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FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT STAND ABOVE THE ORDINARY LAW OF THE LAND

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I will reiterate that a fundamental right is a right guaranteed in the Nigerian Constitution. It is a right which every citizen is entitled to by reason of being a human being unless when a person suffers any of the disabilities set out in the Constitution. ODOGU V. A.G. FEDERATION (2000) 2 HRLRA 82 AT 102; FAJEMIROKUN V. COMM. BANK (NIG.) LTD. (2009) 21 WRN 1. Fundamental rights stand above the ordinary laws of the land. RANSOME KUTI V. A.G. FEDERATION (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 6) 211. These rights are so jealously guarded that no citizen can be shut out from seeking redress when his fundamental right has been allegedly breached unless he suffers any constitutional disability like when he is sentenced to flogging or hard labour by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

— U. Onyemenam, JCA. Iheme v Chief of Defence Staff (2018) – CA/J/264/2017

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human rights

WHAT IS LIBERTY OF THE PERSON? – (ECOWAS Court)

The General Comment No 35 of the Human Right Committee on Art 9 of the Convention on the right to liberty and security of persons (which is pari material to Art 6 of the Charter) states that as follows; . “Liberty of person concerns freedom from confinement of the body, Security of person concerns freedom from injury to the body and the mind, or bodily and mental integrity. The right to security of person protects individuals against intentional infliction of bodily or mental injury, regardless of whether the victim is detained or non-detained.”

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TO USE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS RULES, THE MAIN CLAIM MUST BE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

It is also settled law that for a matter to be instituted under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 to enforce the constitutionally guaranteed rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, the enforcement of such right(s) must be the main/substantive claim before the Court – not ancillary.

— Onnoghen, CJN. Nwachukwu v Nwachukwu (2018) – SC.601/2013

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MERE ALLEGATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION TRIGGERS THE COURT JURISDICTION

Para. 27: “This Court has held in many of its flourishing jurisprudence that mere allegation of violation of human rights is sufficient to trigger the jurisdiction of this Court and the Court will assume jurisdiction without necessarily examining the veracity of the allegation. In Kareem Meissa Wade v. Republic of Senegal, ECW/CCJ/JUD/19/13, at pg. 259 Para. 95 (3), this court held that: “Nevertheless, that simply invoking human rights violation in a case suffices to establish the jurisdiction of the Court over that case.” Similarly, In BAKARE SARRE V MALI (2011) CCJELR pg. 57, the court stressed that: “Once human rights violations which involves international or community obligations of a member state is alleged, it will exercise its jurisdiction over the case.” This position is further supported by the decision of the Court in SERAP V. FRN & 4 ORS, (2014) ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/14 where this court held that: “the mere allegation that there has been a violation of human rights in the territory of a member state is sufficient prima facie to justify the jurisdiction of this court on the dispute, surely without any prejudice to the substance and merits of the complaint which has to be determined only after the parties have been given the opportunity to present their case, with full guarantees of fair trial.” See also the case of His Excellency Vice-President Alhaji Samuel Sam-Sumana v. Republic of Sierra Leone.-SUIT NO: ECW/CCJ/APP/38/16 and JUD NO: ECW/CCJ/JUD/19/17 (At page 14 of the judgment) and Mamadou Tandja (2010) CCJELR pg. 109 & Bakare Sarre & 28 Ors v. Mali (2011) (CCJELR) pg. 57.”

— Boley v Liberia & Ors. (2019) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/24/19

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SUBJECTION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE – EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT

Under section 30(1) of the Constitution, therefore, the right to life, although fully guaranteed is nevertheless subject to the execution of a death sentence of a court of law in respect of a criminal offence of which one has been found guilty in Nigeria. The qualifying word, save, used in section 30(1) seems to me to be the unmistakable key to the construction of that provision. In my view it is plain that the 1979 Constitution can by no stretch of the imagination be said to have proscribed or outlawed the death penalty. On the contrary, section 30(1) of the Constitution permits it in the clearest possible terms, so long as it is inflicted pursuant to the sentence of a court of law in Nigeria in a criminal offence. In other words, section 30(1) of the Constitution recognises the death penalty as a form of punishment but only on the condition that it is in execution of the sentence of a court of law in a criminal offence of which an accused person has been found guilty in Nigeria. The plain meaning of this section of the Constitution cannot be derogated from in the absence of any ambiguity whatsoever. It simply guarantees and protects the right to life. But it also recognises deprivation of life so long as it is pursuant to the execution of the sentence of a court in a criminal offence of which the accused has been found guilty in Nigeria.

— Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996

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ARTICLE 19 – 24 AFRICAN CHARTER ARE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL

Para. 24: In Kemi Penheiro SAN V. Republic of Ghana, ECW/CCJ/JUD/11/12 (2012) (unreported), where the Applicant alleged the violation of Articles 20 and 22 of the African Charter, the Court stressed that it is opinio juris communis that the rights referred to in Articles 19-24 of the African Charter are rights of (all) “peoples” in contrast to the rights of “every individual”, “every human being”, or “every citizen” proclaimed in Article 2-17.

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A FAMILY AS A UNIT CANNOT COMMENCE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS APPLICATION

In the case of OKECHUKWU v ETUKOKWU (1998) 8 NWLR 23 (2018) LPELR 45183 (CA) PART 562, PAGE 511, it was held amongst others per Niki Tobi, JCA (as he then was) that: “As I indicated above, the Umunwanne family is the centre of the whole matter. A family as a unit cannot commence an action on infringement or contravention of Fundamental Rights. To be specific, no Nigeria family or any foreign family has the locus to commence action under Chapter IV of the Constitution or by virtue of the 1979 Rules. The provisions of Chapter 4 cover individuals and not a group or collection of individuals. The expression ‘every individual’, ‘every person’, ‘any person’, ‘every citizen’ are so clear that a family unit is never anticipated or contemplated”.

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