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POWER TO REVOKE BY GOVERNOR IS DERIVED FROM THE LAND USE ACT, AND NOT THE LAND TENURE LAW

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In other words, the provisions of Land Tenure Law is to be followed in the administration of land under the control and management of the Military Governor under the Land Use Act. Further, the provisions of the Land Tenure Law applicable for the purpose are to be modified so as to bring the law into conformity with the Act or its general intendment. It is not the Land Tenure Law that is in operation but the Land Use Act. The provisions of the Land Tenure Law has therefore been incorporated into the Decree for the purpose of administering the lands under the control and management of the Military Governor. Since the Land Use Act came into force in March, 1978, the power a Governor/Military Governor has to grant a statutory right of occupancy and to revoke the statutory right of occupancy is derived from the Land Use Act and NOT the Land Tenure Law or State Land Law. It is a gross misconception of the true state of the law to think or hold the view that because the Land Use Act orders the administration of lands under the control of the Military Governor to be in accordance with the provisions of the Land Tenure Law in the Northern States that the powers exercised are powers under the Land Tenure Law. Both the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant/applicant could only have obtained their grant of statutory right of occupancy under the Land Use Act. The revocation of the right of occupancy could equally only have been exercised under the Land Use Act although in compliance with the procedure prescribed by the Land Tenure Law. The reference to the Land Tenure Law in the Deed of Revocation was a mistake occasioned by a misreading of section 4(a) of the Land Use Act.

— Obaseki, JSC. Saude v. Abdullahi (1989) – SC.197/1987

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SERVICE OF NOTICE MUST BE EFFECTED ON LAND OWNER FOR REVOCATION TO BE VALID

One cannot but continue to emphasize that where a statute specifically provides for a particular way in which Government or any party can obtain title, the Government or the party can only acquire title by strict compliance with the statute, unless the statute or its wording is against the constitution of the Land. Another way of stating it is that there should be strict compliance with the issue of serving notice on land owners or interested persons in compulsory acquisition of land in accordance with the provisions of the law aforesaid. See Provost Lagos State College of Education & Ors v Dr. Kolawole Edun & Ors (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt.870) 476 at 506; Okeowo v Attorney-General Ogun State (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt.1219) 327.

— M. Peter-Odili, JSC. Goldmark & Ors. v. Ibafon Co. & Ors. (2012) – SC.421/2001

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REVOCATION MUST BE FOR OVERRIDING PUBLIC INTEREST; HOLDER MUST BE NOTIFIED

Furthermore, the Act itself provides some checks and balances which must be observed before making any grant, the conditions under which such grants can be revoked and what follows after such revocation. It provides under S. 28 that the Governor can only revoke a right of occupancy for overriding public interest’ which has been defined both in respect of statutory and customary rights of occupancy. If such powers of revocation are to be exercised, the holder of the right of occupancy must be notified in advance. Revocation of a right of occupancy for public purpose or in the public interest does not include the revocation of the right of a grantee for the purpose of vesting it in another. Therefore, since revocation of the grant involves the deprivation of the proprietary rights and obligations of a grantee, all the terms and conditions laid down by the Act must be strictly adhered to and complied with. And so for a revocation of a right of occupancy to be valid in Nigeria, it must be made strictly in compliance with S. 28 of the Land Use Act.

— Mohammed, JSC. C.S.S. Bookshops v. Muslim Community & Ors. (2006) – SC.307/2001

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NOTICE OF REVOCATION MUST BE SERVED ON OCCUPIER OF LAND

A person who is not the proven owner or occupier of land in respect of which notice of acquisition or revocation is issued has no locus standi in law to seek nullification of the acquisition. Elegushi v. Oseni (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt.945) pg.348. It would amount to sufficient service of a notice of acquisition of a piece of land or of revocation of grant in respect of the land if service of the notice is effected on the occupier of the land. Elegushi v. Oseni (2005) 14 NWLR (pt.945) pg.348. Obikoya & Sons Ltd. v. Gov. Lagos State (1987) 1 NWLR (pt.50) pg.385.

— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Goldmark & Ors. v. Ibafon Co. & Ors. (2012) – SC.421/2001

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REVOCATION OF LAND MUST BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 28 OF THE LAND USE ACT

It is not at all in doubt that the provisions of section 28 of the Act contains comprehensive provisions to guide the Governor of a State in the exercise of his vast powers of control of land within the territorial areas of his State particularly the power of revocation of a right of occupancy. One of the preconditions for the exercise of this power of revocation is that it must be shown clearly to be for overriding public interest. In order not to leave the Governor in any doubt as to the conditions for the exercise of his powers, the law went further to provide adequate guidance by defining in clear terms what overriding public interest means in the case of a statutory right of occupancy under the Act in subsection (2) of section 28. What this means of course is obvious. Any revocation of a right of occupancy by the Governor in exercise of powers under the Act must be within the confine of the provisions of section 28 of the Act. Consequently, any exercise of this power of revocation for purposes outside those outlined or enumerated by section 28 of the Act or not carried out in compliance with provisions of the section, can be regarded as being against the policy and intention of the Land Use Act resulting in the exercise of the power being declared invalid, null and void by a competent court in exercise of its jurisdiction on a complaint by an aggrieved party.

— Mohammed, JSC. C.S.S. Bookshops v. Muslim Community & Ors. (2006) – SC.307/2001

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PROVISION ON COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF A PERSON’S LAND MUST BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY

Any provision of the law which gives or governs compulsory acquisition of a person’s property must be construed by the court fortissimo contra preferentes. Such a statute should be construed by the court strictly against the acquiring authority and sympathetically in favour of the complainant or the owner or possessor of the property against any irregularity in the procedure for acquisition as laid down by the enabling statute. See Peenock Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1983) 4 NCLR 122 at 115; Alhaji Bello v. Diocesan Synod of Lagos (1973) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 247 at 268; Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd. v. Chief Ogunbiyi (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt 255) 543; Osho v. Foreign Finance Corporation (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 157.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. C.S.S. Bookshops v. Muslim Community & Ors. (2006) – SC.307/2001

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ONCE LAND IS REVOKED, PARTY HAS CLAIM IN COMPENSATION ONLY

My lords, once Exhibit B is revoked, the appellant and respondent no longer have any rights to the Plot. All their rights stand extinguished. Their only remedy is compensation as provided by Section 44(1) of the Constitution. It is strange to suggest that with the revocation of Exhibit B the appellants interest therein is transferred to Exhibit A. That is not the position in Law or Equity. The appellant’s interest in Exhibit B died with the revocation. Consequently, the appellant forcefully entering Exhibit A confers on the respondent an enforceable cause of action. The respondent was right to go to court to seek redress and the court was correct to enter judgment for him.

— Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. Ibekwe v. Nwosu (2011) – SC.108/2006

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