Judiciary-Poetry-Logo
JPoetry

THE WORD “MAY” SYNONYMOUS WITH “SHALL”

Dictum

In Ushie v. Agbalu (2013) JELR 51127 (CA), the court relied on: Iyoho v. Effiong where the Supreme Court per A. M. Mukthar, JSC (as she then was) said: “Although the word ‘may’ is used in the provision, it does not necessarily mean that it means permissible. ‘May’ in ‘Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 1000, has been defined inter alia as ‘loosely, is required to; shall; must…In dozens of cases, courts have held may to be synonymous with shall or must, usually in an effort to effectuate legislative intent.”

Was this dictum helpful?

SHARE ON

WORDS AND PHRASES ARE TO BE GIVEN THEIR ORDINARY MEANING

Under the literal rule of interpretation of statute, words and phrases in enactments are to be given their ordinary, original or grammatical meanings even if it will create hardship, inconvenience or injustice to the parties in so far as it will not result to absurdity. See, B.A.J (NIG) LTD. v. OGUNSEYE (2010) 4 NWLR (1184) 343, AMAECHI v. INEC (2007) 9 NWLR (PT. 1080) 504, UWAGBA v. FRN (2009) 15 NWLR (P. 1163) 91, OWENA BANK v. STOCK EXCHANGE (1997) 7 SCNJ 160.

— A.O. Obaseki-Adejumo, JCA. FRSC v Ehikaam (2023) – CA/AS/276/2019

Was this dictum helpful?

COURT IS TO INTERPRETE STATUTE AS DICTATED BY THE STATUTE

The duty of the court is to interpret the words contained in the statute and not go outside the words in search of an interpretation which is convenient to the court or to the parties or one of the parties. Even where the provisions of a statute are hard in the sense that they will do some inconvenience to the parties, the court is bound to interpret the provisions once they are clear and unambiguous. It is not the duty of the court to remove the chaff from the grain in the process of interpretation of a statute to arrive at favourable terms for the parties outside the contemplation of the lawmaker. That will be tantamount to traveling outside the statute on a voyage of discovery. This court cannot embark upon such a journey. – Tobi JSC. Araka v. Egbue (2003) – SC.167/1999

Was this dictum helpful?

WHAT IS A DISPUTE – SECTION 232(1) 1999 CONSTITUTION

It has been held by this Court vide Belgore, JSC (as he then was) in AG of the Federation vs AG of Abia State (2001) 11 NWLR (pt. 725) 689-at 737, inter alia, that the term dispute as used in section 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution “Involves acts of argument, controversy, debate, claims as to rights whether in law or facts varying opinion, whether passive or violent or any disagreement that can lead to public anxiety or disquiet…”

Was this dictum helpful?

INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 82 CFRN 1999

It appears rather from the resolution, exhibit A, and the proceedings of the house, exhibit C, that the purposes is the decision of the house to show resentment for the respondent’s affront in daring to publish something about highly placed legislators rather than a plan for the investigation of the members for abuse. This should not be. The essence of section 82(2) of the Constitution is invalid (sic). No power exists under the section for general investigation nor for the aggrandizement of the house. So, the [respondents] were not entitled to have invited the [appellant] in the first instance.

– Oguntade, JCA. El-Rufai v. House of Representatives (2003)

Was this dictum helpful?

IF A STATUTE IS PLAIN, THE DUTY OF INTERPRETATION DOES NOT ARISE

In CAMINETTI V. UNITED STATES, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), the Court while applying the Literal rule of interpretation in its reasoning held thus: “It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain… the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” And if a statute’s language is plain and clear, the Court further warned that “the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.”

Was this dictum helpful?

THE WORD “CULPRIT” SIGNIFIES GUILT

The use of the term culprits implies a finding of guilt and any finding of guilt without a trial is a breach of all the rules of natural justice. The Investigating panel is therefore turned into prosecutor, witness and judge.

– Andrews Otutu Obaseki, JSC. Garba & Ors. v. The University Of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550

Was this dictum helpful?

No more related dictum to show.