BECAUSE AN EMPLOYER IS A CREATION OF STATUTE DOES NOT MEAN EMPLOYEE IS A CREATION OF STATUTE

REPUDIATION BY ONE PARTY DOES NOT TERMINATE THE CONTRACT EXCEPT WHERE ACCEPTED

In Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. (1949) AC. 356, 361 Viscount Simon L.C. said, “But repudiation by one party standing alone does not terminate the contract. It takes two to end it, by repudiation on the one side, and acceptance of the repudiation on the other.” The proposition is founded on the elementary principles of the formation and discharge of contractual obligations. Where there is a unilateral repudiation of a contract, this is treated as an officer by the guilty part to the innocent party of the termination of the contract. It is the acceptance of the officer by the innocent party which acts as a discharge of the contract. – See Hochster H v. De La Tour (1853) 2 F& B. 678; Johnstone v. Milling (1886) 16 QBD 460. It is then open to the innocent party to sue only for damages since by his acceptance of the repudiation the contract comes to an end. Hence where the innocent party refuses to accept the repudiation the contract remains in existence.

EQUAL SALARY FOR EQUAL WORK CANNOT BE APPLIED WHERE PAYMENT SOURCES ARE DIFFERENT

Para. 30: “Indeed, the principle of equality of salary, which implies the elimination of salary discrimination based on whatever criteria that may relate to the person of the salaried worker, does not apply to the diversity of the sources of remuneration. Here, the salaries proposed by the Defendants are to be paid, not from the funds of the Commonwealth, but from the budget of the Defendants themselves. This was what was established as a principle, by Court of Justice of the European Union, in the 17th September 2002 Judgment on Lawrence and Regent Office Care Ltd. & Others (Report 1-07325-C.C.E.E.) when it stated that “the principle of equal work, equal salary, does not apply when the observed disparities in remuneration cannot be attributed to a single source’.”

— Essien v. The Gambia (2007) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/05/07

NOTICE FOR DISMISSAL MUST BE READ INTO CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT

The common law enjoins that even where the contract of employment does not stipulate a notice period, one that is reasonable must be read into the contract of employment. See Akumechiel v. BCC Ltd[1997] (Pt.484) 695 at 703 and Emuwa v. Consolidated Discounts Ltd [2000] LPELR-6871(CA);[2001] 2 NWLR (Pt.697)424. The Supreme Court in Olayinka Kusamotu v. Wemabod Estate Ltd [1976] LPELR-1720(SC); [1976] 9-10 SC (Reprint) 254 stated the law thus: The law is that, generally, the length of notice required for termination of contracts of employment depends on the intention of the parties as can or may be gathered from their contract and in the absence of any express provision, the courts will always imply a term that the employment may be terminated by a reasonable notice (from either of the parties); and even where (as clearly provided in clause 21(c) of “Exhibit “B” for persons still under probation) the employer has power to terminate the contract in his absolute discretion, the law enjoins the employer to give reasonable notice to the employee (see Re-African Association and Allen (1910) 1 KB 396).

— B.B. Kanyip, J. Awogu v TFG Real Estate (2018) – NICN/LA/262/2013 para. 60.