Confirmation before a superior police officer of a statement made by the accused that he was the one who committed the crime may be dispensed with and the confessional statement may be admitted if there is no suspicion of such statement not being voluntary. See MUSA KASA v. THE STATE (1994) 6 SCNJ.
– Galadima, JSC. Kingsley v. State (2016)
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The law is trite that an accused person can be convicted solely on his confession if the confession is positive and direct in the admission of the offence charged. In other words, voluntary confession of guilt whether judicial or extra judicial, if it is direct and positive is sufficient proof of the guilt and is enough to sustain a conviction, so long as the Court is satisfied with the truth of such a confession.
– Abdu Aboki, JSC. Chukwu v. State (2021)
In other words, the retracted confession must pass the six credibility tests forming part of our criminal jurisprudence which have been established in a long fine of cases referred to above. These are: i. Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true? ii. Is it corroborated? iii. Are the relevant statements made in it of facts true as far as they can be tested? iv. Was the accused one who had the opportunity of committing murder? v. Is his confession possible? vi. Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved?
– H.M. Ogunwumiju, JSC. State v. Ibrahim (2021) – SC.200/2016
The use of the imperative word “shall” in the provision underscores its mandatory nature. The mischief sought to be curbed by the law includes such unsavory situations as where an alleged confession is extracted by torture and duress imposed on a defendant which led to the confession, to avoid miscarriage of justice and to reduce to the barest minimum the incidents of retractions and time consumed by trial within trial proceedings. Section 9(3) ACJL is a mandatory procedural law against infractions on the constitutional rights of a defendant as enshrined in Section 35(2) of the CFRN (as altered). Any purported confessional statement recorded in breach of the said provision is of no effect. It is impotent and worthless. See JOSEPH ZHIYA v. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2016) LPELR – 40562 Pp. 28-29 Paras G-B, ISMAILA FATOKI v. THE STATE- unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/1125/2011 delivered on 11/12/2015, FABIAN MATHEW v. THE STATE – unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/1126/2011 delivered on 11/12/2015, KINGSLEY AKHABUE v. THE STATE – unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/1056/2011 delivered on 11/12/2015, AGBANIMU v. FRN (2018) LPELR – 43924 (CA) Pp. 11-12 Paras E-A, ENECHE v. PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2018) LPELR – 45826 (CA) Pp. 27-28 which are persuasive precedents of the Court of Appeal.
— H.M. Ogunwumiju, JSC. Friday Charles v. The State of Lagos (SC.CR/503/2020, Friday March 31 2023)
The tests for determining the voluntariness of a confessional statement have been consistently applied by this Court in a plethora of cases as follows: (1) Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true. (2) Whether the statement is corroborated, no matter how slight (3) Whether the facts contained therein, so far as can be tested, are true. (4) Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence. (5) Whether the confession of the accused person was possible. (6) Whether the confession was consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved in the matter.
– J.I. Okoro JSC. Berende v. FRN (2021)
It is trite that the mere retraction of a confessional statement by the Defendant will not render it inadmissible. It will only affect the weight to be attached to it where the Defendant denies making it at the earliest opportunity.
– Ogunwumiju JSC. Junaidu v. State (2021)
INGREDIENTS BEFORE INDUCEMENT/PROMISE/THREAT WILL NULLIFY A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
Ngorka v. A.-G., Imo State (2026) 13 NWLR (Pt. 2056) 1 at 36—37, H—C: ‘In the first instance, the law is that a confession is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if the making of the confession was caused by inducement, threat promise or torture, having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature. In other words, for an inducement, threat or promise to make a confessional statement irrelevant and therefore inadmissible, three conditions must be present it must have reference to the charge against the (i) defendant; (ii) it must proceed from a person in authority (iii) and the defendant should believe that by making the statement, he would gain advantage and avoid evil even if temporarily – Dondos v. State (2021) 9 NWLR (Pt.1780) 24. The act of showing to the appellant the confessional statement of the second accused person, containing assertions implicating him in the robbery, and on the basis of which the appellant chose to ‘open up’ and confess his role in the robbery, did not come within the above definition and/or meet the requirements of what amounts to inducement. The second respondent who made the confessional statement shown to the appellant was not a person in authority over the appellant and there was nothing to suggest that the appellant believed that by ‘opening up’ and making his confessional statement he stood to gain any gain advantage and avoid evil, even if temporarily. The showing of the confessional of the second respondent to the appellant could thus not nullify the confession of the appellant.’
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