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AN APPEAL DOES NOT ACT AS AN AUTOMATIC STAY OF EXECUTION

Dictum

In Agba v. Okogbue (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.91) 747, I observed at page 753 G-H as follows:- “It must be clearly borne in mind that a stay of execution is never granted as a matter of course because section 18 of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976, enacts that an appeal under part 2 of the Act shall not operate as a stay of execution. The grounds of appeal filed against the judgment must therefore be tested under a microscopic mirror if the application is not a ruse to delay the enjoyment of the fruits of the judgment by the respondent. In so doing, it is wrong to suggest that a court is acting as if it is hearing an appeal because it has pointed out the absurdity of a ground of appeal in considering whether it is prima facie an arguable ground”.

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ONLY FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WHICH ARE INCIDENTAL TO THE MAIN CLAIM CAN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE SUPREME COURT

✓ It is this clear that the jurisdiction to entertain any suit which seeks to enforce the observance of a fundamental right under chapter 4 of the Constitution, including the right of any person not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment guaranteed under section 31(1)(a), of the 1979 Constitution, ties only with the High Court of a State or a Federal High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is appellate and not original. See Attorney-General of Anambra State and others v. Attorney-General of the Federation and others (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 692. However, constitutional issues which pertain only to the breach of a fundamental right in the course of trial or hearing before the lower courts may be raised in an appeal to the Supreme Court. Such issues are those that relate mainly to breach of the right to fair hearing and the right to personal liberty under sections 32 and 33 of the Constitution. Other rights such as right to life and those to private and family life, peaceful assembly and association and freedom of the press can only be enforced through a substantive action in the appropriate High Court and cannot be raised in an appellate court, including the Supreme Court, as being incidental to the proceedings in the lower courts. The appellate courts, inclusive of the Supreme Court, have no original jurisdiction to entertain, determine or pronounce on questions relating to an alleged breach of fundamental rights, especially where the issue involved or the redress invoked is not directly relevant or intrinsic to the determination, on the merit, of the appeal before them. — Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996

✓ The death row phenomenon was only raised obliquely and clearly extrinsically by the appellant in this appeal. The issue raised is whether the appellant’s confinement under sentence of death for an alleged unnecessarily prolonged length of time from the date of his conviction amounts to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to section 31(1)(a) of the Constitution thereby warranting the quashing of his death sentence and substituting the same with life imprisonment. This issue, in my view, is not properly before this court. The jurisdiction of this court to entertain and determine such constitutional question will only arise on appeal after both the High Court and the Court of Appeal have considered and adjudicated on the issue. This is exactly the procedure adopted in the foreign cases that were cited before us. — Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996

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RESPONDENT CANNOT COUCH ISSUE OUTSIDE APPELLANT’S GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Be that as it may, it would therefore not be necessary to go into the second issue formulated for determination in this notice of objection. But I will like to comment and emphasize that a Respondent is not permitted to couch any issue outside the perimeters of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal unless such a Respondent has filed a Respondent’s notice or Cross-Appeal. And where an issue for determination is not related to the grounds of appeal it would be incompetent and it ought to be struck out. See:- Falola v. UBN (2005) 7 NWLR Part 924 Page 405 at 424.

— J.O. Bada, JCA. Conoil v Vitol (2011) – CA/A/213/2010

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INELEGANCE & UNTIDINESS CANNOT RENDER AN APPEAL INCOMPETENT

It is to be seen that it can be said that filing more than a notice of appeal and using more than one could be inelegant, untidy or even confusing, but the law and its practice have had it settled that the inelegance or untidiness are not enough reason for rendering those notices of appeal incompetent or invalid as to do that would be taking technicality too far and not covered by law.

– Peter-Odili, JSC. Tukur v. Uba (2012) – SC.390/2011

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APPEAL AGAINST A NONEXISTENT DECISION

I need only add that an appeal against a phantom or non-existent decision is an abuse of the Court’s process.

– Ejembi Eko, J.S.C. Mekwunye v. Emirates (2018) – SC.488/2014

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A RESPONDENT IS TO DEFEND THE JUDGEMENT ON APPEAL

A Respondent’s role in an Appeal is to defend the judgment on Appeal, and not attack it. On the other hand, it is duty of the Appellant to attack the judgment. After all he filed the Appeal because he believes it is wrong. If a Respondent is not satisfied with the judgment on Appeal he should file a Cross Appeal or Respondents Notice. See New Nig Bank PLC v Egun (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) p.1 and Ibe v Onuorah (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt. 638) p. 340. It must be noted, though that a Cross Appeal and a Respondents Notice cannot co-exist.

— O. Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. Bakari v. Ogundipe (2020) – SC.514/2015

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INTEREST TO BE SHOWN BY AN INTERESTED PERSON TO APPEAL

The interest which will support an application for leave to appeal as interested party must be genuine and legally recognisable interest in respect of a decision which prejudicially affects such a person. And for a person to qualify as a person interested, the applicant must show not only that he is a person having interest in the matter but also that the order or judgement of the Court below which he is seeking leave to appeal against prejudicially affects his interest. In other words, to succeed in the application, the applicants must show that they are persons who are aggrieved or persons against whom decisions have been produced which have wrongfully refused them something or wrongly affected their title to something. See: Nwaogu v. Atuma (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 669) 1022, In re: Ugadu (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 93) 189 at 202 per Karibi Whyte JSC; Usanga and Ors v. Okada and Ors (1964) 1 All NLR 36; Ikonne v. Commissioner of Police (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 36) 473; Dairo v. Gbadamosi In re: Afolabi (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 63) 18 and Ademola v. Sodipo (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 253) 260 261.

— K.B. Aka’ahs JSC. Abdullahi v. Nigerian Army (SC.433/2010(R), 25 MAY 2018)

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