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WHERE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL INGREDIENTS ARE INTERTWINED IN AN ELECTION PETITION

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I take the line of thought of the respondents in that it is not enough to allege, non-compliance with the Electoral Act, the Petitioner now Appellant ought to establish by concrete evidence not only the non-compliance but that it was substantial to vitiate the election. Nothing other than that would suffice. Also the petitioner cannot run away from his responsibility on the burden of proof and on-whom it lies. In the present circumstances, the allegations are civil in character as well as criminal and so intertwined or interwoven as to make severance of one genre from the other which is impossible. Therefore the standard of proof must be of the higher standard which is beyond reasonable doubt. It is when the petitioner has discharged the onus on this that the burden can shift to the respondents to see how far he can go to impugn such a rock solid evidence put forward by the appellant. That is the prescription of law in practice and there is no running away from it See Awofowo v Shaman (1979) 1 ALL NLR 120 at 126: Buhari v Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941).

— M. Peter-Odili, JSC. Akeredolu v. Mimiko (2013) – SC. 352/2013

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election

PURPORT OF A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION

A free and fair election is one in which all eligible voters who are willing to vote are given every opportunity to cast their votes which must be counted and declared for the candidate of their choice. See the case of JIMOH VS ADEKUNLE (1991) 1 LRECN 123. The essence of democratic elections, it has been held, is that they be free, fair and that in that atmosphere of freedom, fairness and impartiality, citizens will exercise their freedom of choice of who their representatives shall be by casting their votes in favour of those candidates who, in their deliberate judgment, they consider to possess the qualities which mark them out as preferable candidates to those others who are contesting with them. See the case of OJUKWU VS ONWUDIWE & ORS (1984) 1 S 15 AT 91. The above essential tenets of democratic elections are fundamentally negatived by election rigging.

— A. Osadebay, J. APC v INEC & Ors. (EPT/KN/GOV/01/2023, 20th Day of September, 2023)

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PETITIONER HAS BURDEN TO PROVE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE ELECTORAL ACT

In the instant case, it is fundamental to point out that, from the pleadings, the allegation of non-compliance is generated by the Petitioners. Under Sections 134(1) and 135 of the Electoral Act, the level of proof required for the success of the Petition is doubled. There must be proof of non-compliance and the further proof that the non compliance affected substantially the result of the election. In the face of such an allegation of non-compliance, the court is enjoined by the law not to invalidate an election if it appears that the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the principles of the Electoral Act. All said and done, the Petitioners have the primary burden of proving that there was non-compliance and that the non-compliance affects substantially the result of the election before the burden can shift to the Respondents to establish that there was no substantial non-compliance with the Electoral Act in the conduct of the election.

— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Atiku v PDP (CA/PEPC/05/2023, 6th of September, 2023)

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AMENDMENTS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO ELECTION PETITION AFTER FILING PARTICULARLY WHEN THE 21 DAYS PERIOD HAVE ELAPSED; EXTENSION OF TIME ARE PROHIBITED TOO

In OKE & ANOR v MIMIKO & ORS (2013) LPELR 20645(SC), the Apex Court, per Ogunbiyi, JSC held that: ‘By Paragraph 4(1) and (5) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, a composite analysis of an election petition has been spelt out and also a list of materials which must be accompanied. The use of the word “shall” in the subsections is very instructive, mandatory and conclusive. In other words, the provisions do not allow for additions and hence, the procedure adopted by the appellants in seeking for an extension of time is nothing other than surreptitious attempt to amend the petition. This is obvious from the nature and substance of the application especially where one of the grounds seeks to put in facts which were allegedly not available at the time of filing the petition but only came into their possession after the statutory time limit allowed for the presentation of election petition. Expressly, there is no provision in the legislation which provides for extension of time. What is more, vide paragraph 14(2) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, the Appellants by Section 134(1) of the Electoral Act had been totally foreclosed from any amendment which was in fact the hidden agenda promoting the application. The saying is true that even the devil does not know a man’s intention; it can only be inferred from the act exhibiting that which is conceived in the heart and mind. The use of the word “shall” in paragraph 14(2)(a) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act is mandatory and places a complete bar on any form of amendment to a petition filed and does not also allow for an exercise of discretion whatsoever. See UGWU v ARARUME (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 367 at 510 511 and BAMAIYI V A.G FEDERATION (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt. 727) 428 at 497. Further still and on a critical perusal of the application, relief 2 seeks “leave to call additional witness, to wit A.E.O”. It is pertinent to restate that at the close of pleadings parties had submitted the list of witnesses who were to testify together with their depositions. The idea, purpose and intention of the application is suggestive of nothing more but a clear confirmation seeking for an order of an amendment as rightly and ingeniously thought out by the trial tribunal and also affirmed by the lower court. This will certainly violate the provisions of Section 285(5) of the Constitution and Section 134 of the Electoral Act.’

In his concurring judgment in the same case, Ngwuta, JSC specifically stated that: ‘The additional or further witness depositions sought to be allowed for a just and fair determination of the petition are fresh facts as found by the tribunal and which finding was endorsed by the lower court. This Court will not interfere with a concurrent finding of fact of the two lower courts when the appellants have failed to show a special circumstance for this Court to do so. Election petitions are time-bound and the Court will not allow a party to resort to any sort of subterfuge to frustrate the intention of the Electoral Act that petitions be disposed of expeditiously.’

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FAILURE TO JOIN A PARTICULAR PARTY WILL NOT WARRANT STRIKING OUT OF ENTIRE PETITION

The other argument of note of 2nd Respondent in this application is the one of failure of petitioners to join Friday Adejoh and Governor Yahaya Bello of Kogi State and its effect on the petition. We have already struck out the relevant paragraphs of the petition where allegations of malpractice were made against the two men. We abide by that decision. We shall simply add that we do not agree with 2nd respondent’s argument that the entire petition merits dismissal for non-joinder of those two men. The proper sanction, in the circumstances of this case as we have already pointed out citing Nwankwo v. Yar’Adua (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1209) 518 @ 583 paras G-H. (SC), is to strike out the paragraphs of the petition where those allegations were made. That order, we also further add, and contrary to the argument of 2nd Respondent, will not affect the paragraphs where allegations were made against unnamed thugs.

— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Atiku v PDP (CA/PEPC/05/2023, 6th of September, 2023)

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ALL ELECTION PETITIONS LIE AS OF RIGHT TO THE COURT OF APPEAL

In the case of Awuse v. Odili (2003) 18 NWLR (pt. 851) 116 at 119, Ejiwunmi JSC supported the lead judgment of I.L. Kutugi JSC quoted the provision of Section 246 (1) (b) (ii) of the 1999 Constitution as amended and said of the Section as follows: “An appeal to the Court of Appeal shall lie as of right from the decision of the Governorship Election Tribunal on any question as to whether any person has been validly elected to the office of Governor”. “Though the word “any” when used as an adjective is defined in Longman Dictionary of the English Language thus: “One or some indiscriminately, whichever is chosen”. It would appear that the word “any” qualifying “question” was deliberately used by the law makers to indicate that an appeal to the Court of Appeal was not limited only to hearing appeals only to whether any person has been validly elected to the office of Governor —– It follows therefore that the provisions of Section 246 (1) allows appeals to lie to Court of Appeal in respect of interlocutory decision of the Governorship Election Tribunals and the other tribunals named in that section of the Constitution”.

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PARTY WHO ALLEGES NONCOMPLIANCE HAS THE LEGAL BURDEN

It is trite that a Petitioner who alleges non-compliance with Electoral Act has the legal burden to establish such non-compliance and show how the non-compliance substantially affected the result of the election. See: LADOJA v AJIMOBI (2016) LPELR-40658(SC) at page 29, paras. A E; and SHINKAFI V YARI (2016) LPELR-26050(SC) at pages 19 – 20, para. C.

— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Peter Obi & Anor. v INEC & Ors. (2023) – CA/PEPC/03/2023

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