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TWO TYPES OF FINDING OF FACTS – WHEN APPEAL COURT CAN INTERFERE

Dictum

In a trial, there are generally two sets of findings of facts: A finding of fact may be based on the credibility of witnesses or may be informed from other facts proved before the trial court. Where a witness gives direct evidence that is the evidence of the facts in issue as seen, heard or perceived by any other sense by him. (Section 77 of the Evidence Act). The finding of the trial court on such evidence depends on whether or not it believes that witness (credibility of the witness). Such a finding on such evidence is a primary finding of fact, i.e. the way the witness testifies, his demeanor in the box tells much of his credibility. The trial court that saw and heard the witness is in the best position to assess his credibility and make findings of primary facts. But, where on the other hand, other facts are put in evidence from which the facts in issue can be inferred, or where a witness gave circumstantial evidence, the finding of the trial court on the facts in issue depends on inference. This is a secondary finding of fact as it is not based on the credibility of the witness but on logical process of inference. In the former’s case, i.e. primary findings of fact, an appeal court should always be loathe in interfering with such a finding as it did not have the privilege of seeing, hearing or observing the demeanour of the witness. There are several decided authorities on this: Ebba v. Ogodo & Anor (1984) 4 SC 75; Akintola v. Olowa (1962) 1 All NLR 224; Fatoyinbo v. Williams (1956) 1 FSC 87; Egri v. Uperi (1974) 1 NMLR 22; just to mention a few. In the latter’s case, i.e. where findings of fact are secondary, i.e. drawn from inferences, an appeal court is in as good position as a court of trial to do this. It can differ from the trial court. See: Akpopuma V. Nzeka (1983) 2 SCNLR 1.

— T. Muhammad, JSC. VAB Petroleum v. Momah (2013) – SC.99/2004

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A COMPLAINT IS CHARACTERISED BY THE CASE FACTS SUBMITTED – (African Court)

The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on what qualifies as a complaint is defined as the purpose or legal basis of the claim, The complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on.

– CHACHA v. THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (003/2012) [2014] AFCHPR 48 para 120

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WHERE FACTS PROPERLY APPRAISED, COURT OF APPEAL SHOULD NOT SUBSTITUTE VIEWS FOR TRIAL COURT

It is settled that where a court of trial unquestionably evaluates the evidence and appraises the facts it is not the business of a Court of Appeal to substitute its own views for the trial court. It is equally settled that a Court of Appeal should not easily disturb the findings of fact of a trial Judge who had the singular opportunity of listening to the witnesses and watching their performance although such findings of fact or the inferences drawn from them may be questioned in certain circumstances (See for example Akinola v. Fatoyimbo Oluwo & 0rs ( 1962) 1 SCNLR 352: (1962) 1 All NLR 244: Fabumiyi & 0rs. V. Obaje & Anor (1968) NMLR 242; Fatoyinbo Williams (1956) SCNLR 274: (1956) 1 FSC 87.

— Kutigi, JSC. Awaogbo & Ors. v. Eze (1995) – SC.69/1991

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APPELLATE COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE IN FINDING OF FACT

In concluding this Issue, it is now firmly established, that where the question involved are purely those of fact, an Appellate Court, will not interfere, unless the decision of the trial Judge, is shown to be perverse and not the result of a proper exercise of judicial discretion (to believe or disbelieve witnesses) or that there is no evidence at all to support a particular crucial finding or that the trial court made wrong deductions or drew wrong inferences from admitted or established facts. See Ubani & 2 ore, v. The State (2003) 12 SCNJ 111 @ 727-728.

— Ogbuagu, JSC. Moses v State [2006] – S.C.308/2002

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FINDING OF FACT WILL BE DISTURBED WHEN PERVERSE

It is elementary law that needs no citation of any authority that an appellate court shall not disturb any finding of fact unless the finding is found to be perverse or cannot be justified having regard to the pleadings and the evidence led.

– Musdapher, JSC. Atta v. Ezeanah (2000)

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WRONGFUL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION MUST BE SHOWED FOR COURT TO INTERFERE IN FINDING OF FACT

On the other side which is that of the respondents is that this Court should affirm the Ruling of the Court of Appeal and dismiss the appeal as frivolous and unmeritorious. This appeal throws up very interesting facets as one is mindful of the fact that an appellate Court will not easily interfere with the exercise of discretion by a lower Court such as presented in the case in hand. To interfere, this Court has to be satisfied from the showing of materials that a wrongful exercise of that discretion has been made such as where the Court below acted under a misconception of the law or under a misapplication of fact such that it is seen that the lower Court gave weight to irrelevant or unproved matters or it omitted to take into account issues that are relevant or where it exercised or failed to exercise the discretion on wrong or insufficient materials and so it behoves the appellate Court the duty in the interest of justice to disturb that earlier decision. I rely on Enekebe v Enekebe (1964) 1 All NLR 102 at 106; Demuren v Asuni (1967) All NLR 94 at 101; Mobil Oil v Federal Board of Inland Revenue (1977) 3 SC 97 at 141; Sonekan v Smith (1967) 1 All NLR 329; Solanke v Ajibola (1968)1 ALL NLR 46 at 52.

— M.P. Odili, JSC. County Dev. Co. v Hon. Min. Env. Housing Urban Dev. (2019) – SC.239/2011

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INFERENCE NOT FRESH POINT OF LAW

An appellate court can draw conclusion or make inference from the record before it. Conclusion or inference borne out of/from the record cannot be branded as raising fresh point of law. A fresh point of law is a new point of law which was not raised by any of the parties at the trial of the case. A point of law which was raised by the parties at the trial cannot be a fresh point of law.

– Niki Tobi JSC. Gbadamosi v. Dairo (2007)

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