COURT MAY RELY ON AUTHORITIES NOT CITED BY PARTIES

RATIONALE FOR SOMETIMES DEPARTURE FROM THE EVIDENCE ACT BY THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

The resolution of labour/employment disputes is the resolution of disputes where the nature of rights is one in personam. This is an area of law where even the identity card of an employee is the property of the employer and must be surrendered immediately the employment relationship ceases or comes to an end. (Exhibit D5 actually demanded that the claimant should surrender any and all correspondences, materials and equipment provided to her by the defendant without retaining copies in any form whatsoever should the claimant discover them in her possession.) This is an area of law where upon the cessation of employment, an employee who hitherto had access (often very limited access) to the documents of the employer immediately ceases to so have simply because the employee’s internet access had been immediately clogged. See, for instance, Exhibit D5 couched as a non-competition term but which threatens the claimant with prosecution should she as much as divulge any information or document through sending such to herself vide her home address or personal email account. There is even the additional threat to the claimant that UAE law recognizes this behavior as theft punishable by imprisonment – this is even aside from the fact the claimant will forfeit any unpaid salary or commission and be liable to be sued for damages. This is an area of law where an employer expected to certify a document will willingly refuse to so certify the document. God save the employee if the employer is a public institution for which the Evidence Act requires certification before any secondary evidence can be rendered.

— B.B. Kanyip, J. Awogu v TFG Real Estate (2018) – NICN/LA/262/2013

COURT WOULD INTERFERE WHERE POWER IS EXERCISED ARBITRARILY

Congreve v. Home Office (1976) Q.B. 629. In that case, on January 29th 1975 the Home Secretary announced that the colour television licence fee would be increased from £12 to £18 on April 1st and made an order under section 2(1) of the Wireless and Telegraphic Act 1949 to effect the increase. The Home Secretary, in accordance with his administrative practice when an increase in the fee was imminent, prepared special instructions for its agents who included, post office counter clerks, telling them that anyone applying in advance for the renewal of a licence which did not expire until March 31st or later should be told to reapply on or before April 1. On March 26th, the plaintiff, whose current licence expired on March 31, applied to the post office for a £12 licence. The counter clerk did not follow the Home Office Instruction; she issued him with a £12 licence which on its face would not expire until February 29, 1976. Some 24,500 licence holders were likewise issued with overlapping licences before April 1. The Home Office wrote to each holder of a £12 overlapping licence stating that unless the additional £6 was paid the licence taken out in advance of April 1 would be revoked. The plaintiff did not pay and was one of those who received the letter dated 11th November 1975 which threatened that unless the £6 was paid by December 1, the overlapping licence would be revoked and prosecution for the use of colour television proceeded with. The plaintiff issued a special indorsed writ claiming a declaration that the revocation of his licence would be unlawful, invalid, and of no effect. The High Court refused to make the declaration holding that the Home Secretary was entitled to revoke a licence under section 1(4) of the Act of 1949 and that the Home Office letters gave the licence holder open choices. On appeal, the appeal was allowed, the Court of Appeal holding that although the Home Secretary has undoubted discretion under Section 1(4) of the Wireless and Telegraphic Act, 1949 to revoke a licence the discretion was fettered to the extent that the courts would intervene if it was exercised arbitrarily or improperly; and in view of the fact that the licence issued to the plaintiff was a valid licence on the day it was issued and that there was nothing in the Act or the Regulations which prohibited the holding of overlapping licences, it was an improper exercise of the Minister’s discretionary power to propose to revoke a licence validly obtained as a means of levying money which Parliament had given the Executive no authority to demand. Accordingly, the court could and should intervene to declare that the proposed revocation of the plaintiff’s licence was unlawful, invalid, and of no effect.

SECTION 12 OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT ACT PERMITS THE COURT TO BE FLEXIBLE

The very first thing a labour court understands is the difficulty of the employee accessing documents to prove his/her case. It is as a result of all of this that the NIC, as a special Court, is permitted under section 12 of the NIC Act 2006 to be flexible, informal and depart from the Evidence Act if the interest of justice so demands. The NIC realizes that section 12 of its enabling Act is not license to act anyhow. So when it comes to admissibility of especially documentary evidence, the NIC insists that once the issue of authenticity is raised, particular care must be taken to admit only documents that are authentic; and in deserving cases the NIC had refused to admit inappropriate documents even when section 12 of the NIC Act was relied on.

— B.B. Kanyip, J. Awogu v TFG Real Estate (2018) – NICN/LA/262/2013