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PARTY CANNOT RESILE AFTER SUBMISSION TO CUSTOMARY ARBITRATION

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On these facts of the customary arbitration by the Abuloma Council of Chiefs before whom the parties herein lead consensually submitted themselves to for the resolution of their dispute and the verdict of which arbitration was acceptable to all of them, it would no longer be open to either of the parties to subsequently back out or resile from the decision or verdict reached and pronounced upon the arbitration. See Oparaji v. Ohanu (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 290, (2001) FWLR (Pt. 43) 385. The appellants are now estopped from resiling out of the customary arbitration of the Abuloma Council of Chiefs, which they voluntarily submitted their dispute with the respondents to, and agreed to accept the verdict of. Apart from this specie of estoppel operating as estoppel per rem judicatam; it also operates as estoppel by conduct by virtue of section 150 of the Evidence Act, 1990 (now section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011). It is, therefore, unconscionable for the appellants, having by their words or conduct made the respondents to believe that they would be bound by the verdict of the Abuloma Council of Chiefs, to resile out of it and set up the suit, the subject of this appeal. See Joe Iga & Ors. v. Ezekiel Amakiri & Ors. (1976) 11 SC 1 at pages 12 – 13.

— Eko JSC. Benjamin v Kalio (2017) – SC/207/2006

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ARBITRAL AWARD IS BINDING ON PARTIES

It is important to note here that all these facts were before Longe J when the application which led to this appeal was being considered. It is also equally important to say that it was open to either of the parties to apply to the Court in England to set aside, the award if either felt that the arbitrator had misconducted himself or that the award on its face was wrong. The necessary consequence of the award is that if neither of the parties applied to set it aside, it was liable to be enforced as binding on the parties.

— Oguntade, JCA. Adwork Ltd. v Nigeria Airways Ltd. (1999) – CA/L/156/99

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WRONG FACT FINDING CANNOT SET ASIDE AN ARBITRAL AWARD

In arbitration proceedings, the general principle is that facts finding by an Arbitrator is not a ground for setting aside an award on the ground that it is wrong nor on the ground that there is no evidence on which the facts could be found because that would be mere error of law.

– Garba, JCA. Dunlop v. Gaslink (2018)

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LITIGATION PREPONDERATES OVER ARBITRATION IN THIS INSTANCES

No doubt, there are some instances where even though parties have submitted to arbitration, suitability of litigation preponderates over arbitration. These are instances among others: 1. Where the issue for resolution is essentially a legal one. 2. Where the issue turns largely on the credibility of the evidence. 3. Where immediate enforcement of a right is required. 4. Where one of the parties is intransigent. 5. Where there are multiparty disputes arising from a transaction e.t.c. Thus an arbitration agreement cannot and does not completely oust the jurisdiction of the Court. U

BA v Triedent Consulting Ltd. (SC.CV/405/2013, July 07, 2023)

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FROM THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE IT SHOWS THAT ARBITRATION MAY BE MORE OPEN TO FRAUD

582. Regardless of my decision, I hope the facts and circumstances of this case may provoke debate and reflection among the arbitration community, and also among state users of arbitration, and among other courts with responsibility to supervise or oversee arbitration. The facts and circumstances of this case, which are remarkable but very real, provide an opportunity to consider whether the arbitration process, which is of outstanding importance and value in the world, needs further attention where the value involved is so large and where a state is involved. 583. The risk is that arbitration as a process becomes less reliable, less able to find difficult but important new legal ground, and more vulnerable to fraud. The present case shows that having (as here) a tribunal of the greatest experience and expertise is not enough. Without reflection, then a case such as the present could happen again, and not reach the court.

— R. Knowles CBE. FRN v. Process & Industrial Developments Limited [2023] EWHC 2638 (Comm)

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TIME LIMIT TO SET ASIDE AN ARBITRATION AWARD

It can easily be observed that the provisions of Section 29 are complementary to the provisions of Section 32 in that they only provide the time limit and the discretion to set aside an award on proof that it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to the arbitration. The provisions of the two (2) sections are therefore neither in conflict nor mutually exclusive of each other as erroneously argued by the learned counsel for the Appellant.

– Garba, JCA. Dunlop v. Gaslink (2018)

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ARBITRAL AWARDS HAVE SAME FORCE AS A JUDGEMENT OF A COURT

Onwu v. Nka (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt.458) 1 at 17 paragraph E, where the Supreme Court, per Iguh JSC. had this to say: “The law is well settled that where disputes or matters in difference between two or more parties are by consent of the disputants submitted to a domestic forum inclusive of arbitrators or a body of persons who may be invested with judicial authority to hear and determine such disputes and matters for investigation in accordance with customary law and general usages, and a decision is duly given, it is as conclusive and unimpeachable (unless and until set aside on any of the recognized grounds) as the decision of any constituted court of the land, such a decision is consequently binding on the parties and the courts in appropriate cases will enforce it.”

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