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STATUTES ARE TO BE GIVEN THE ORDINARY MEANING

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It is a settled cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that where, in their ordinary meaning the provisions are clear and unambiguous effect should be given to them without resorting to external aid. The duty of the court is to interpret the words of the statute as used. Those words may be ambiguous, but even if they are the power and duty of the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited (see for example Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Attorney-General of ‘the Federation (1981) 10S.C. 1; Abioyev.Yakubu(1991)5 NWLR (Pt. 190) 130, Lawal v. G.B. Ollivant (1972) 2 S.C. 124, Aya v. Henshaw (1972) 5 S.C. 87.

— I.L. Kutigi, JSC. Kotoye v. Saraki (1994) – S.C. 147/1993

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EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS

A-G. of Bendel State v. Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR 646. This is that the express mention of one thing in a statutory provision automatically excludes any other which otherwise would have applied by implication, with regard to the same issue.

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GENERAL PROVISION MUST GIVE WAY FOR SPECIFIC PROVISION

The law is trite that where there is a specific legislation on a matter, the general principle of law must give way and cannot override the specific provisions of law on the subject. See Orubu v. INEC (1988) 12 SCN) 256 at 349, Unity Bank Plc. v. Kay Plastic Nig. Limited & anor (2011) LPELR 8839 (CA).

– T. Akomolafe-Wilson, JCA. Onnoghen v. FRN (2019) – CA/A/44C/2019

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LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

It is that the provisions of the Constitution are to be given liberal construction so as to best carry out the intention of the founding fathers. Their construction is not to be guided by the construction of other constitutions in other common law jurisdictions unless similar provisions in pari materia were in question. This Court will not give to any provision of the Constitution a construction, which will defeat its obvious intention. – Andrews Otutu Obaseki, JSC. Garba & Ors. v. The University Of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550

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INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTION IS DIFFERENT FROM INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

It is pertinent to state that unlike interpretation of statutes, the interpretation of Constitution has its own guiding principles. In FRN V NGANJIWA, which was cited by the Petitioners as SC/794/2019, but which is reported as FRN v NGANJIWA (2022) LPELR-58066(SC), the Supreme Court has succinctly reviewed decided cases on interpretation of the Constitution and outlined these guiding principles: ) In interpreting the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land, mere technical rules of interpretation of statutes should be avoided, so as not to defeat the principles of government enshrined therein. Hence a broader interpretation should be preferred, unless there is something in the text or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that a narrower interpretation will best carry out the objects and purpose of the Constitution. (b) All Sections of the Constitution are to be construed together and not in isolation. (c) Where the words are clear and unambiguous, a literal interpretation will be applied, thus according the words their plain and grammatical meaning. (d) Where there is ambiguity in any Section, a holistic interpretation would be resorted to in order to arrive at the intention of its framers. (e) Since the draftsperson is not known to be extravagant with words or provisions, every section should be construed in such a manner as not to render other sections redundant or superfluous. (f) If the words are ambiguous, the law maker’s intention must be sought, first, in the Constitution itself, then in other legislation and contemporary circumstances and by resort to the mischief rule. (g) The proper approach to the construction of the Constitution should be one of liberalism and it is improper to construe any of the provisions of the Constitution as to defeat the obvious ends which the Constitution was designed to achieve. See also on this: NAFIU RABIU V STATE (1980) 8-11 S.C. 130 at 148; A.G. BENDEL STATE V A.G. FEDERATION & ORS (1981) N.S.C.C. 314 at 372 – 373; BUHARI v OBASANJO (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1 at 281; SAVANNAH BANK LTD v AJILO (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 97) 305 at 326; and A.G., ABIA STATE V A.G. FEDERATION (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 275) 414 at 450, which were also referred to by the Apex Court.

— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Atiku v PDP (CA/PEPC/05/2023, 6th of September, 2023)

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WHERE WORDS ARE CLEAR NO INTERPRETATION IS NEEDED

It is settled law that where the words of a statute or Constitution are clear and unambiguous, they call for no interpretation, the duty of the court in such a circumstance being to apply the words as used by the legislature.

– WS Onnoghen, JSC. Calabar CC v. Ekpo (2008)

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INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 137(1)(D) OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION

The Petitioners have centered their contention on the provisions of Section 137(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution which reads as follows: “137(1) A person shall not be qualified for election to the office of President if – (d) he is under a sentence of death imposed by any competent court of law or tribunal in Nigeria of a sentence of imprisonment or fine for any offence involving dishonesty or fraud by whatever name called or for any other offence imposed on him by any court tribunal or substituted by a competent authority for any other sentence imposed on him by such a court or tribunal.” A careful examination of the above provision shows that the operative words of that paragraph of the Section are “sentence”, “imprisonment or fine” and “for any offence.” … It is discernible from the above that the “fine” referred to in paragraph (d) of Section 137(1) quoted above is one which emanates from a sentence for a criminal offence involving dishonesty or fraud. The words “for imprisonment or fine” also pre-supposes that the “fine” envisaged under the section is one which is imposed as an alternative to imprisonment. In other words, the provision of Section 137(1)(d) relates to sentence of death, or sentence of imprisonment or fine imposed as a result of a criminal trial and conviction.

— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Peter Obi & Anor. v INEC & Ors. (2023) – CA/PEPC/03/2023

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