Furthermore, it is the law that in construing any provision of a statute, a court ought, and is indeed bound, to consider any other parts of the statute which throw light upon the intention of the legislature and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would if considered alone without reference to such other parts of the statute.
– Katsina-Alu, JSC. Dantsoho v. Mohammed (2003)
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In Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Imo State (1993) 4 NCLR 178 where Bello, JSC (as he then was of blessed memory) defined the word “Federation” in his judgment at pages 193-194 where he said:- “It now remains to consider the crucial question, which has never been decided by this Court, as to what is ‘Federation’ and ‘State’ within the ambit of section 212 of the Constitution . . . ‘State’ when used otherwise than in relation to one of the component parts of the Federation includes government . . . ‘government’ includes the Government of the Federation, or of any State or of a Local Government Council or any person who exercises power or authority on its behalf . . . The meaning of the word ‘Federation’ presents no difficulty. It is clear from the provisions of section 2 of the Constitution that the words ‘Nigeria’, ‘Sovereign State’, ‘Federal Republic of Nigeria’ and ‘Federation’ are synonymous. I hold that ‘Federation’ in section 212(1) of the Constitution bears the same meaning as the Federal Republic of Nigeria.” (Relied on in AG Kano State v AG Federation (2007) – SC 26/2006)
It would be safer for the courts in this country to err on the side of liberalism whenever it comes to the interpretation of the fundamental provisions in the Constitution than to import some restrictive interpretation.
– Kayode Eso, JSC. Garba & Ors. v. The University Of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550
The retrospective nature of a statute may concern the whole provisions of the Statute, as where the commencement date so indicates; or may concern only a section of the statute – see Lauri v. Renad. (1892) 3 Ch. 402 at p. 421; Pardo v. Bingham, (1868 -69) 4 L.R.Ch. App. 735 at p. 739 and West v. Gwynne (1911) 2 Ch. 1. Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed – see p. 395 of Craies on Statute Law. 7th Edition. Where a statute is in its nature declaratory, the presumption against construing it retrospectively is inapplicable – See A – G v. Theobald. (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 557. If by necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the courts will give it such an operation- Lane v. Lane (1896) P. 133.
Ibrahim v Barde (1996) – SC.74/1995
A-G. of Bendel State v. Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR 646. This is that the express mention of one thing in a statutory provision automatically excludes any other which otherwise would have applied by implication, with regard to the same issue.
My Lords, I am persuaded that we must look at the heading of both sections of the statute to clarify any ambiguity. See OGBONNA v. A. G. IMO STATE (1992) 1 NWLR Pt. 220 Pg. 647, OYO STATE BOARD OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN (2013) LPELR 2215.
— H.M. Ogunwumiju, JSC. UBA v Triedent Consulting Ltd. (SC.CV/405/2013, July 07, 2023)
I think I ought to state at this stage that, generally, the fundamental principles that govern the interpretation of our Constitution are:
(i) That such interpretation as would serve the interest of the Constitution, best carry out its object and purpose and give effect to the intention of the framers thereof should be preferred;
(ii) In the above regard, all the relevant provisions of the Constitution must be read together and not disjointly. See Ojokolobo v. Alantu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.61) 377;
(iii) Where the words of any section are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary meaning unless this would lead to absurdity or be in conflict with some other provisions of the Constitution and effect must be given to those provisions without any recourse to any other consideration;
(iv) So, too, where the provisions of the Constitution are capable of two meanings, the court must choose the meaning that would give force and effect to the Constitution read together as a whole and promote its object and purpose. See Nafiu Rabiu v. The State (1981) 2 NCLR 293; (1980) 8 – l I S.C. 130; Attorney-General of Ogun State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1982) 1-2 S.C. 13; Chief Dominic Ifezue v. Livinus Mbadugha and another (1984) 1 SCNLR 427; (1984) 5 S.C. 79 at 100-101; (v) Although our courts may in appropriate cases give due regard to international jurisprudence and seek guidance, as persuasive authorities only, from the decisions of the courts of other common law jurisdictions on the interpretation and construction of similar provisions of their Constitutions which are in pari materia with the relevant provisions of our Constitution, the court will nevertheless accord due weight to our peculiar circumstances, the generally held norms of society and our values, aspirations and local conditions. See too Nafiu Rabin v. The State (supra); Senator Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981) 5 S.C. 112; Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (1981) 10 S.C. 1; Ade Ogugu and others v. The Stare (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt.366) 1 at 22 – 28 etc.
— Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996
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