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WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PLEADINGS – PLEADING FACTS NECESSARY – RESULTING TRUST

Dictum

The object of pleadings is to state succinctly and accurately the issues for trial and to appraise the other side of the issues which it would meet in court. A defendant cannot rely on a defence which is based upon facts not stated in the statement of claim or defence, unless he pleads such facts specifically e.g. fraud. So, where a party intends to rely on a special defence, such as resulting trust, it is sufficient if he pleads enough facts as pointing to such special defence. Such defence can be inferred from the facts raised in the pleading.

– Musdapher, JSC. Atta v. Ezeanah (2000)

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WHERE PLEADINGS RAISE NO TRIABLE ISSUE OR DEFENSE

Akinola & Anor. v. Solano (1986) 4 SC 106, where the Supreme Court per Oputa JSC, (God bless his soul) had stated inter alia thus: “It is time Courts…begin looking critically at the pleadings and where appropriate giving judgement on the pleadings, if no triable issue of fact, Plaintiff’s case should be considered on his pleading and the applicable law. Where the Plaintiffs statement of claim does not disclose a cause of action … instead of filing a Statement of Defense, the Defendant should move the Court to have the case dismissed. Alternatively, where the Statement of Defense does not answer, deny …. the essential facts on which the Plaintiff’s case rests, the Plaintiff should be courageous enough to ask for judgement on his Statement of Claim.”

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COURTS ARE BOUND TO DECIDE CASES ON THE PLEADINGS

The foregoing is the gist of the simple case presented before the trial judge. But it was made very complicated by the introduction of legal technicalities at the hearing of the appeal in this Court. The matter was further compounded by the conduct of the parties in that neither, as was disclosed by the issues canvassed before us, had any respect for the truth. However, courts are bound to decide cases on the pleadings of the parties and admissible evidence.

— M. Bello, JSC. Salawu Ajide V. Kadiri Kelani (SC.76/1984, 29 Nov 1985)

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NATURE OF PROOF OF PLEADINGS

It must be appreciated that there cannot be a better notice of a case a party intends to make than his pleading. It is a mere notice and can never be substituted for the evidence required in proof of the facts pleaded, subject however to an admission made by the other party. Unless through skilful cross-examination discrediting the case of the other party, he is still bound to lead evidence in support of his own pleading. Where evidence is adduced to buttress a pleading, then it is good news for the pleader, as it strengthens his case. However, evidence adduced in support of facts not pleaded goes to no issue and should therefore be disregarded ORIZU V. ONYAEGBUNAM 1978.5 S.C. 21 at 820. In ACB V. GWAGWALADA 1994. 5 NWLR Part 342 page 25 at 27 it was held that before considering admissibility of any evidence or document in support of a party’s case it must be shown that the evidence sought to be led is relevant. Even if the evidence is admissible and it is not relevant, the admission of such evidence does not advance the case of the party.

— A. Jauro, JCA. Chevron v. Aderibigbe (2011) – CA/L/76/04

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PARTY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO LEAD EVIDENCE ON MATTER NOT PLEADED

The elementary rule of pleading is that a party shall plead facts which he propose to rely upon in order to establish his own case. It is now trite law that a party will not be allowed to lead evidence in respect of facts not pleaded; or to lead evidence contrary to his pleading. The sole purpose of pleading is to ensure that the parties to the case know the case they will meet at the trial, to obviate element of surprise. Pleading saves time and brings out clearly the issues in the case.

— Olatawura JSC. African Continental Bank Ltd. v. Alhaji Umaru Gwagwada (SC.26/1990, 29 APR 1994)

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THERE MUST BE A SPECIFIC DENIAL PLEADINGS BY THE OTHER PARTY

In the case of Messrs. Lewis & Peat (N.R.I.) Ltd. v. Akhimien ( 1976) 7 S.C. 157 at page 163-4 where he stated: “We must observe, however, that in order to raise an issue of fact in these circumstances there must be a proper traverse: and traverse must be made either by a denial or non-admission either expressly or by necessary implication. So that if a defendant refuses to admit a particular allegation in the statement of claim, he must state so specifically; and he does not do this satisfactorily by pleading thus: ‘defendant is trot in a position to admit or deny (the particular allegation on the statement of claim) and will at the trial put plaintiff to proof.” … We are, of course, not unmindful of the first paragraph of the statement of defence. Nowadays almost every statement of defence contains such a general denial. (See Warner v. Sampson (1959) 1 Q.B. 287 at 310-311. However, in respect of essential and material allegations such a general denial ought not be adopted; essential allegations should be specifically traversed. (See Wallersteins v. Moir (1974) 1 W.L.R. 991 at 1002 per Lord Denning, M.R.; also Bullen & Leake & Jacobs, Precedents of Pleadings 12th Edition 83).

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GENERAL TRAVERSE WILL BE THE APPOSITE WHERE PETITIONER/CLAIMANT PLEADINGS WHERE GENERAL IN NATURE ITSELF

per Ogunwumiju, JCA (as he then was, now JSC), held in UDEAGHA & ANOR v OMEGARA & ORS (2010) LPELR-3856(CA), as follows: “The argument of Appellants’ counsel that the Respondents did not adequately traverse the petition is unfounded. The petition itself contained general complaints. There was no effort to pinpoint in the pleadings the various places where corrupt practices, non voting, use of violence, thuggery, rigging in polling units, massive thumb-print of ballot papers, fictitious entry of election results took place. Therefore, there was a general corresponding reply denying the allegations in general terms from the Respondents. If the Petitioners did not plead particulars, how could the respondents traverse non-existent particulars? The averments in the Appellants’ pleadings should have contained details of the allegations and complaints to which the Respondents could reply in detail in their own pleadings. The Appellants expected the Respondents to reply to the various specific allegations contained in the witness statements filed along with the petition. That is not the correct procedure. Those specific allegations should have been in the pleadings. The pleadings must show the facts disputed while the witnesses would give evidence of these facts. In election petitions, it has been held that there is need for particulars where required in order to prevent taking adverse party by surprise. See Buhari v Obasanjo (2005) 7 SCNJ 1. It is not the function of particulars to take the place of necessary averments in pleadings. See Nwobodo v Onoh (1984) 1 SC 201…”

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