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WHEN THE SUPREME COURT WILL DEPART FROM HIS EARLIER DECISION

Dictum

As departure from a decision of a court or overruling a decision of a court is a very major judicial exercise, which if done often will ruin or jeopardise the stable rules of judicial precedent, and particularly the rules of stare decisis, courts of law, even the highest court of the land, will not yield to the invitation of counsel just for the asking, in the sense that the case sought to be overruled is not in favour of the party. In asking for a case to be overruled, the party should take into account or consideration, the totality of the decision, meaning that the ratio decidendi must be considered along with the facts of the case. The party should also make a distinction, if any, in the case between a ratio decidendi and an obiter dictum. If a party’s worry is an obiter dictum, a court of law will not depart from its earlier judgment or overrule it because obiter does not ipso facto have or possess any force in the judgment. And when I say this I am not ignorant of the law that obiter dictum of this Court followed by this Court in certain instances could ripen into a ratio decidendi by frequent adoption.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

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ONLY MATTERS DECIDED IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CAN BE ENTERTAINED BY THE SUPREME COURT

By canvassing in this court matters decided in the trial Court and not adverted to in the Court of Appeal, without leave having been obtained to argue matters not argued in the Court of Appeal, such matters or issues are incompetently before this court and will be discountenanced. This Court is only competent to entertain appeals from the Court of Appeal and not from any court below the Court of Appeal. Ogoyi v. Umagba (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt.419) 283, 293; Oduntan v. General Oil Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 387) 1, 101. Similarly the appellate court will deal only with matters duly canvassed at the trial court and appealed against. The issues of fair-hearing or breach of Sections 20,21 and 22(6) of the Chiefs Law never came into argument at the trial Court nor at the Court of Appeal, and no leave having been obtained to argue them as novel issues not raised in the courts below, are not competent for argument in this court. There was no pronouncement on these issues at the trial court, and no appeal was lodged on this failure in the Court of Appeal, it is therefore incompetent in this court for the appellants to start raising issues of lack of fair hearing, or breach of natural justice in the conduct of investigation into the selection of Baale of Isundunrin. In the absence of a decision on a point, and that point has been canvassed at the trial court, the course open to the party aggrieved is to appeal against that non-decision. Saude v. Abdullahi (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 116) 387, 433, 434; Adesokan v. Adetunji (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.346) 540, 575, 576.

— Belgore, JSC. Ogundare v Ogunlowo (1997) – SC.25/1994

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AN APPELLATE COURT IS ONLY INTERESTED IN THE CORRECTNESS OF THE DECISION, NOT THE REASON BY WHICH IT WAS REACHED

It is apposite to state here that it has been established by sufficient authority that an appellate Court is only interested in the correctness of a judgment/ruling or conclusion reached and not with the correctness of the reason by which the Court arrived at its decision, unless it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice, Taiwo and Ors v Sowemimo [1982] 5 SC 60, 74-75; Ibuluya v Dikibo [2011] 3 WRN 1, 23; Agbeje v Ajibola [2002] 2 NWLR (pt. 750) 127; Hillary Farms Ltd. v MV Mahtra[2007] 14 NWLR (pt. 1054) 210.

— C.C. Nweze, JSC. Uzoho v NCP (SC.141/2007, Friday, May 13, 2022)

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SUPREME COURT IS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DECISION, THAN REASON OF COURT OF APPEAL

Again for emphasis is that an appellate Court such as this Apex one, will not reverse the decision of the Court below simply because the conclusion and decision were reached from a wrong reason. This is so because once the decision is correct the wrong channel or route through which that decision was made would not scuttle the said conclusion. See The State v John Ogbubunjo (2001) 1 SCNJ 86 at 106 per Onu JSC. — M.U. Peter-Odili, JSC. Kwara Judicial Commission v Tolani (2019) – SC.63/2010

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APPELLATE COURT APPROACH TO REVIEWING CUSTOMARY COURT DECISION

This court in the case of Odofin v. Oni (2001) 1 SCNJ 130 handed down the principles to be adopted in interpreting the records of proceedings of a Native or Customary Courts. At page 149 of the report Achike JSC of blessed memory stated the principles thus:- “In order to appreciate the real effect of the lower courts strong criticism of the statement of the customary court that the respondent “failed to prove ownership of the land in dispute” it is important to stress that greater latitude and broader interpretation must be accorded to decision of customary courts as it is trite that the proceedings in the customary courts are not subject to the application of the Evidence Act. It is important that superior appellant courts in relation to matters relating to customary courts should focus their attention to the substance of the judgments or decisions in those courts rather than the forms. This is so because customary courts be they Area Courts or whatever name they are christened in our judicial jurisdiction are generally presided over by laymen without even rudimentary exposure to legal principles. An Appellate Court should in all circumstances strive to get the bottom of the decision of a customary court. This can only be achieved by considering the input of a decision of a customary court not in fragments or in isolation of excerpts thereof but must be read harmoniously as a whole in order to capture its imports. In other-words when greater latitude is accorded to the interpretation of the decisions of customary court it will be sufficient if such decisions are seen to accord with the view of person of good common sense and reason completely devoid of legalistic encrustments”.

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CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF UNREPORTED DECISION MUST BE PROVIDED BY COUNSEL

I need to point out that in paragraph 6.2 of their written address, the claimants referred to an unreported decision of the Court of Appeal: Appeal No: CA/A/122/2014: Federal Inland Revenue Service v. TSKJ Construcoes International Sociadade Unipersonal LDA delivered 17 July 2017. A copy of the unreported decision was not forwarded to this Court as enjoined by Order 45 Rule 3(1) of the NICN Rules 2017. This Court is accordingly not obliged to give any consideration to the cited unreported case (Appeal No: CA/A/122/2014). As His Lordship Augie, JSC intoned in Major General Kayode Oni (Rtd) & 4 ors v. Governor of Ekiti State & anor [2019] LPELR-46413(SC). It is an elementary principle, very elementary, that Counsel who want the Court to make use of authorities cited in Court must provide the name of Parties, the year the case was decided, and where the case is reported, name of the Law Report, the year, volume and page must be cited. But if the said case is unreported, Counsel must provide the Court with a certified true copy of the Judgment sought to be relied upon – see Chidoka & anor v. First City Finance Co. Ltd [2013] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1344) 144 and Ugo-Ngadi v. FRN [2018] LPELR-43903(SC).

— B.B. Kanyip, J. FG v. ASUU (2023) – NICN/ABJ/270/2022

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AS LONG AS A DECISION HAS NOT BEEN SET ASIDE, THE JUDGEMENT OF COURT MUST BE OBEYED

The point must be rammed home that an order issuing from any court, a fortiori an order of the Court of Appeal, the penultimate court in the judicial ladder, must be obeyed to the letters. It is of no moment that such order is wrongly made as long as it has not been set aside by an appellate court. Obedience to order of court is part and parcel of rule of law, which, in turn, is sina qua non for orderliness and development of democracy in any society. Contrariwise, disobedience of court order, as amply demonstrated by the respondent’s unrepentant conduct, is capable of igniting chaos and anarchy in any country. The respondent, erroneously, think that the court is a toothless bulldog which can bark without biting. By his aberrant desecration of the order of this court, made on 10/06/2010, he has insulted the law and he must incur its wrath.

— O. Ogbuinya, JCA. Ogunleye v. Aina (2012) – CA/IL/22/2011

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