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PENDING DETERMINATION BY THE CCT, THERE IS NO LAW THAT PROHIBITS A LEGAL PRACTITIONER (EVEN IF A PUBLIC SERVANT) FROM RIGHT OF AUDIENCE IN COURT

Dictum

‘The right of audience in court is governed by the Legal Practitioners Act. It is clear from the provisions of sections 2 and 8 of the Legal Practitioners Act that as long as the name of a legal practitioner remains on the roll, it is wrong to deny him right of audience in court. The procedure for removal of names of legal practitioners from the roll or to deny a legal practitioner right of audience in court is clearly set out under the Legal Practitioners Act. It is only for non-payment of the yearly practising fee that a court can deny a legal practitioner whose name is on the roll the right of audience in Court. The Legal Practitioners Act, does not provide for any other circumstances for denying a Legal Practitioner the right of audience in court apart from the direction of the disciplinary committee or by implication from the constitution, as a result of an Order by the Code of Conduct Tribunal. Support for this view can be found in the decision of Benin High Court Presided by Justice Ogbonine, in the case of OLOYO V ALEGBE (1981) 2 NCLR 680, where his Lordship Ogbobine, J. rejected an objection against the appearance of Mr. Alegbe in court (and while leading other lawyers) for himself as the speaker of the Bendel State House of Assembly. Hear his Lordship. “I do not think it is right for any court to disqualify a Legal Practitioner from practicing his profession, except on very sound grounds set out under the Legal Practitioner’s Act and other enabling law and regulations made to that effect”. It is beyond reproach that the primary legislation that disqualifies any person whose name is on the roll from acting as Barrister and or Solicitor officially or in private is sections 8 (2) of the Legal Practitioner’s Act, which deals with payment of practicing fee.’

— S. Kado J. Akazor Gladys & Ors. V. Council of legal education (NICN/ABJ/346/2017, 20th day of March 2019)

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LAWYERS VS POLITICIANS: MASTERS OF THE LAW VS MASTERS OF THE GAME

While lawyers pride themselves as masters of the law, the Politicians are master game planners and they would never give up unless and until either they realize their desire to ‘serve their people’ or the Apex Court in an appeal before them tell the Politicians with finality that it is all over, then they would...

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DUTY THE ADVOCATE OWES THE COURT IS SUPERIOR

While the point is conceded that an advocate should be sensitive and loyal to his client’s case, such sensitivity and loyalty should not exceed required boundaries, particularly the duty the advocate owes the court to present the law correctly, even if it is against his client. – Niki Tobi JSC. Okonkwo v. Cooperative Bank (2003)...

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RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS HAS A FORCE OF LAW

I have to emphasise that the legal status of the rules of professional conduct in the legal profession made by the General Council of the Bar pursuant to Section 1 of the Legal Practitioners Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 is that of a subsidiary legislation since it is made by provision in...

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WHERE WITNESS DEPOSITION IS SIGNED IN A LAWYER’S OFFICE

Under cross-examination, DW3 admitted that he signed his deposition in the chambers of his counsel. However, there is no evidence before me that DW3 did not present himself before the Commissioner for Oaths to be sworn. The name and signature of the Commissioner for Oaths is on the deposition together with the date it was sworn. There is therefore a presumption of regularity in the statement on oath by virtue of Section 168 of the Evidence Act 2011. See Auta v Olaniyi [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt 863) 394.

— O.A. Obaseki-Osaghea, J. Akinsete v Westerngeco (2014) – NICN/LA/516/2012

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APPEAL TO SET ASIDE COST AWARDED AGAINST COUNSEL SHOULD PROVIDE TENABLE REASON

Before I round off, learned senior counsel for the Appellant has urged this court to set aside the costs of #5 million awarded against J.O. Olotu, Esq, counsel who settled the Appellant’s brief at the lower court. Without belabouring the point, let me state clearly that the Appellant has not placed before this court, any...

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THE RATIONALE FOR LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The general principle on which the above statutory provision is grounded is as stated by Holden J in the case of Iris Winifred Horn v. Robert Rickard (1963) NLR 67 at 68 or (1963) 2 All NLR 40 at 41 as follows: “Every client is entitled to feel safe when making disclosures to his solicitor or counsel, and there are cases establishing firmly that counsel cannot be called to give any evidence which would infringe the client’s privilege of secrecy.”

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