The appellate court will therefore not interfere with the exercise of it by the lower court unless it has been shown that it was not exercised judicially, that is bonafide, and not arbitrarily or illegally or by reference to extraneous considerations or by omitting to take relevant factors into account. This is the result of all the cases.
– Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC. Adejumo v. Ayantegbe (1989)
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From the onset it must be emphasized that being a concurrent finding of fact by the two courts, this Court is very slow at intervening except where the Appellants succeed in showing to us that notwithstanding the fact of concurrence in the decisions of both courts, the finding is perverse or that the finding has violated some essential principle of law or procedure and that the violation is substantial enough to lead to miscarriage of justice. See Onowan v Isarhjen (1976) 9-10 SC 95, Fashanu v. Adekoya (1974) 1 ALL NLR (PT. 1) 35 and Onwuka v Ediala (1989) 1 NWLR (pt.96) 182 at 202. It is only if this is demonstrated that this court will interfere. See Abinabina v Enyimadu 12 WACA 171 at 173, Omoborinola II v Military Governor Ondo State (1998) 14 NWLR (pt 584) 89 at 107, U.A.C Nig. Ltd. v Fashoyiten (1998) 11 NWLR (pt.573) 199 at 185 and Chinwedu v Mbamah & Or (1980) 3-4 SC 31 at 75.
— M.D. Muhammad, JSC. Kubor v. Dickson (2012) – SC.369/2012
From a long line of cases, it is clearly evident that it is the policy of this Court not to interfere with the concurrent findings of the two courts below. This policy is predicated on, and presupposes that, the court of first instance evaluated the evidence, exercised its right to believe or disbelieve witnesses, and then finally arrived at specific findings on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings and evidence as presented to the court for resolution. When that had been done and the Court of Appeal confirms the findings of the trial court, then an appellant is confronted with a rather uphill task. There again, such an appellant will be required to show either that the findings were perverse thus leading to an obvious miscarriage of justice or that there was a violation of some principle of law or procedure.
– Oputa JSC. OLUFOSOYE v. OLORUNFEMI (1989)
The position of this Court has always been to refrain from interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings are perverse. A finding is perverse (i) Where it is not supported by evidence on the record; (ii) Where it does not reflect a proper exercise of judicial discretion; (iii) Where evidence has been wrongly admitted or rejected at the trial; (iv) Where there has been an erroneous appraisal of facts leading to erroneous conclusion; (v) Where the finding has been reached as a result of a wrong application of some principles of substantive law or procedure. See: Ayeni Vs Adesina (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 370) 1451 @ 1457-1458; Woluchem Vs Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291 @ 326; Adegbite Vs Ogunfaolu, (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt.146) 578; Itu Vs The State (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt.1506) 443.
— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. MTN v. Corporate (2019) – SC.674/2014
My lords, the appellants have not shown that the concurrent findings of fact made by the trial court and the lower court are perverse or unreasonable. Neither have they shown that any miscarriage of justice had been occasioned by the concurrent findings. The attitude of this court to concurrent findings of facts by the two lower courts is well settled. This court will only interfere with such concurrent findings when the appellants show special circumstances by establishing either that there was a miscarriage of justice, or a serious violation of some principles of substantive law or procedure, or that the findings are perverse, or that the findings do not flow from the evidence adduced by the parties. See Enang v. Adu (1981) 11 – 12 SC 25 at page 42, (1981) 5 SC 291; Lokoyi v. Olojo (1983) 8 SC 61 at page 73; Ojomu v. Ajao (1983) 9 SC 22 at page 53; Ibodo v. Enarofia (1980) 5 – 7 SC 42 at page 45; Akayepe v. Akayepe (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1152) 217. The principle has been repeated and repeated times without numbers. Unfortunately, legal practitioners, obviously for their economic gains, keep encouraging litigants to approach this court with appeals repeating the same complaints over findings of facts by courts of first instance which had been duly affirmed by the intermediate court. I think there should be serious sanction for these vexatious frivolities.
— Eko JSC. Benjamin v Kalio (2017) – SC/207/2006
We have to emphasize all over again that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of a trial court and the court of Appeal on issues of fact. The two courts are presumed to have considered all the facts necessary for their coming to such findings. The Supreme Court will only disturb or upturn a concurrent finding of fact of the two lower courts in exceptional circumstances like: – (1) Where violation of some principles of law or procedure exists, and such erroneous proposition cannot stand if not corrected; (2) Patently erroneous findings of fact which amount to a travesty of justice if not left uncorrected; (3) Where the findings of fact are erroneous or perverse.
— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) – SC.231/2006
It is a trite procedural tenet that the evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence are the exclusive preserve of the trial court which had the opportunity of hearing and assessing the testimony and conduct of the witnesses. It is unusual for an appellate court to disturb such findings of a trial court except where it is found to be perverse irrational or does not accord with common sense. See DARE VS FAGBAMILA (2009) 14 NWLR (PT 1160) 177; SULE VS HABU (2011) 7 NWLR (PT 1246) 339 and KARIBO VS GREND (1992) 3 NWLR (PT 230) 426.
— S.C. Oseji, JCA. ACB v Ajugwo (2011) – CA/E/66/2006
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