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WHEN A CASE IS SAID TO BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

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It must however, be emphasized that the burden of proof of the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt by the Prosecution in criminal cases should not be taken to mean that the prosecution must sustain its case beyond every shadow of doubt. Absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of justice. Thus, once the Prosecution has been able to prove that an offence has been committed and that no person other than the accused committed the offence, the prosecution is said to have established its case beyond reasonable doubt.

– Abdu Aboki, JSC. Chukwu v. State (2021)

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ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY IS NOT REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES

It can be discerned from these cases that though certainty is an essential element of proof in criminal liability or guilt, absolute certainly is not required because it is “impossible in any human adventure including the administration of criminal justice.” That’s one reason why the requirement of standard of proof placed on the prosecution is to prove beyond reasonable doubt and not beyond all or any shadow of doubt. The standard of proof and the burden placed on the prosecution are by the endless judicial authorities on the issue, now common place.

– M.L. Garba JCA. Odogwu v. Vivian (2009) – CA/PH/345/05

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BETTER FOR TEN GUILTY PERSONS TO GO FREE THAN ONE INNOCENT SHOULD SUFFER

As we indicated in Stephen Ukorah v. The State (1977) 4S. C. 167 there is great need for a trial court to tread cautiously in the application of circumstantial evidence for the conviction of an accused for any offence with which he is charged. The Romans we pointed out, with approval, in Ukorah (Supra at p .177) had a maxim that it is better for a guilty person to go unpunished than for an innocent one to be condemned: and Sir Edward Seymour speaking on a Bill of Attainder in 1696 laid greater emphasis on this maxim when he stated that he would rather “that ten guilty persons should escape than one innocent should suffer.” That also was our view in Ukorah (Supra).

— Idigbe, JSC. Adie v. State (1980) – SC24/1978

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LORD DENNING’S COMMENT ON REASONABLE DOUBT – ‘FANCIFUL POSSIBILITIES’

Denning , J., (as he then was) stated in Miller v. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372, 373: “does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted of fanciful possibilities to defect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence ‘of course it is possible, but not in the least probable’ the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt but nothing short of that will suffice.”

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PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Dibie v. The State (2007) LPELR 941 (SC) said thus: “Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond every shadow of doubt. Once the proof drowns the presumption of innocence of the accused, the Court is entitled to convict him, although there exist shadows of doubt. The moment the proof by prosecution renders the presumption of innocence on the part of the accused useless and pins him down as the owner of the mens rea or actus rea or both, the prosecution has discharged the burden placed on it by Section 138(3) of the Evidence Act”.

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BURDEN OF PROOF “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” NEVER SHIFTS

It must always be borne in mind and this is settled, that the burden of proving that any person is guilty of a crime, rests on the prosecution. The cardinal principle of law, is that the commission of a crime by a party must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. This is the law laid down in section 138(1) of the Evidence Act. The burden never shifts. Therefore, if on the whole of the evidence, the court is left in a state of doubt (as I am in this instant case leading to this appeal), the prosecution would have failed to discharge the onus of proof which the law lays upon it and the prisoner/accused person, is entitled to an acquittal. See the cases of Alonge v. Inspector-General of Police (1959) 4 FSC 203, (1959) SCNLR 516; Fatoyinbo v. Attorney-General, Western Nigeria (1966) WNLR 4, and The State v. Musa Danjuma (1997) 5 SCNJ 126 at 136-137, 156; (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 506) 512.

— Ogbuagu, JSC. Udosen v State (2007) – SC.199/2005

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WHAT REASONABLE DOUBT MEANS IN CRIMINAL TRIAL

The term “Reasonable doubt” has not been defined in the definitions Section 2 of the Act, but its connotation has received many definitions from judicial authorities. For instance, the very famous and erudite Denning, J (later M.R.) in the case of MILLER V. MINISTER OF PENSIONS (1947) 2 ALL E.R. 372 said that- “It need not reach certainly, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt.” The term is therefore of common law origin and was incorporated in our law of evidence.
In the case of BAKARE V. STATE (1987) 579 @ 587, our own version of Denning, J and equally erudite and eloquent OPUTA, JSC put the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt thus:- “Proof beyond reasonable doubt stems out of the competing presumption of innocence inherent in our adversary system of criminal justice. To displace the presumption, the evidence of the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond the shadow of doubt that the person accused is guilty of the offence charged. Absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including administration of criminal justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt means what it says. It does not admit of plausible and fanciful possibilities but it does admit of a high degree of cogency consistent with an equally high degree of probabilities.”

– M.L. Garba JCA. Odogwu v. Vivian (2009) – CA/PH/345/05

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