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WHERE WITNESS DEPOSITION IS SIGNED IN A LAWYER’S OFFICE

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Under cross-examination, DW3 admitted that he signed his deposition in the chambers of his counsel. However, there is no evidence before me that DW3 did not present himself before the Commissioner for Oaths to be sworn. The name and signature of the Commissioner for Oaths is on the deposition together with the date it was sworn. There is therefore a presumption of regularity in the statement on oath by virtue of Section 168 of the Evidence Act 2011. See Auta v Olaniyi [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt 863) 394.

— O.A. Obaseki-Osaghea, J. Akinsete v Westerngeco (2014) – NICN/LA/516/2012

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APPEAL TO SET ASIDE COST AWARDED AGAINST COUNSEL SHOULD PROVIDE TENABLE REASON

Before I round off, learned senior counsel for the Appellant has urged this court to set aside the costs of #5 million awarded against J.O. Olotu, Esq, counsel who settled the Appellant’s brief at the lower court. Without belabouring the point, let me state clearly that the Appellant has not placed before this court, any...

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DRAWING UNINTENDED CONCLUSIONS FROM JUDGES STATEMENTS

Sir James Bacon, V.C., said in Green’s Case (1874) L.R. 18 Eq C.A. 428:- “In the judgments which Judges pronounce, this is inevitable, that having their minds full, not only of the cases before them, but of all the principles involved in the cases which have been referred to, it very often happens that a Judge, in stating as much as is necessary to decide the case before him, does not express all that may be said upon the subject. That leaves the judgment open sometimes to misconstruction, and enables ingenious advocates by taking out certain passages, to draw conclusions which the Judge never meant to be drawn from the words he used.”

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EFFECT OF COUNSEL STATEMENT FROM THE BAR

It is settled that a statement by a counsel from the Bar has the character of an oath and the court is bound to take this into consideration. See Tika Tore Press Ltd. v. Umar (1968) 2 ALL NLR 107. — Opene JCA. United Bank for Africa (UBA) v. Samuel Igelle Ujor (CA/C/134/99, 20 FEB...

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HOW TO DETERMINE IF AN AFFIDAVIT CONTAINS ARGUMENT OR CONCLUSIONS

Bamaiyi V. State (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt 715) 270 at 289 that “The test – – is to examine each of the paragraphs deposed to in the Affidavit to ascertain whether it is fit only as a submission, which counsel ought to urge upon the Court. If it is, then it is likely to be either an objection or legal argument, which ought to be pressed in oral argument; or it may be conclusion upon an issue, which ought to be left to the discretion of the Court either to make a finding or to reach a decision upon through its process of reasoning. But if it is in the form of evidence, which a witness may be entitled to place before the Court in his testimony on oath and is legally receivable to prove or disprove some fact in dispute, then it qualifies as a statement of facts and circumstances, which may be deposed to in an Affidavit. It, therefore, means that prayers, objections and legal arguments are matters that may be pressed by counsel in Court and are not fit for a witness either in oral testimony or in affidavit evidence; while conclusions should not be drawn by witnesses but left for the Court to reach.”

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SENIOR ADVOCATES SHOULD BE PROFESSIONAL IN ACTS

Learned Senior Advocates, being not only officers of the Court but supposedly noble and worthy knights in the temple of justice should be more silky in the administration of justice, particularly in election or pre-election disputes. I will, at any time, hate to recall the antonyms of the word “silky” in relation to the manner...

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THE RATIONALE FOR LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The general principle on which the above statutory provision is grounded is as stated by Holden J in the case of Iris Winifred Horn v. Robert Rickard (1963) NLR 67 at 68 or (1963) 2 All NLR 40 at 41 as follows: “Every client is entitled to feel safe when making disclosures to his solicitor or counsel, and there are cases establishing firmly that counsel cannot be called to give any evidence which would infringe the client’s privilege of secrecy.”

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