It is trite law that where the findings of trial court and indeed the concurrent findings of the Judge and the Court of Appeal are perverse, this court can interfere and give the correct findings as the evidence in the record show. See Ajeigbe vs. Odedina (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 72) 584; Okonkwo vs. Okolo (1988) 2 NWLR (pt. 79) 632; lbhafidon vs. 1gbinosun (2001) FWLR (pt. 49) 1426, (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 716) 653.
— N. Tobi, JSC. Ezennah v Atta (2004) – SC.226/2000
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The law remains that an Appellate Court is reluctant to upset a finding of fact made by a trial court which had the opportunity of listening to witnesses testify and observing their demeanour and that evaluation of evidence and the ascription of probative value thereto are the primary functions of a trial court which saw, heard and assessed the witnesses. Where a trial court clearly evaluated the evidence of the parties and justifiably appraised the facts, it is not the business of an Appellate Court to substitute its own views of the facts for those of the trial court. It is only where the trial court is proved to have abdicated this function or in carrying out the function makes an unsound finding that an Appellate Court can justifiably step in to do so or set aside such unsound finding for being perverse. (See Oduwole v Aina (2001) 17 NWLR (Part 741) 1 at 47 and Udengwu v Uzuegbu (2003) 13 NWLR (Part 836) 36 at 156).
— Onnoghen JSC. Ndukwe v LPDC [2007] – SC 48/2003
Although appellate courts are very slow and reluctant in interfering with the findings of fact by the trial lower courts, nevertheless where such findings are not borne out by conclusive or positive evidence, or where the lower court did not properly evaluate the evidence before making the findings or where the lower court failed to apply the law properly to the facts proved, the appellate courts are under a duty to interfere with such findings. To neglect to do so will certainly occasion a miscarriage of justice sufficient to warrant a superior appellate court to interfere with the trial court’s findings.
– Mahmud JSC. Ogiorio v. Igbinovia (1998)
It has long been established that the function of the evaluation of evidence is essentially that of the trial Court, Igago v State (1999) LPELR – 1442 (SC) 27; Onuoha V. The State [1998] 5 NWLR (pt. 548) 118. Where the trial Court has unquestionably, evaluated evidence and, justifiably, appraised the facts, it is not the business of an appellate Court to interfere, and to substitute its own views for the view of the trial Court. – Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)
It is true that the Court of Appeal will be reluctant to upset the findings of fact of a trial court but where as in this case the learned trial court draws wrong conclusions from the totality of the evidence before it, the Court of Appeal will and in fact has a duty to reverse the wrong conclusions and make findings that the facts before it demand.
– Babalakin JSC. Finnih v. Imade (1992)
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on what qualifies as a complaint is defined as the purpose or legal basis of the claim, The complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on.
– CHACHA v. THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (003/2012) [2014] AFCHPR 48 para 120
I agree with the law that an appellate court should not interfere with the findings of fact by a trial court once the findings are based on the evidence upon the pleading of the parties. The appellate court can however interfere where the trial court failed to inter alia make findings or arrived at inconsistent findings on a crucial issue raised by the parties.
– Onnoghen JCA. Union Bank v. Akinrinmade (1999)
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