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HOW COURT SHOULD EVALUATE EVIDENCE – CONCEPT OF FACT FINDING

Dictum

The law has saddled a trial Court, like the lower Court herein, with the primary duty to evaluate relevant and material evidence, both oral and documentary, after hearing and watching the demeanour of witnesses called by the parties in any proceedings having regard to their pleadings. To discharge that bounden duty, a trial Court must show how and why it arrived at its findings of fact and final determination of the issues before it. It has to be cautious and understand the distinction between summary or restatement of evidence and evaluation of evidence which means assessment of evidence and giving them probative value. It appraises evidence by constructing an imaginary scale of justice and putting the evidence of the parties on the two different pans of the scale. Then, it weighs them to determine which is heavier, not in terms of quantity, but quality of the testimonies, see Mogaji v. Odofin (supra); Olagunju v. Adesoye (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 225; Oyewole v. Akande (supra); Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 135; Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 522; Ndulue v. Ojiakor (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 311.

— O.F. Ogbuinya, JCA. Impact Solutions v. International Breweries (2018) – CA/AK/122/2016

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NATIVE CUSTOM IS A QUESTION OF FACT

Native law and custom being a question of fact in an action in the High Court, it is true that the findings in these cases are not binding as precedents, and it is also true, as has been pointed out by Mr Oseni on behalf of the respondents, that however learned and experienced the Judges whose judgments are relied on may have been, they could only act on the evidence which the parties in the cases concerned chose to call before them.

Odunsi Lasisi Ajibola v. Aminu Akindele Ajani Ojora (1961)

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ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES WILL COURT INTERFERE IN FINDINGS OF FACT

When the appeal is predicated on the question of facts, concurrently found by the Courts below, the attitude of this Court is well settled. This Court will not interfere with those findings of facts except when appellant shows special or exceptional circumstances justifying the interference. Such special or exceptional circumstances include the showing either that there was miscarriage of justice; or a serious violation of some principles of substantive or procedural law; or that the findings of fact are perverse, in the sense that they do not at all flow from the totality of the evidence at the trial and or that the findings are unreasonable. See ENANG v. ADU (1981) 11-12 SC 25 at 42; LOKOYI v. OLOJO (1983) 8 SC 61 at 73; OJOMU v. AJAO (1983) 9 SC 22 at 53; IBODO v. ENAROFIA (1980) 5-7 SC 42; AKAYEPE v. AKAYEPE (2009) 11 NWLR (pt. 1152) 217 SC. Notwithstanding this stance of this Court, this Court is still being perpetually inundated by appeals predicated solely on concurrent findings of facts by Courts below to this Court. The connivance of legal practitioners in this regard cannot be ruled out; particularly by those desperately wanting to make up their qualifying appearances in this Court to enable them apply for the award of the privilege of Senior Advocate of Nigeria. The sooner the balance between this privilege and the congestion in, or the work load of, this Court was struck the better for this Court and those seeking to be conferred the privilege. I say no more for now.

— E. Eko, JSC. Galadima v. State (2017) – SC.70/2013

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APPEAL: FINDING NOT APPEALED IS BINDING ON PARTY

It is trite law that in an appeal against a judgment, a party who did not appeal against a finding, holding or decision, accepts it as correct, conclusive and binding and cannot argue against it.

– Agim JSC. Pillars v. William (2021)

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EXCEPT FINDINGS OF FACT ARE PERVERSE, APPEAL COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE IN SUCH FINDINGS

Before I turn to the treatment of the above findings of fact by the Court of Appeal, I think I need re-emphasize that where facts in issue, whether in a criminal or civil proceedings are accepted or believed by the trial court and no question of misdirection arises, an appellate court, will not ordinarily interfere with such findings of fact made by a trial Judge which are supported by evidence simply because there is some other evidence in contradiction of the finding or that if the same facts were before the appellate court, it would not have come to the same decision as the trial Judge. See: Ike v. Ugboaja (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.301) 539;Odofin v. Ayoola, supra; Ogbero Egri v. Uperi (1974) 1 NMLR 22; Ogundulu & Ors. v. Phillips & Ors. (1973) NMLR 267 etc. This, as already stated, is because findings of fact made by a trial court are matters peculiarly within its exclusive jurisdiction and they are presumed to be correct unless and until an appellant satisfactorily proves that they are wrong. Such trial courts saw the witnesses and heard them testify and unless the findings are perverse or unsupported by credible evidence, the Court of Appeal will not interfere with them. See: Adelumola v. The State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.73) 683. An appellate court may however interfere with such findings in circumstances such as where the trial court did not make a proper use of the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses at the trial or where it drew wrong conclusions from accepted credible evidence or took an erroneous view of the evidence adduced before it or its findings of fact are perverse in the sense that they did not flow from the evidence accepted by it. See: Okpiri v. Jonah (1961) 1SCNLR 174; (1961) 1 All NLR 102 at 104-5; Maja v. Stocco (1968) 1 All NLR 141 at 149; Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291 at 295-6 and 326-9.

— Iguh, JSC. Oguonzee v State (1998) – SC.131/97

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WHEN FINDING OF FACT IS SAID TO BE PERVERSE

A finding of fact is said to be perverse – (a) Where it runs counter to the evidence and pleadings. (b) Where it has been shown that the trial court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account. (c) Where the trial court shuts its eyes to the obvious. (d) When the decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. State v. Agie (2000) 11 NWLR pt. 678 pg. 434 Atolagbe v. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR pt.2 pg. 360 Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR pt. 80 pg.1. Akinloye v. Eyiyola (1968) NWLR 92.

— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) – SC.231/2006

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TWO TYPES OF FINDING OF FACTS – WHEN APPEAL COURT CAN INTERFERE

In a trial, there are generally two sets of findings of facts: A finding of fact may be based on the credibility of witnesses or may be informed from other facts proved before the trial court. Where a witness gives direct evidence that is the evidence of the facts in issue as seen, heard or perceived by any other sense by him. (Section 77 of the Evidence Act). The finding of the trial court on such evidence depends on whether or not it believes that witness (credibility of the witness). Such a finding on such evidence is a primary finding of fact, i.e. the way the witness testifies, his demeanor in the box tells much of his credibility. The trial court that saw and heard the witness is in the best position to assess his credibility and make findings of primary facts. But, where on the other hand, other facts are put in evidence from which the facts in issue can be inferred, or where a witness gave circumstantial evidence, the finding of the trial court on the facts in issue depends on inference. This is a secondary finding of fact as it is not based on the credibility of the witness but on logical process of inference. In the former’s case, i.e. primary findings of fact, an appeal court should always be loathe in interfering with such a finding as it did not have the privilege of seeing, hearing or observing the demeanour of the witness. There are several decided authorities on this: Ebba v. Ogodo & Anor (1984) 4 SC 75; Akintola v. Olowa (1962) 1 All NLR 224; Fatoyinbo v. Williams (1956) 1 FSC 87; Egri v. Uperi (1974) 1 NMLR 22; just to mention a few. In the latter’s case, i.e. where findings of fact are secondary, i.e. drawn from inferences, an appeal court is in as good position as a court of trial to do this. It can differ from the trial court. See: Akpopuma V. Nzeka (1983) 2 SCNLR 1.

— T. Muhammad, JSC. VAB Petroleum v. Momah (2013) – SC.99/2004

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