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WHERE DEATH SENTENCE IS THE PUNISHMENT, CONFESSIONAL STATEMENTS SHOULD APPLY WITH THE LEGAL PROCEDURE

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The learned trial judge having admitted that the prosecution still bears the burden to call evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant made a voluntary confession in a trial within trial, went ahead to shift the burden of proof to the Appellant (Defendant at the trial Court). Evidence of a video recording or the presence of a legal practitioner would have been conclusive proof that the confessional statement was obtained voluntarily. It makes it imperative in the circumstances, particularly in cases of armed robbery where a death sentence is the sanction on conviction, that confessional statements should be taken according to the provisions of the law. Even where the prosecution has ignored the provision of the law as sacrosanct as this, the trial judge should have brought it up suo motu. The judge cannot pick and choose which extant law to enforce.

— H.M. Ogunwumiju, JSC. Friday Charles v. The State of Lagos (SC.CR/503/2020, Friday March 31 2023)

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confessional statement, death penalty

CASES IN SUPPORT OF DEATH PENALTY

This cases were made reference to in Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996:

✓ In Mbushuu and another v. The Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 142 of 1994; 30th January, 1995), the Tanzanian Court of Appeal held that although the death –penalty is a form of “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,” it affirmed that it was nonetheless constitutionally permissible, having regard to the qualified nature of the right to life as entrenched in the Tanzanian Constitution. The right to life in their Constitution was neither absolute nor unqualified. It was, as in section 30(1) of our Constitution, qualified.

✓ In the Zimbabwean Supreme Court case of Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, Zimbabwe and other (1993) (4) SA 239 in which Gubbay, C.J. delivering the judgment of the court with which Me Nally, Korsah, Ebrahim and Muchechetere JJ.A were in full agreement impliedly adopted the position that the right to life under their Constitution was qualified and thus upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty in Zimbabwe. Said the learned Chief Justice: “It was not sought, nor could it reasonably be, to overturn the death sentences on the ground that they were unlawfully imposed. The judgments of this court dismissing the appeals of the condemned prisoners cannot be disturbed. They are final. And the constitutionality of the death penalty, per se, as well as the mode of its execution by hanging, are also not susceptible of attack.”
However, on the crucial issue of whether even though the death sentences had been properly passed, supervening events had not been established to constitute the execution of the convicts inhuman or degrading treatment, in violation of section 15(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution on account of prolonged and excessive delay, the court, on the peculiar facts of the case resolved the same in favour of the convicts.

✓ In Bacan Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) (2) SCR 583, the constitutionality of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution came into question before the Supreme Court of India. In a well considered judgment, that court ruled, and quite rightly in my view, that the right to life entrenched in their Constitution was qualified and that in the circumstance, the death penalty was constitutionally valid. In conclusion, the court observed: “By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the death penalty either per se or because of its execution by hanging constitutes an unreasonable, cruel or unusual punishment prohibited by the Constitution.”

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RETRACTED CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT MUST MEET FOLLOWING TESTS

My Lords, the confessional statement of the Appellant was retracted by him in the course of the trial and the position of the law as reiterated by this Court in several cases is that the statement must meet the probability test set out in R. v. Sykes (1913) 18 CR All Pg. 233: a) Whether there is anything outside it to show the statement is true, b) Whether it is corroborated, c) Whether the statement made in it of fact so far as they can be tested are true, d) Whether the accused had the opportunity of committing the offence, e) Whether it is consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and have been proved.

– Ogunwumiju JSC. Junaidu v. State (2021)

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CONVICTION CAN BE FOUNDED ON RETRACTED CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

The law is trite that a conviction can be found on a retracted confessional statement of an accused person once it is voluntary, positive and true. Where an accused person objects to the tendering of his confessional statement on the ground that he did not make it, the confession will be admitted and the question as to whether he made it or not will be decided at the end of the trial, since the issue of its voluntariness does not arise for consideration. See: Dibia v. State (2017) LPELR 48453 SC.

— Abdu Aboki, JSC. Abdulrahim Usman v. The State (SC.61C/2019, Friday May 06, 2022)

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DENIAL OF CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT DOES NOT MAKE THE CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT INADMISSIBLE

Against this background, it is important to note that the Appellant, in the course of his evidence-in-chief before the lower Court, retracted from the said Exhibits A and A1, thus prompting the lower Court into deciding that the entire evidence of the Appellant was at that stage unreliable and therefore discountenanced same; but the settled position of the law is that a retraction of a confession does not ipso facto render the confession inadmissible. See the old case of R. v. JOHN AGAGARIGA ITULE (1961) 1 ANLR 402 (FSC) where the Supreme Court per BRETT, Ag CJF held thus; “A confession does not become inadmissible merely because the accused person denies having made it and in this respect a confession contained in a statement made to the Police by a person under arrest is not to be treated different from any other confession. The fact that the Appellant took the earliest opportunity to deny having made the statement may lend weight to his denial. See R v. SAPELE and ANOR (1952) 2 FSC 74 but it is not in itself a reason for ignoring the statement.” … It would be further recalled that the Appellant took the earliest opportunity when the statement was offered in evidence to deny having made it. But the position remains in law, that a mere denial without more, even at the earliest opportunity, cannot, on the bare facts of the case, lend any iota of weight to the denial. Apart from the fact that the denial is a bare statement bereft of any supporting facts, it is by and large, standing only on the ipsi dexit of the Appellant. To make matters rather worse and as revealed by the printed records in this case, the said statements were not even challenged on grounds of involuntariness and the learned trial Court in its Ruling on the objection raised by the Appellant rightly declined the invitation to conduct a trial within trial. Against this backdrop, the question of the voluntariness of the statements, not having been raised or challenged at the trial, this Court therefore holds that the prosecution proved affirmatively that Exhibits A and A1 were voluntary confessional statements of the Appellant. Regardless of this position, the usual thing in all criminal trials is that the burden of proving affirmatively beyond doubt that the confession was made voluntarily is always on the prosecution, which this prosecution succeeded in doing as expected in this case. See the cases of JOSHUA ADEKANBI v. A-G WESTERN NIGERIA (1961) All NLR 47; R v. MATON PRIESTLY (1966) 50 CR APP. R 183 at 188; ISIAKA AUTA v. THE STATE (1975) NNLR 60 at 65 SC on the issue.

— F.O. Oho, JCA. Nasiru v State (2016) – CA/S/78C/2015

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CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT CONSTITUTES EVIDENCE AGAINST THE MAKER ALONE

In a plethora of decisions, this court has held that a confessional statement constitutes evidence against the maker alone and cannot be used as evidence against a co-accused unless the co-accused adopts it by word or conduct. The rationale for this is clear – noone can confess to a crime on behalf of another. See: Ajaegbo v. The State (2018) LPELR – 44531 (SC) @ 44 – 45 C – D; (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1631) 484; Kasa v. The State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 344) 269 @ 288; Jimoh v. The State (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1414) 105 @ 139. It is therefore an incorrect statement of the law to state that the court can rely on the extra-judicial confession of an accused against his co-accused, to ground a conviction against him so long as it incriminates him.

— Kekere-Ekun, JSC. Enobong v. The State (2022) – SC/CR/249/2020

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WHEN A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT CAN GROUND A CONVICTION

Where a confessional statement is direct, positive and admits all or some of the elements of the offence charged, and the Court is satisfied that it was voluntarily made, the Court can rely on it to ground a conviction even though retracted at the trial. See: Igbinovia Vs The State (1981) LPELR — 1446 (SC) @ 17 B-D; (1981) 2 SC 5; Yesufu Vs The State (1976) 6 SC 163; Adebayo Vs The State (2014) LPELR — 22988 (SC) @ 55-56 F-A.

— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. State v Abdu Musa (2019) – SC.625/2016

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