Judiciary-Poetry-Logo
JPoetry

WHERE CONTRACTUAL NEW TERM CAN BE INTRODUCED

Dictum

Where parties enter into an agreement and subsequently decide to introduce new terms, they can only do so by specific reference to the earlier agreement to the effect that the later agreement has introduced new terms thereof.

– Niki Tobi JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)

Was this dictum helpful?

SHARE ON

FAILURE TO PERFORM WITHIN TIME IS BREACH OF CONTRACT

Finally the law is that time is of essence where the parties have expressly made it so, or where circumstances show that it is intended to be of essence or where a definite time is fixed for execution of a mercantile and the contract even though time is not expressly made of the essence, thus failure to perform the contract within the limit will constitute a breach. Performance must be rendered within a reasonable in the absence of any specification as to time in the contract itself.

– Adekeye JSC. Nwaolisah v. Nwabufoh (2011)

Was this dictum helpful?

TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF SERVICE BRINGS TO AN END MASTER-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP

Chukuma v. Shell Petroleum Development Company (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512 at 560 where Karibi-Whyte JSC said: “In the ordinary case and following the common law principle,termination of a contract of service even if unlawful brings to an end the relationship of master and servant, employer and employee. This rule is based on the principle of the confidential relationship between master and servant which cannot continue in the absence of mutuality.”

Was this dictum helpful?

PARTIES BOUND BY CONTRACTUAL TERMS IN ABSENCE OF FRAUD

The well laid down position of the law is that Courts do not rewrite contact for the parties where the terms of the contract are clear. In the absence of fraud, duress and undue influence, misrepresentation, the parties are bound by their contract. It is only parties to a contract that can sue and be sued on it.

– Rhodes-Vivour JSC. Alade v. Alic (2010)

Was this dictum helpful?

NATURE OF A BREACH OF CONTRACT

It is clear to me that a contract between parties may be discharged by breach of a fundamental term by any of the parties. There is no gain-saying the point that a breach of contract is committed when a party to the contract without lawful excuse fails, neglects or refuses to perform an obligation he undertook in the contract or incapacitates himself from performing same or in a way back down from carrying out a material term. See: Adeoti & Anr. v. Ayofinde & Anr. (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt.709) 336 … Where a party to a contract is in breach of a material term of same, the breach gives the aggrieved party a lee-way or an excuse for non-performance of its own side of the bargain. Such a party is at liberty to treat the contract as extinguished or at an end. See: Yadis (Nig.) Ltd. v. G.N.I.C. Ltd. (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt.1055) 584 at 609.

— Fabiyi, JSC. Best Ltd. v. Blackwood Hodge (2011) – SC

Was this dictum helpful?

THE ILLEGAL PART OF A CONTRACT CAN BE SEVERED FROM THE OTHER LEGAL PART

This is because it is a recognized principle of law that a contract will rarely be totally illegal or void: certain parts may be entirely lawful in themselves, while others are valid. Where the illegal or void parts can be “severed” from the rest of the contract on the well-known principles of severance such will be done and the rest of the contract enforced without the void part. It is permissible for courts to adopt this course where the objectionable part of the contract involves merely a void step or promise and is not fundamental, and it is possible to simply strike down the offending part without re-writing or remaking the contract for the parties and without altering the scope and intention of the agreement; and lastly, the contract, shorn of the offending parts, retains the characteristics of a valid contract. See on these Vol. 9 Hals. Laws of England (4th Edn.) p.297 in paragraph 430. See also Commercial Plastics Ltd. v. Vincent (1964) 3 All E.R. 546, C.A.

— Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC. Adesanya v Otuewu (1993) – SC.217/1989

Was this dictum helpful?

CONSTITUTING A BINDING CONTRACT: OFFER, ACCEPTANCE, CONSENSUS AD IDEM

In law, to constitute a binding contract between parties, there must be a meeting of the mind often referred to as consensus ad idem. The mutual consent relates to offer and acceptance. While an offer is the expression by a party of readiness to contract on the terms specified by him by which if accepted by the offeree gives rise to a binding contract, the offer only matures into a contract where the offeree signifies a clear and unequivocal intention to accept the offer. An offer can be accepted in such a manner as may be implied, such as doing an act which the person expecting acceptance wants done. On the other hand, an invitation to treat is simply the first step in negotiations between the parties to a contract. It may or may not lead to a definite offer being made by one of the parties to the other in the negotiation. In law therefore, an invitation to treat is thus not an agreement or contract. See Meka BAB Manufacturing Co. Ltd v. ACB Ltd (2004) 2 NWLR (PT. 858) 521. See also Unitab Nigeria Ltd v. Engr. Oyelola and Anor (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 286) 824 @ pp. 829-830; Okugbule and Anor v. Oyegbola and Ors (1990) 4 NWLR (pt. 147) 723; See also Afolabi v. Polymera Industries Ltd (1967) 1 All NLR 144; Nneji v. Zakhem Construction Nig. Ltd (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 994) 297; BFI Group Corporation v. Bureau of Public Enterprises (2012) LPELR-9339 (SC).

— B.A. Georgewill JCA. Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc V. Longterm Global Capital Limited & Ors. (CA/L/427/2016, 9 Mar 2018)

Was this dictum helpful?

No more related dictum to show.