It is clearly at the discretion of the trial Judge to determine whether in the light of the evidence before him, there is need to resolve, by a visit to the locus in quo, the conflict of evidence or clear a doubt as to the accuracy of a piece of evidence when there is such conflict of evidence.
– Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)
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In ADIGWE v. FRN (2015) 18 NWLR (pt. 1490) 105 this Court reiterated the point that “the exercise of discretion is not based on mere judgment of the person doing so but upon facts on circumstances necessary for the proper exercise of that discretion”. See also OYEGUN v. NZERIBE (2010) 41 NSCQR 127 at 147.
— E. Eko, JSC. Francis v. FRN (2020) – SC.810/2014
The decision of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Limited (1920) A.C. 508 – dealing with the issue of payment of compensation by the Crown to a subject in respect of property requisitioned for the prosecution of the war – established the principle that in the protection of the property of the subject, the Crown was liable to pay compensation to the subject for the acquisition of the property, the exigencies of the war notwithstanding. Even amidst the clash of arms, they said, the courts would not be silent.
I shall, in treating this issue, begin by saying that the line between a proper exercise of judicial discretion and an abuse of that discretion is not readily definable and it may be, that the term “abuse of discretion” means no more than that the decision below fell outside the permissible limits as viewed by the appellate court or that the Court of Appeal is of the opinion that the trial court should have decided otherwise. The resort of “discretion” at all times could turn to be an unruly horse. As Justice William Douglas in State of New York v. United States (1951) 342 US 822, opined at page 884 and I quote: “Absolute discretion, like corruption marks the beginning of the end of liberty.” Lord Simon of Glaisdale expressing the traditional view on the exercise of judicial discretion by a Judge said in D. v. NSPCC (1978) A.C 171 at page 239 and I quote:-. “And if it comes to the forensic crunch … it must be law, but discretion, which is in command.” Summing up the above dicta, in my words of definition, I will say an issue falls within a Judge’s discretion if, being governed by no rule of law, its resolution depends on the individual Judge’s assessment of what is fair and just to do in the particular case. A Judge has no discretion in making his findings of fact, he has no discretion in his rulings of the law. If a Judge, having made any necessary finding of fact and any necessary ruling on law, it seems to me clear that he has to choose between different causes of action, orders, penalties or remedies he then exercises a discretion. Let me reiterate that it is only when a trial Judge reaches a stage at which he asks himself, what is the fair and just thing to do or order in the instant case that he embarks on the exercise of a discretion. However, where the situation is governed by the rule of law, as in the instant case, which touches on admissibility of a document where the provisions of the Evidence Act come into play, although the court may have its own discretion, such discretion must be exercised according to the ordinary principles laid down in the Evidence Act as set out above. Its judicial discretion is founded upon those principles. And if a trial Judge refuses to do so, then the appellate court will set the matter right. See R. v. Stafford Justices (1940) 2 K.B. 33 at 43.
— P.O. Aderemi JSC. Musa Abubakar v. E.I. Chuks (SC.184/2003, 14 DEC 2007)
Discretionary powers judicially and judiciously exercised cannot be interfered with. One must let the decision of the lower court be. – M.D. Muhammad, J.C.A. Shona-Jason v Omega Air (2005) – CA/L/418/2000
The renewal of Oil Mining Lease II (OML II) falls squarely within the powers and discretion of the Honourable Minister of Petroleum Resources and the renewal of such lease may be with new terms and conditions. The Appellants have offered to renew the Oil Mining Lease for the Respondent on new terms and conditions. The Respondent refused and failed to accept the offer. The Respondent cannot dictate to the Appellants, the terms and conditions under which the renewal of the lease could be crystallized. The 1st Appellant acted within his powers and in accordance with the Petroleum Act, 2004 earlier referred to. The lower Court greatly erred in law in deciding the questions raised for determination and the reliefs sought against the Appellants.
– OLABISI IGE, JCA. Petroleum Resources v. SPDC (2021)
A court of appeal will not set aside a discretion exercised by the Court below if it is judicially exercised i.e. it is not arbitrary, or based on extraneous or irrelevant materials.
– Nnamani, JSC. Adejumo v. Ayantegbe (1989)
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