Therefore, for the plaintiff to be able to rely on part performance, he must be the person who has been let into possession of land and allowed to alter his position for the worse by carrying out acts in performance of the contract. Equity then come to his aid arising from the changed position in which he finds himself.
– Uwaifo JSC. Ekpanya v. Akpan (1988)
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On the issue of whether the appellant established sufficient acts of part performance to support and order for specific performance, it is the view of the court below that there had been no part performance to warrant a specific performance. I have myself considered all the evidence led before the court but can find no reason to fault this finding. At all events, whether or not part performance was established by the appellant in this case cannot now be regarded as any matter of great moment. This is because of my finding that there can be no specific performance of an agreement for a lease such as Exhibit A when the parties had not reached a consensus ad idem on vital issues such as the commencement date. The covenant, rent and mode of determination of the lease among others.
– Iguh JSC. Nlewedim v. Uduma (1995)
In Mogaji and Ors v. Cadbury Fry (Export) Ltd. (supra) at p. 88, Madarikan, JSC, delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court said: “Possession of a parcel of land means the occupation or physical control of the land either personally or through an agent. As stated by Lord Fitzgerald in Lord Advocate v. Young (1887) 12 App. Cas. 544 at p. 556, by possession is meant possession of that character of which the thing possessed is capable. Thus, if a person adduced evidence that he or his agent or servant were cultivating a farmland that would be evidence sufficient to establish that he was in possession of the land. Similarly, if a person erects on a parcel of land a signboard bearing his name, he hereby gives notice to all and sundry that he is in possession of the land.”
The essential distinction which could be made between a “holder” and an “Occupier” as defined, is that whereas the former is a person entitled in law to a right of occupancy, the latter is not a person so entitled. The legal effect of the distinction is that an “occupier” will necessarily hold of a “holder” who would at the commencement of the Land Use Act be entitled to a customary right of occupancy. Hence, the fact that the “occupier” is in possession, and the “holder” is not, does not alter the true legal status of the parties.
– Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Abioye v. Yakubu (1991) – SC.169/1987
In a case where the landlord does not know the names of the illegal occupiers of his land or cannot even physically identify all of them, the requirement that the persons be made defendants to the action would result in great injustice and hardship to the landlord or land owner thus giving rise to the procedure under Order 50 – Nnodi v. Thanks Investment Ltd (2005) 11 NWLR (pt 935) 29.
– Abiru, JCA. Okoli v. Gaya (2014)
✓ Ponsford v. H.M.S. Aerosols (supra). Here there was lease dated August 19, 1968 of factory premises in Barking for 21 years and the revision of rent was to be referred to a surveyor under an arbitration clause where the parties disagree on the revised rent. In 1969, the premises were burnt down and rebuilt out of the proceeds of insurance. The licence for the improvements which were in fact made was contained in a document dated November 14, 1969, where in clause 1 it provided: “The landlords hereby grant unto the tenants licence to execute in and upon the demised premises the several alterations and works indicated in the plan annexed …. It is hereby agreed and declared that all the lessee’s covenants and conditions contained in the lease which are now applicable to the premises demised thereby shall continue to be applicable to the same when and as altered and shall extend to all additions which may be made thereto in the course of such alterations.” The lease of August 19, 1968 indicated, inter alia, that the rent would be assessed “as reasonable rent for the demised premises”. The trial judge. held that a reasonable rent for the premises should be assessed without taking account of the improvements made by the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed on the ground that the judge was wrong in his construction of the rent review clause. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, by a majority of 2:1, reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that the revised rent would include the improvements made on the demised premises.
✓ Cuff v. J. & F. Stone Proper Ltd. (supra) provided that improvement on the land should not be wholly disregarded. Cuffs case is different from the case before us in the sense that the improvements on the land had been made prior to the execution of the lease. Accordingly the improvement, unless expressly excluded, must be taken into account in computing the revised rent. In the instant case there was not improvement on the bare land at the time of the lease, and the subsequent improvement did not form part of the demised premises. Without doubt, the improvements in the Cuff case formed part of the demised premises.
This case has once more highlighted the unnecessary difficulties created by lack of precision and inelegant drafting of statutes. The Land Use Act as a major legislation affecting the fortunes of every Nigerian leaves a lot to be desired in its drafting. The Land Use Act is an existing law and, as I declared in another forum earlier on last year, has come to stay with us. Laudable as the intention of the Act declared in the provisions of section 1 is, it is my opinion that it cannot be realised as long as the administrative provisions which deprive all Nigerians of the use and benefit of the land vested in the Military Governor remains. It is for Nigerians through their representatives (elected and non elected) to give detailed examinations to these provisions and make the necessary amendments to enable the Act achieve its laudable purpose.
– Obaseki, JSC. Savannah v. Ajilo (1989)
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