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A PERSON WHO CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE UNDER A CONTRACT CAN SUE

Dictum

There is authority for the proposition that a person who can take advantage of a contract can sue on it, even if no consideration has moved from him: See Smith and Snipes Hall Farm v. River Douglas Catchment Board (1949) 2 K.B. 500, p.517; Drive Yourself Hire Co. (London) Ltd. V. Strutt (1954)1 Q.B. 250, pp. 271-275.

– Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC. Adejumo v. Ayantegbe (1989)

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INCOMPETENT PARTY CANNOT FILE APPLICATION

A party who is not competently before the Court is incapable of filing applications. The incompetence of the application fatally affected the ruling of the trial Court appealed against. – SAULAWA, JCA. Eshiet v. Effiong (2018)

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PARTY CANNOT BE GRANTED WHAT HE DID NOT CLAIM

In this regard, the law is long and well settled that where a plaintiff claims, say, a declaration of title to land or whatever, and his claim is dismissed, it will be wrong to grant the declaration to the defendant if he did not ask for it by way of counter-claim. See: Ntiaro v. Akpam 3 N.L.R. 10; Abisi v. Ekwealor (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 302) 643 etc. As has been pointed out repeatedly by this and other courts, courts of law are no father Christmas and they must not grant to a party a relief which he has not sought or claimed or which is more than he has claimed. see: Ekpenyong v. Nyong (1975) 2 S.C. 71 at 81-82.

– Iguh JSC. Awoniyi v. AMORC (2000)

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APPELLANT MUST SUCCEED ON STRENGTH OF HIS OWN CASE

But that notwithstanding, it must be borne in mind that an Appellant does not need the support of the Respondent to win his own appeal. He must succeed or fail, on the strength of his own brief and his own case. – Jonah Adah, JCA. Eshiet v. Effiong (2018)

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DISTINCTION PROPER, DESIRABLE, NECESSARY PARTIES

The locus classicus on the often vexed issue of distinction between ‘proper parties’ ‘desirable parties’ and ‘necessary parties’ is the evergreen case of Green v. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480 at 493 or (1987) 18 NSCC (Pt. 2) 1115. Wherein the supreme court per Oputa JSC (now of blessed memory) held that:- “This now leads one to the consideration of the difference between ‘proper parties’, ‘desirable parties’ and ‘necessary parties.’ Proper parties are those who ought not interested in the plaintiff claim, are made parties for some good reasons e.g where an action is brought to rescind a contract, any person is a proper party to it who was active or concurring in the matters which gave the plaintiff the right to rescind. Desirable parties are those who have an interest or who may be affected by the result. Necessary parties are those who are not only interested in the subject matter of the proceedings but also who in their absence, the proceedings could not be fairly dealt with. In other words, the question to be settled in the action between the existing parties settled unless they are parties to the action instituted by the plaintiff.”

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APPEAL COURT HAS THE POWER TO AMEND PARTIES CAPACITY

See, Lawrence Elendu and others v. Felix Ekwoaba (1998) 12 NWLR (pt. 578) 320 at 331 – 332 where this court, per Onu J.S.C., succinctly put the proposition of law under consideration as follows: – “Once the pleadings and evidence show conclusively a representative capacity and the case was fought throughout in that capacity, the trial court can justifiably properly enter judgment for and/or against the party in that capacity even if an amendment to reflect that capacity had not been applied for and obtained. Moreover, an appeal court has the power in the interest of justice to amend the parties’ capacity in the writ of summons and to enter judgment for them accordingly.”

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