The appellate court will therefore not interfere with the exercise of it by the lower court unless it has been shown that it was not exercised judicially, that is bonafide, and not arbitrarily or illegally or by reference to extraneous considerations or by omitting to take relevant factors into account. This is the result of all the cases.
– Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC. Adejumo v. Ayantegbe (1989)
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Where the appeal challenges only the concurrent findings of fact the burden on the appellant to displace the presumption that the concurrent findings of fact are correct is made difficult by the rule of practice in the appellate Courts to the effect that an appellate Court is loathe to disturb concurrent findings of fact and therefore such concurrent findings of fact should rarely disturbed: ENANG v. ADU (1981) 11 12 SC 17 at 27 (Reprint) … The usual circumstances concurrent findings of fact are disturbed are: when it is shown that the findings are perverse and not the result of a proper exercise of judicial discretion, or that there is no evidence at all to support a particular crucial finding, or that the trial Court made wrong deductions or drew wrong inference from the admitted or established facts: UBANI & ORS v. THE STATE (2003) 18 NWLR (PT. 851) 224.
— E. Eko, JSC. Lawali v State (2019) – SC.272/2017
HOW TO SUCCEED WHEN APPEALING AGAINST CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF TWO LOWER COURTS
In Ngorka v. A.-G., Imo State (2026) 13 NWLR (Pt. 2056) 1 at 29, G—H per Abiru JSC: ‘in an appeal against the concurrent findings of two lower courts, it is not enough for an appellant to come before this court to repeat the case he presented before the lower courts with the hope that the court will come to different decision. An appellant must visibly demonstrate the perversity of the findings made by the lower courts and that where he fails to do so, this court has no business re-evaluating the evidence and interfering with the findings of the lower courts.’
There was no evidence before the learned trial judge that there was any reason to deviate from the agreed stopping places. Flying to Johannesburg, South Africa amounts to willful misconduct that the appellant has been unable to explain. The appellant was in breach of contract and created the situation which led to the loss of the respondent’s brief case, and his deportation to Nigeria after spending eight nights in jail. In the absence of justification for flying to Johannesburg, South Africa, there is a clear breach of contract since the respondent was never flown to Manzini, Swaziland. The appellant is responsible for all that happened to the respondent in South Africa, and so concurrent findings by the two courts below that the appellant was in breach of contract is affirmed.
– Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. Cameroon v. Otutuizu (2011) – SC.217/2004
From a long line of cases, it is clearly evident that it is the policy of this Court not to interfere with the concurrent findings of the two courts below. This policy is predicated on, and presupposes that, the court of first instance evaluated the evidence, exercised its right to believe or disbelieve witnesses, and then finally arrived at specific findings on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings and evidence as presented to the court for resolution. When that had been done and the Court of Appeal confirms the findings of the trial court, then an appellant is confronted with a rather uphill task. There again, such an appellant will be required to show either that the findings were perverse thus leading to an obvious miscarriage of justice or that there was a violation of some principle of law or procedure.
– Oputa JSC. OLUFOSOYE v. OLORUNFEMI (1989)
It is now well settled that this court will not disturb the findings of facts of two courts below unless there is manifest error which leads to some miscarriage of justice, or a violation of some principle of law or procedure.
– Karibe-Whyte JSC. Amadi v. Nwosu (1992)
The position of this Court has always been to refrain from interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings are perverse. A finding is perverse (i) Where it is not supported by evidence on the record; (ii) Where it does not reflect a proper exercise of judicial discretion; (iii) Where evidence has been wrongly admitted or rejected at the trial; (iv) Where there has been an erroneous appraisal of facts leading to erroneous conclusion; (v) Where the finding has been reached as a result of a wrong application of some principles of substantive law or procedure. See: Ayeni Vs Adesina (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 370) 1451 @ 1457-1458; Woluchem Vs Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291 @ 326; Adegbite Vs Ogunfaolu, (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt.146) 578; Itu Vs The State (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt.1506) 443.
— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. MTN v. Corporate (2019) – SC.674/2014
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