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STARE DECISIS ON SIMILAR FACTS

Dictum

It is settled that Courts, including this Court are bound by the earlier decisions of the apex Court on same or similar facts determined on the basis of same or similar legislations in their subsequent determination of cases in respect of same or similar facts and on the basis of same or similar legislations. See ATOLAGBE & ANOR V. AWUNI & ORS (1997) LPELR – 593 (SC) and DR. UMAR V. ADMIRAL MURTALA NYAKO & ORS (2014) LPELR – 22878 (SC).

– M.D. Muhammad JSC. Odey v. Alaga (2021) – SC.9/2021

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[DS] IT IS EMBARRASSING FOR A LOWER COURT TO SET ASIDE A DECISION OF A HIGHER COURT

It is also not in dispute that following the order of 19 th March, 09 which had been carried out, the respondents appealed to this court against the grant of same and followed up with an application for an injunction restraining the receiver appointed from acting in that office. It is when this application and the appeal were in existence that the respondents orally applied to have the Court of Appeal order of 19/3/09 discharged. Thus when this order was discharged on 1/7/09 it completely rendered ineffective and nugatory the motion and the appeal pending before the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. This situation, with tremendous respect to the learned senior counsel to the respondents’ is extremely embarrassing to our judicial system and the order of seniority of the court of record in Nigeria. In the first place, the trial court is bound by the orders of the Court of Appeal and I therefore wonder where the trial court conjured its jurisdiction to discharge the higher court’s order, not being a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction without any reference to the higher court. This is to dis-organise the constitutionally well arranged seniority of courts Hierarchy of courts and staire decises brushed aside. My Lords, a trial court may not be satisfied with the orders or findings of the Court of Appeal, there is nothing it can do about it, its constitutional and judicial role is either to obey or enforce that order, any act or process challenging the said order would have to be referred to the Court of Appeal any act to the contrary would amount to a breach of the constitutional provisions of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The same applies to the Court of Appeal where the Supreme Court’s order is in question. By granting the order of discharge not made by it but by a higher court the trial court has in effect knocked off the substratum or lis of the appeal against the grant of that order now pending before this court.

— Mutaka-Coomassie, JSC. Shinning Star Nig. Ltd. v. AKS Steel Nigeria Ltd. (2011) – SC. 101/2010

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EACH CASE IS ONLY AN AUTHORITY FOR WHAT IT DECIDES

Let me emphasise here, and it is important to always bear in mind that the decision of a court must always be considered in the light of its own peculiar facts and circumstances. No one case is identical to another though they may be similar. Thus, each case is only an authority for what it decides. It cannot be applied across board. The case of Nwosu (supra) is different in all expects from the instant appeal and cannot be applied without more. See Skye Bank Plc & Anor. Vs. Chief Moses Bolanle Akinpelu (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt.1198), Okafor Vs. Nnaife (1987)4 NWLR (Pt.64)129, Peoples Democratic Party Vs. INEC (2018) LPELR-44373 (SC).

— J.I. Okoro, JSC. PDP v INEC (2023) – SC/CV/501/2023

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CASES ARE AUTHORITIES FOR WHAT THEY DECIDE

It is trite law that cases are authorities for what they decide such, that it is not helpful to flog authorities where the facts and circumstances of cases are different. See PDP VS INEC (2018) LPELR-44373 (SC) AND OLLEY VS TUNJI (2015) 10 NWLR (PT. 1362) 374.

— A. Osadebay, J. APC v INEC & Ors. (EPT/KN/GOV/01/2023, 20th Day of September, 2023)

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THERE ARE TIMES WHEN DEPARTURE FROM PRECEDENT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE LAW

✓ In Bucknor Maclean v. Inlaks Limited (1980) 8-11 S.C. 1, the decisions overruled were clearly shown to become vehicles of injustice and this Court could not allow such state of affairs to continue and my late learned brother, Idigbe, J.S.C. fully gave expression to this when reading the lead judgment at page 25, he said. “I share the view of Lord Morris in Conway v. Rimmer that “though precedent is an indispensable foundation on which to decide what is the law, there may be times when a departure from precedent is in the interest of justice and the proper development of the law.” . . . I see no more justification for perpetuating recent error than for retaining any uncorrected error in much older decisions of this court.”

✓ In Golak Nath v. State of Punjab Air (1967) S.C. 1643, Subba R. CJ. (on behalf of himself, Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ. said at page 1670: “A final appeal is made to us that we shall not take a different view as the decision in Sankari Prasads case (1952) SCR 89-AIR 1951 S.C. 458 held the field for many years. While ordinarily this court will be reluctant to reverse its previous decisions, it is its duty in the constitutional field to correct itself as early for otherwise the future progress of the country and the happiness of the people will be at stake. As we are convinced that the decision in Sankari Prasad’s case 1952 SCR 89-(AIR 1951 S.C. 458) is wrong it is pre-eminently a typical case where the court should overrule it.

✓ Instances of this are to be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. In Planny v. Ferguson (1896) 163 V.S. 537, the Court, in a segregation case, held that once, in public facilities accommodation was separate but equal it was constitutional to compel segregation of races in the use thereof. In Brown v. Topeka (1954) 347 V.S. 483, that is sixty years later, the court gave a decision in direct opposition to its view in Planny v. Ferguson. Times had changed and the court’s view was that attitude must change with them.

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‘STARE DECISIS’ IS TO STAND BY THINGS DECIDED

This appeal illustrates the fundamental importance of the principle of stare decisis in our jurisprudence. “Stare decisis” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, at Page 1443 thus: “to stand by things decided. The doctrine of precedent under which it is necessary for a Court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation. ….. “The rule of adherence to judicial precedent finds its expression in the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine is simply that, when a point or principle of law has been once officially decided or settled by the ruling of a competent Court in a case in which it is directly and necessarily involved, it will no longer be considered as open to examination or to a new ruling by the same tribunal, or by those which are bound to follow its adjudication, unless it be for urgent reasons and in exceptional cases. ….” It is settled law that for the doctrine to apply, the facts of the two cases must be the same or similar. The adherence to precedent provides for certainty of the law. See: Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250; Mailantarki v. Tongo (2017) 5 – 6 SC (Pt. II) 132; University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) LPELR – 3419 (SC) @ 26 C – F.

— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. State v. Andrew Yanga (SC.712/2018, 15 Jan 2021)

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THE IMPORTANCE OF STARE DECISIS IN OUR ADJUDICATORY SYSTEM

The most fundamental methodology of administration law in our country, as in most legal systems particularly the common law based systems, is stare decisis, the policy or legal principle which requires courts to follow judicial precedents established by previous decisions. Courts are mandatorily bound to follow the decisions of superior courts that are higher than them in the judicial hierarchy. All courts are bound to follow Supreme Court decisions in cases that are similar to the ones before them. It will amount to a very serious error of law for a court to refuse to follow the judicial precedent of a superior court higher in the judicial hierarchy in a case whose facts are obviously basically similar to the facts of the case before it. It is the kind of judicial attitude that is viewed, across jurisdictions, as a deliberate refusal to follow the law. Whatever different views a judge may hold as to how the law was applied to the facts in the precedent case, he or she is bound to follow the judicial precedent of the Supreme court or in the absence of a Supreme Court precedent, that of a superior court higher in the judicial hierarchy, provided the facts of the present case and that of the precedent case are basically similar. The mandatory duty to follow judicial precedent is in the public interest. It ensures that the adjudicatory process is organized and orderly. It ensures that the judicial application of law to facts is orderly and consistent and thereby makes the law more certain, predictable and responsive to the changed circumstances and expectations of the society. It helps to harmonize judicial opinion and ensure an orderly change of such opinion. The great success of the policy of stare decisis as a very reliable adjudicatory process for centuries, has attracted its application even in Roman Dutch based legal systems in varying degrees. In any case our indigenous traditional adjudicating system is precedent based. It will be dangerous to encourage derogations from the principle of stare decisis. The dis-equilibrating effects can better be imagined. Suffice it to say that it will certainly result in the failure of the judicial process, a failure of the legal system and the resulting collapse of the state structure. These consequences which may appear remote can occur as a direct result of such derogations.

– E.A. Agim, JCA. Ogidi v. Okoli [2014] – CA/AK/130/2012

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