See, Lawrence Elendu and others v. Felix Ekwoaba (1998) 12 NWLR (pt. 578) 320 at 331 – 332 where this court, per Onu J.S.C., succinctly put the proposition of law under consideration as follows: – “Once the pleadings and evidence show conclusively a representative capacity and the case was fought throughout in that capacity, the trial court can justifiably properly enter judgment for and/or against the party in that capacity even if an amendment to reflect that capacity had not been applied for and obtained. Moreover, an appeal court has the power in the interest of justice to amend the parties’ capacity in the writ of summons and to enter judgment for them accordingly.”
DISTINCTION PROPER, DESIRABLE, NECESSARY PARTIES
The locus classicus on the often vexed issue of distinction between ‘proper parties’ ‘desirable parties’ and ‘necessary parties’ is the evergreen case of Green v. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480 at 493 or (1987) 18 NSCC (Pt. 2) 1115. Wherein the supreme court per Oputa JSC (now of blessed memory) held that:- “This now leads one to the consideration of the difference between ‘proper parties’, ‘desirable parties’ and ‘necessary parties.’ Proper parties are those who ought not interested in the plaintiff claim, are made parties for some good reasons e.g where an action is brought to rescind a contract, any person is a proper party to it who was active or concurring in the matters which gave the plaintiff the right to rescind. Desirable parties are those who have an interest or who may be affected by the result. Necessary parties are those who are not only interested in the subject matter of the proceedings but also who in their absence, the proceedings could not be fairly dealt with. In other words, the question to be settled in the action between the existing parties settled unless they are parties to the action instituted by the plaintiff.”