In the circumstances of this case, I would, as the two lower courts did, hold that the deed of mortgage dated 5th September, 1980 (marked Exhibit A in these proceedings) executed by the 1st plaintiff in favour of the 1st Defendant bank to secure money owed it by the 2nd plaintiff company (Respondents herein) is null and void, the consent of Military Governor of Lagos State having not been obtained before the execution of the Deed.
– Nnamani, JSC. Savannah v. Ajilo (1989)
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A dispute as to volume of indebtedness is not a valid ground known to law such as can be relied upon to prohibit a mortgagee from exercising his right of sale. In other words, the mortgagee will not be restrained from exercising his power of sale because the amount due is in dispute. He will be restrained, however, if the mortgagor pays the amount claimed into court, that is the amount which the mortgagee swears to be due to him, unless on the terms of the mortgage the claim is exclusive. [Sabbagh v. Batik of West Africa (1962) 2 All NLR 225]
– L.A. Ayanlere v. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nig. Ltd. (1998) – CA/K/186/96
It is important to note that incident to every mortgage is a right of the mortgagor to redeem. This right is generally referred to as the right of redemption. The right to redeem is so inseparable an incident of a mortgage that it cannot be taken away even by an expressed agreement of the parties that the mortgage is not to be redeem or that the right is to be continued to a particular time or to a particular description of persons. The right continues unless and until the mortgagor’s title is extinguished or his interest is destroyed by sale either under the process of the court or of a power in the mortgage deed.
– Mohammed JCA. Rufukka v. Kurfi (1996)
Exhibit ‘A’ does not contain a covenant to pay the principal’s debt and interest on a given date. On the authorities however, there is an implied promise to pay and as no date has been fixed for the repayment it is my view that a reasonable time will be implied. – Ogundare JSC. Ejikeme v. Okonkwo (1994)
An important feature of mortgages both legal or equitable is that once a mortgage always a mortgage and nothing but a mortgage. – Chukwuma-Eneh JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)
This brings us to the subject of the equitable doctrine of “Notice.” It is usually said that a purchaser of the legal estate in any property for value and without notice has an “absolute, unqualified and unanswerable defence” to any claim of a prior equitable owner or person having a prior equitable interest in the same property (see Pilcher Vs Rawlings (1872) 7 Ch. App. 259 at 269 per James L.J.). Where, however, the purchaser, as here, has notice of a prior equitable mortgage in the property in which he seeks to take a legal estate he has a duty, by himself or by his vendor, to get rid of that prior equitable interest otherwise he is taking unnecessary risk.
– Idigbe JSC. Ogundiani v. Araba (1978)
I have earlier set out the peculiar factors and circumstances not least being that the appellant has paid part of the purchase price of ₦2.3m to the tune of ₦1.8m leaving a balance of ₦500,000.00 and has been put in possession of the disputed property. There is a binding agreement of sale of the 1st respondent’s interest in the said property between the appellant and the 1st respondent. The appellant has thereby acquired an equitable interest to the extent of the 1st respondent’s interest in the equity of redemption and this is the interest which the mortgagor, the 1st respondent has had at all material times. The 1st respondent cannot give what it hasn’t got. And as I intimated earlier any attempt to pass the legal estate in the disputed property to the appellant will be of no effect and void not voidable because the 1st respondent as the mortgagor has bound itself to convey the legal estate to the mortgagee whenever it is called upon to do so until the principal, interest and costs are duly paid on the mortgage. See: Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Ashiru and Anor. (supra) per ldigbe JSC, and Jared v. Clements (1903) 1 Ch. 428. Besides, the appellant is acquainted with notice of the mortgage and so cannot take priority to the 2nd respondent’s equitable mortgage which is first in time. – Chukwuma-Eneh JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)
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