance Corp. v Lagos State Devt. & Pty. Corp. & Ors. (1991) – SC. 9/1988
A court of law cannot ignore provisions of a statute which are mandatory or obligatory and tow the line of justice in the event that the statute has not done justice. Courts of law can only do so in the absence of a mandatory or obligatory provision of a statute. In other words, where the provisions of a statute are mandatory or obligatory, courts of law cannot legitimately brush the provisions aside just because it wants to do justice in the matter. That will be adulterating the provisions of the statute and that is not my function; the Judge that I am. I must say that I will be doing justice only to the appellants if I interpret Sections 22 and 26 of the Land Use Act in the way he has urged. But that will certainly be unjust to the respondent. He too, like the appellants, needs justice: As the independent umpire that I am, I am bound to do justice in the case before me.
– Niki Tobi, JSC. Calabar CC v. Ekpo (2008)
Adebayo v. Johnson (1969) 1 All NLR 176 where at page 190 this Court observed: “Even if the procedure adopted by the applicant Adebayo were wrong, we think that it is now much too late in the day for the directors to complain about it. They failed to challenge the correctness of the procedure at the commencement of the proceedings or on their entry into the case and sought unsuccessfully to get the Statement of Delinquencies filed by the applicant Adebayo struck out. Clearly in those circumstances the adoption of a wrong procedure would be no more than an irregularity, and would not render the entire proceedings a nullity as was submitted by learned counsel for the director Kamson: so unless a miscarriage of justice is thereby alleged and proved, the proceedings would not be struck out. See in re Kellock (1887) 56 L.T.R. 887: also Allen v. Oakey (1890) 62 LT.R. 724.”
And justice is not a one-way traffic. It is not justice for the appellant only. Justice is not even only a two-way traffic. It is really a three-way traffic – justice for the appellant accused of a heinous crime of murder; justice for the victim, the murdered man, the deceased, “whose blood is crying to heaven for vengeance” and finally justice for the society at large – the society whose social norms and values had been desecrated and broken by the criminal act complained of. It is certainly in the interest of justice that the truth of this case should be known and that if the appellant is properly tried and found guilty, that he should be punished. That justice which seeks only to protect the appellant will not be even handed justice. It will not even be justice tempered with mercy.
— Oputa, JSC. G. Josiah v. The State (1985) – SC.59/1984
It is now settled law, that it is not every mistake in a judgment or decision that can warrant the reversal of a decision. To justify a reversal of a decision, the error complained of must be of such a nature to cause real miscarriage of justice. In the instant case, the fact that a breach was considered, even if erroneously, in appeal which does not concern the appellant, cannot be a basis for the appellant to complain.
– Musdapher JSC. Gbadamosi v. Dairo (2007)
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