Oputa, JSC in his judgment in Ojukwu’s case (1986) 17 NSCC 304 at 322 referred to Lord Denning’s dicta in the case of Agbor v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1969) 1 WLR 703 at page 707 where the learned Lord Justice stated that:- “The plain fact here is that Mr & Mrs Agbor claim as of right to be entitled to possession of the ground floor of this house. They occupied it on February 4. They entered by stealth. They used a key that had been left behind. But they did it under a claim of right. It may be that they had no such right as they claimed. But, even so, the proper way to evict her was by application to the courts of law. No one is entitled to take possession of premises by a strong hand or with a multitude of people. That has been forbidden ever since the Statute of Richard II against forcible entry. This applies to the police as much as to anyone else. It applies to the government departments also. And to the Nigerian High Commission. If they are entitled to possession, they must regain it by due process of law. They must not take the law into their own hands. They must apply to the courts for possession and act only on the authority of the courts.”
THEORY OF THE RULE OF LAW VIS-A-VIS CUSTOMARY LAW – PECULIARITY OF NIGERIAN SITUATION
The theory of the rule of law which is now commonly canvassed and resorted to by politicians, journalists, and even lawyers to describe innominate situations seems to me much wider than the formulation of the Rule by Dicey in the late 18th century. It is different from the rule familiar to Constitutional lawyers. The principles in the rule as stated by Dicey are three. The first is the absolute supremacy of law as opposed to the exercise of arbitrary power. The second is the equality of all persons before the law. The third is that the constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land as interpreted by the courts. It is important to bear in mind that Dicey formulated the rule of law with respect to the unwritten Constitution of England, and in relation to the nature and content of English law – common law and statutory. There is no doubt he had in mind the application of democratic principles of the Westminster style and the impartial enforcement of the laws of England. The rules enunciated by Dicey were formulated in contrast with the situation in foreign countries. Our circumstances in this country are not identical. They are peculiar. We have adopted English law as the general law. We did not abolish all our own laws and customs which govern our ways of life in many important respects. We have also adopted the principles of democracy as recognised in West European countries. Undoubtedly, these principles adopted must be applied with necessary modification and adaptation within the context of the laws adopted, recognised and applicable in our communities. Of course where any such laws are incompatible with our democratic values, they are by our Constitution to be rejected. Hence the Court of Appeal ought to have shown which of the rules of law or its variant is inconsistent with the custom being rejected. The custom applies uniformly only to defaulting members of the Age grade society. It is the law as accepted by them. It is, on the evidence, the law recognised by the community.
– Karibe-Whyte JSC. Agbai v. Okogbue (1991) – SC 104/1989