Why must the seven landlords who were the plaintiffs in the case need the occupation of the single ground floor flat before they can recover possession of the flat. If that is the law, it is a law devoid of human face, human reason and common sense. I shall not project such a law.
– Ubaezonu JCA. Coker v. Adetayo (1992)
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An act of a new tenancy is conscious and specific one which must be a subject of bilateral conduct on the part of the landlord and tenant. As a matter of law, the parties must clearly and unequivocally express their willingness to enter into the new tenancy at the termination of the old one. As a specific act emanating from the landlord and the tenant, it cannot be a subject of guess or speculation. An agreement or contract is a bilateral affair which needs the ad idem of the parties. Therefore where parties are not ad idem, the court will find as a matter of law that an agreement or contract was not duly made between the parties.
– Tobi JSC. Odutola v. Papersack (2007)
The use of the summary procedure for possession under the provisions of order 50 of the High Court Rules is limited only to virtually uncontested cases for which default of summary judgment can be obtained or in clear cases where there is no issue or question to try, i.e. where there is no reasonable doubt as to claim of the claimant to recover possession of the land or as to the wrongful occupation of the land without licence or consent and without any right, title or interest thereto – Henderson V. Law (1984) 17 HLR 237. It is only applicable in the clearest of cases where the title of the claimant to the land is not in dispute and has been confirmed. Where the existence of a serious dispute is apparent, this procedure should not be used – Adedipe v. Theophilus (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt 951) 250. In Madam Sinotu Osinowo V. Persons Named Unknown (1976) 10 CCHCJ 2551, Cole J, speaking of order 113 of the English Rules, stated at page 2555 thus: “This Order, in my view, is meant only to be employed in uncontested cases, where there is no issue or questions to be tried, and there is no reasonable doubt to the claim of the plaintiff to recover possession of the land, as example where the person wrongfully occupying the land cannot claim any right, title or interest in the land whatsoever.”
– Abiru, JCA. Okoli v. Gaya (2014)
I think the most devastating evidence to the case of the respondent is that the 2nd respondent handed over the keys of the premises to him and put him in possession. Payment of purchase price coupled with delivery of possession can oust any subsequent conveyance of the legal estate to any subsequent purchaser. A diligent purchaser will certainly find out that there is someone in possession and be served with notice of his interest.
— Obaseki, JSC. Osagie v. Oyeyinka & Anor. (1987) – SC.194/1985
This is yet another misconception of the legal issue raised in the case. Once a Plaintiff claims that a Defendant is his customary tenant on the land in dispute and claims relief based thereon, he admits unequivocally that the Defendant is in exclusive possession of the land in dispute. It would be a contradiction in terms therefore for a Plaintiff whose claim is founded on customary tenancy to also assert that he is in exclusive possession.
— F.F. Tabai JSC. Tijani Dada v Jacob Bankole (2008) – S.C. 40/2003
Firstly, the submission that the Nigeria Police Force is an integral part of ‘the Federal Executive’ with no capacity to own or possess land independently of the Federal Government is unnecessary. But more importantly, the assumption ignores the fact that the Nigeria Police Force is a creation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in much the same way as other organs of the Federal Government, such as the legislature, executive the judiciary and the armed forces of the federation, each of which, though an arm of the Government of the Federation, nonetheless, has an independent capacity and rights that do not depend on the executive arm, including the right to possess land. See sections 4 and 43; 5 and 122; 6 and part I of chapter VII; sections 194 and 197 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
– Olagunju JCA. Ofodile v. COP (2000)
It was the appellants’ contention that the claims of the parties were based on the Land Use Act. 1975. That was not disputed as the suit was filed in the trial High Court in 1981. On that date the Land Use Act had become applicable to all land in Imo State of Nigeria and by virtue of section 1 of the Act, same has been vested in the Governor of that State on that date. This provision takes away the freehold title vested in individuals or communities but not the customary right of use and control of the land. Section 36(1) does not enlarge the right of a customary tenant to any piece of land in non-urban area which was, at the commencement of the Act in his possession and occupation. A customary tenant remains so and is subject to the conditions attached to the customary tenancy.
— Wali JSC. Onwuka & Ors. V. Ediala & Anor. (SC.18/1987, 20 January 1989)
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