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INVOKING A COURT UNDER WRONG LAW DOES NOT STOP THE COURT

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But that in order to benefit from the principle, the facts relied upon, must support the correct law to be applied. In other words, where a court has jurisdiction to make an order, the fact that the power of the court, is invoked under a wrong law or rule of court, is no reason, for not making the order or where it is made, it is no reason for setting it aside. See also the cases of Salawu Oke & Ors. v. Musilim Aiyedun & Anor.: (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 23) 548: (1986) 4 SC 61 at 68 and Dr. Maja v. Mr. Costa Samouris (2002) 3 SCNJ 29 at 50, (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt.765) 78.

— I.F. Ogbuagu, JSC. Witt Ltd. v Dale Power (2007) – SC.240/2000

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ROLES OF TRIAL COURT AND THAT OF COURT OF APPEAL

What was the Tribunal’s treatment of the witnesses and their evidence as placed before it? Before embarking on the exercise, I shall, firstly, remind myself of the role of this Court. Trial Courts, as their name suggests, try cases. To them belongs the reception of evidence. (Appellate Courts receive evidence only in exceptional cases and circumstances), the evaluation of such evidence, the issue of credibility or otherwise of witnesses adducing such evidence and the making of findings of fact based most times on the credibility of the witnesses – all these are matters peculiarly and comfortably in the exclusive province of the Court that sees, hears, matches and believes. See Chief Frank Ebba vs. Chief Wani Ogodo (1984) 4 S.C. 84 at Pp. 98/99; (1984) 1 SCNLR 372. It is quite a different matter when it is a matter of what inference or deduction to make from facts either as admitted or as found. In such a situation the Court of Appeal is in as a good a position as or even better than the trial court. See Benmax vs. Austin Motors (1955) A.C. 370 at p. 375.

— Nsofor, JCA. Ugo v Indiamaowei (1999) – CA/PH/EP/97/99

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COURT CANNOT GRANT MORE THAN A PARTY SEEKS FOR

It is revealed by the record and the pleadings filed by the Respondent that the relief sought by the Appellant was not contested at all. Thus, parties are bound by their pleadings. It is elementary that a Court is bound by the reliefs sought. The generosity or charity of a Court of law is confined strictly to the reliefs sought to the extent that a Court of law cannot give a party what he did not claim. That is completely outside our procedural law. The rationale behind this is that a party who comes to Court knows where the shoe pinches him and therefore knows the limits of what he wants. The Court, as an unbiased umpire, cannot claim to know the reliefs better than the party. See Per Tobi, JSC, in EAGLE SUPER PACK (NIGERIA) LTD V. ACB PLC (2006) 19 NWLR (PT 1013) 20 or (2006) LPELR (980) 1 AT 40.

— U.M. Abba Aji, JSC. Cappa v NDIC (2021) – SC.147/2006

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NATIONAL COURTS DO NOT QUALIFY AS INTERNATIONAL COURTS

In Valentine Ayika V. Republic Of Liberia (2011) CCJELR, pg. 237, para 13, the Court held that the Supreme Court of Liberia and for that matter any other Court in Member States does not qualify as international court within the meaning of Article 10 (d)(ii) of the Protocol as amended.

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RATIONALE FOR SOMETIMES DEPARTURE FROM THE EVIDENCE ACT BY THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

The resolution of labour/employment disputes is the resolution of disputes where the nature of rights is one in personam. This is an area of law where even the identity card of an employee is the property of the employer and must be surrendered immediately the employment relationship ceases or comes to an end. (Exhibit D5 actually demanded that the claimant should surrender any and all correspondences, materials and equipment provided to her by the defendant without retaining copies in any form whatsoever should the claimant discover them in her possession.) This is an area of law where upon the cessation of employment, an employee who hitherto had access (often very limited access) to the documents of the employer immediately ceases to so have simply because the employee’s internet access had been immediately clogged. See, for instance, Exhibit D5 couched as a non-competition term but which threatens the claimant with prosecution should she as much as divulge any information or document through sending such to herself vide her home address or personal email account. There is even the additional threat to the claimant that UAE law recognizes this behavior as theft punishable by imprisonment – this is even aside from the fact the claimant will forfeit any unpaid salary or commission and be liable to be sued for damages. This is an area of law where an employer expected to certify a document will willingly refuse to so certify the document. God save the employee if the employer is a public institution for which the Evidence Act requires certification before any secondary evidence can be rendered.

— B.B. Kanyip, J. Awogu v TFG Real Estate (2018) – NICN/LA/262/2013

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COURT WOULD INTERFERE WHERE POWER IS EXERCISED ARBITRARILY

Congreve v. Home Office (1976) Q.B. 629. In that case, on January 29th 1975 the Home Secretary announced that the colour television licence fee would be increased from £12 to £18 on April 1st and made an order under section 2(1) of the Wireless and Telegraphic Act 1949 to effect the increase. The Home Secretary, in accordance with his administrative practice when an increase in the fee was imminent, prepared special instructions for its agents who included, post office counter clerks, telling them that anyone applying in advance for the renewal of a licence which did not expire until March 31st or later should be told to reapply on or before April 1. On March 26th, the plaintiff, whose current licence expired on March 31, applied to the post office for a £12 licence. The counter clerk did not follow the Home Office Instruction; she issued him with a £12 licence which on its face would not expire until February 29, 1976. Some 24,500 licence holders were likewise issued with overlapping licences before April 1. The Home Office wrote to each holder of a £12 overlapping licence stating that unless the additional £6 was paid the licence taken out in advance of April 1 would be revoked. The plaintiff did not pay and was one of those who received the letter dated 11th November 1975 which threatened that unless the £6 was paid by December 1, the overlapping licence would be revoked and prosecution for the use of colour television proceeded with. The plaintiff issued a special indorsed writ claiming a declaration that the revocation of his licence would be unlawful, invalid, and of no effect. The High Court refused to make the declaration holding that the Home Secretary was entitled to revoke a licence under section 1(4) of the Act of 1949 and that the Home Office letters gave the licence holder open choices. On appeal, the appeal was allowed, the Court of Appeal holding that although the Home Secretary has undoubted discretion under Section 1(4) of the Wireless and Telegraphic Act, 1949 to revoke a licence the discretion was fettered to the extent that the courts would intervene if it was exercised arbitrarily or improperly; and in view of the fact that the licence issued to the plaintiff was a valid licence on the day it was issued and that there was nothing in the Act or the Regulations which prohibited the holding of overlapping licences, it was an improper exercise of the Minister’s discretionary power to propose to revoke a licence validly obtained as a means of levying money which Parliament had given the Executive no authority to demand. Accordingly, the court could and should intervene to declare that the proposed revocation of the plaintiff’s licence was unlawful, invalid, and of no effect.

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IT IS NOT THE BUSINESS OF THE COURT TO NOMINATE PARTIES FOR ELECTION

It is not the business of any Court to select or nominate candidates for any political party for election. The nomination of a candidate to contest an election is the sole responsibility of the political party concerned. The Courts do not have jurisdiction to decide who should be sponsored by a political party as a candidate in an election. See Onuoha v Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244, Dalhatu v Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt 843) 310, Shinkafi & Anor v Yari & Ors (2016) LPELR – 26050 (SC) page 57 paragraphs A – D, Olofu & Ors v Itodo & Anor (2010) 18 NWLR (pt 1225) 545. The above position has been the law and has not changed because issue of selection and/or nomination of a candidate for an election is strictly within the domestic jurisdiction or power of political parties.

— J.I. Okoro, JSC. Uba v. Ozigbo, INEC, PDP (SC.CV/772/2021, October 21, 2021)

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