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THE COMPANY CEASES TO HAVE RIGHTS WHEN A RECEIVER IS APPOINTED

Dictum

The company ceases to have any right to deal with the assets. It’s right thereto is suspended. The Receiver/Manager appointed by the Debenture holder is now regarded as agent of the company for the purposes of dealing with assets in the Receivership.

– Karibi-whyte, JSC. Intercontractors v. National Provident (1988)

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IN RECEIVERSHIP COMPANY DOES NOT LOSE ITS LEGAL PERSONALITY

It is important to appreciate the fact that the company neither loses its legal personality nor its title to the goods in the receivership.

– Karibi-whyte, JSC. Intercontractors v. National Provident (1988)

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FRAUD LIFTS VEIL OF INCORPORATION

One of the occasions when the veil of incorporation will be lifted is when the Company is liable for fraud as in the instant case. – Galadima JSC. Alade v. Alic (2010)

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COMPANY’S DIRECTORS MAY DEAL WITH ASSET OUTSIDE RECEIVERSHIP

The Receivership in the instant case which does not necessarily result in the liquidation or winding up of the company, the right to deal with the assets in the receivership are revived at the termination of the receivership. In all cases the right of the directors of the Company to deal with the assets of the company not in receivership or other matters not suspended are not affected by the appointment of a Receiver/Manager over the assets of the Company. The directors of the company do not by virtue of a receivership become functus afficio for all purposes of the company.

– Karibi-whyte, JSC. Intercontractors v. National Provident (1988)

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OBJECT CLAUSES OF A COMPANY IN ITS MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION

The object clauses are no more than a list of the objects the company may lawfully carry out. They are certainly not objects that the company must execute. It is fairly common knowledge that most companies in drawing up the objects clauses of the memorandum of association cover a spectrum far wider than what they can accomplish immediately. It seems to me that the inclusion of the terms of the preincorporation agreement in the memorandum of association of a company is an indication of a strong desire by the contracting shareholders that the proposed company after its incorporation should execute the terms of the agreement so included. This can be taken together with the acts of the company after incorporation in determining whether a new contract has come into existence.

— Nnamani, JSC. Edokpolo v. Sem-Edo & Ors. (1984) – SC.89/1983

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SOME FOREIGN CASES ON LIFTING COMPANY VEIL

In Littlewoods Stores Ltd v. I.B.C. (1969)1 W.L.R. 1241 Lord Denning M.R. said: “The doctrine laid down in Salomon’s case has to be watched very carefully. It has been supposed to cast a veil over the personality of a limited liability company through which the Court cannot see. But that is not true. The Court can and often do draw aside the veil. They can and often do pull the mask. They look to see what really lies behind. The legislature has shown the way in group accounts and the rest. And the Court would follow suit.”
The English case of Jones v. Lipman (1962)1 WLR 832 exemplifies the situations in which the corporate veil will be lifted when a company is used as a mere facade concealing the true facts, which essentially means it is formed to avoid pre-existing legal obligations.

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APPELLANT CASE WAS BASED ON THE POST-INCORPORATION CONTRACT

The facts averred in the statement of claim which are deemed to be true for the purpose of the objection taken in limine show that the appellant and the 1st respondent company entered into a new contract in the terms of the preincorporation contract after the 1st respondent company had been incorporated. In the circumstance, the rule of company law that a company is not bound by a preincorporation agreement entered into by its promoters and that the company cannot ratify such agreement after its incorporation is inapplicable to the facts of the case as pleaded in the statement of claim. As the appellant alleged that his claim was founded on the post-incorporation agreement whereas the respondents said the claim was based on the preincorporation contract, the dispute cannot be resolved in limine. The issue can only be determined upon the hearing of the case on the merits.

— Bello, JSC. Edokpolo v. Sem-Edo & Ors. (1984) – SC.89/1983

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