STOP SEEING INTRUSIVE ADS, & HAVE PREMIUM FEATURES? Stop seeing intrusive ads and have a smoother reading experience, once you sign up on Judicial Poetry. Sign up now!

STATUTE SETTING TRIAL TIME LIMIT IS VOID

Reach more audience. Place advert here.

Bello, JSC, (later CJN, now of blessed memory) in the case of Unongo v. Aku and Ors. (1983) 14 NSCC 563 at 577-578 thus – “One of the powers which has always been recognised as inherent in courts has been the right to control their internal proceedings and to so conduct the same that the rights of all suitors before them may be safeguarded in such a manner that all parties are given ample opportunity to prosecute or defend the cases for or against them without let or hinderance. The old adage that delay of justice is denial of justice has the same force as the maxim that hasty or hurried justice is also a denial of justice. On this account any statute which prescribes time limit within which a trial court must try and determine cases or within which an appeal court must hear and determine appeals is inconsistent with the provisions of Sections 4(8) and 6(9)(b) of the Constitution and is therefore void by virtue of Section 1(3) of the Constitution.”

Was this dictum helpful?

SHARE ON

trial

A TRIAL IS A TEST OF FACT IN ISSUE

A trial is merely the finding out by due examination of witnesses or documents or both, the truth of a point in issue of a question in dispute whereupon a finding is made or judgment is given … A trial is a step in an action, prosecution or other judicial proceeding by which the questions of fact in issue are decided.

– Oputa, J.S.C. Garba & Ors. v. The University Of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550

Was this dictum helpful?

HE IS NOT ON TRIAL FOR THAT

The Appellant himself testified that he was a narcotics dealer, but he is not on trial for that. – Ogunwumiju JCA. Okeke v. State (2016)

Was this dictum helpful?

VARIATIONS IN LPDC PANEL MEMBERS AFFECTS ITS’ FINAL DECISION

In Adeigbe & Anor v. Salami Kusimo & Ors (1965) LPELR -25226 (SC) this issue was properly explained by Ademola JSC (as he then was) as follows: “The complaint against a hearing that was not always before the same bench does not pertain to any matter that goes to the jurisdiction of the Court. It is at bottom a complaint that the judgment cannot be satisfactory on the ground that as the persons who gave it had not seen and heard all the witnesses, they could not appraise the evidence as a whole and decide the facts properly. Thus, it is a complaint on the soundness of the judgment itself, and not a complaint that is extrinsic to the adjudication, which is the test to apply when considering a submission on jurisdiction. We are therefore of the opinion that variations in the bench do not make the judgment a nullity; they may make it unsatisfactory, and it may have to be set aside for this reason, but whether they do or not depends on the particular circumstances of the case.”

Was this dictum helpful?

A TRIAL BY A COURT IS THE ONLY PERMITTED WAY TO PROVE GUILT – EXCLUSIVE TO THE COURT

ACTION CONGRESS v INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 220 at 259 – 260, as follows: “The disqualification in Section 137(1) clearly involves a deprivation of right and a presumption of guilt for embezzlement or fraud in derogation of the safeguards in Section 36(1) and (5) of the Constitution. The trial and conviction by a Court is the only constitutionally permitted way to prove guilt and therefore the only ground for the imposition of criminal punishment or penalty for the criminal offences of embezzlement or fraud. Clearly, imposition of the penalty of disqualification for embezzlement or fraud solely on the basis of an indictment for those offences by an Administrative Panel of Enquiry implies a presumption of guilt, contrary to Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999, whereas, conviction for offences and imposition of penalties and punishments are matters appertaining exclusively to judicial power.” See also on this: AMAECHI v INEC & ORS (2008) LPELR-446(SC) at pages 49-51, paras. E F; OMOWAIYE v A.G. OF EKITI STATE & ANOR (2010) LPELR-4779(CA) at pages 28 – 28, paras. A F, per Nweze, JCA (as he then was); and ABDULKARIM & ORS v SHINKAFI & ORS (2008) LPELR 3555(CA) at pages 24 32, paras. A C.

Was this dictum helpful?

A RETRIAL WILL NOT BE MADE WHERE THE PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PROVE HIS CASE

There are two options open to this court. 1. to remit the case to the trial court to be heard de novo by another judge, or 2. for this court to put itself in the shoes of the trial court and do what that court ought to have done after hearing arguments on the admissibility of both letters. It would be wrong to make an order of retrial if such an order would give the party that lost an opportunity a second time to prove what he failed to prove. A retrial should not be made where the plaintiff fails to prove his case and there is no substantial irregularity apparent on the record. See Thompson v. Arowolo (2003) 7 NWLR Pt.818 P.163 Solomon v. Magaji (1982) 11 SC. P.1. Wassah & Ors. v. Kara & Ors. (2014) – SC.309/2001

Was this dictum helpful?

WHERE ORAL EVIDENCE IN PRIOR TRIAL MAY BE USED

Ariku v. Ajiwogbo (1962) All NLR (Pt. 4) 630, Ademola CJF (of blessed memory) delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court stated the law as follows:- “This court has frequently directed attention to the practice, now not uncommon of making use of evidence of a witness in another case as if it were evidence in the case on trial. As was pointed out in Alade v. Aborishade (1960) 5 FSC 167 at 171, this is only permissible under section 33 or 34 of the Evidence Act. Where a witness in a former case is giving evidence in a case in hand, his former evidence may be brought up in cross-examination to discredit him if he was lying, but evidence used for this purpose does not become evidence in the case in hand for any other purpose. There are also prerequisites to the making use of the former testimony of a witness; for example his attention must be called to the former case where such evidence was given and he would be reminded of what he had said on the occasion.”

Was this dictum helpful?

No more related dictum to show.