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ORDINARY COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION IN PRE-ELECTION MATTERS

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The same approach adopted by the Respondents in Amaechi’s case was also adopted in the instant case. The belief was that if elections were conducted that would put an end to the appellants case or “kill his case”. The jurisdiction of ordinary court in pre-election matters is sacrosanct and the holding of such an election when the action was pending would not deprive the ordinary court of its jurisdiction to conclude the matter, even to the appeal court. It is to be noted that the appellant in this case took steps immediately he was aware of this substitution. He instituted this action before the conduct of the election and had been steadfast, believing in the judicial process that justice would be done. He did not stand by and allowed the party to be heard to fight for the election and therefore seek to take the benefit of the result of the election by proceeding to seeks for the enforcement of his right after the election. All what I have been labouring to state is that he did not sleep over his right. If this action had been instituted after the conduct and declaration of the election I would have held that the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the pre-election matters has been over taken by event.

– Coomassie JSC. Odedo v. INEC (2008)

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TECHNICALITIES IN ELECTION PETITIONS – IT NEVER SOLVES BASIC ISSUES IN CONTROVERSIES

It is now trite law that election petitions are sui generis that is, that they are in class of their own and are governed by different rules. An election petition is by nature a very peculiar proceeding which distinguishes it from an ordinary civil proceeding. See Abubakar v. Yar’adua (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt 1120) 1. In Nwole v. Iwuagwu (2004) 15 NWLR (Pt 895) 61 the Court, held thus: “The courts have often harped on the need to do substantial justice in most cases without dwelling too much on technicalities … in all election matters, the use of technicalities should be avoided, as technicalities merely help to shut the opponent out. It never resolves basic issues in controversy. Once it is agreed that election petitions are in a class of their own, the handling of the matter too must take a form devoid of legal technicalities that tend to leave the litigants more confused. Boldness of a high degree is required of the electoral tribunal, which must never be seen to shy away from obvious grave allegations.”

— J.S. Abiriyi, JCA. Aregbesola v Omisore (2014) – CA/AK/EPT/GOV/05/237/2014

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WITNESS DEPOSITION NOT FILED BY A WITNESS AS AT THE TIME OF FILING THE PETITION WILL NOT BE COUNTENANCED

Peoples’ Democratic Party v. Chibuzor Okogbuo & Ors (2019) LPELR-48989 (CA) at p.24-25, when it said (per Orji-Abadua, JCA) that: “What is deducible is that Witness Deposition filed by a witness not listed in the Petition cannot be countenanced by the Court or Tribunal after the expiration of the time prescribed for the filing of the Petition. It was stressed by this court therein that to allow a Petitioner to file an additional witness statement at any stage of the Election proceedings would destroy the regulated environment that must exist to ensure that both parties to the petition are expeditiously heard and the Petition determined within 180 days from the date of the Petition. This court observed that such an indulgence would remove the control of the pace of the proceedings from the control of the Constitution, the Electoral Act and the First Schedule to the Electoral Act and leave it at the whim of the parties and open the floodgate for all kinds of abuses of the judicial process.”

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PETITIONER IN AN ELECTION MUST PROVE NONCOMPLIANCE FIRST

In Buhari v Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (Part 941) 1, when the case came to the Supreme Court on appeal, the court held that where an allegation of non-compliance with the electoral law is made, the onus lies on the petitioner firstly to establish the non-compliance, and secondly, that it did or could have affected the result of the election. It is after the petitioner has established the foregoing that the onus would shift to the respondent whose election is challenged, to establish that the result was not affected.

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REGISTER OF VOTERS IS REQUIRED TO PROVE NO ACCREDITATION OF VOTERS

It is clear from the provisions of S.47(1) and (2) of the Electoral Act 2022 and Regulations 14(a) and (b), 18(a) and (b), 19(b) and (e) that the Register of voters for each polling unit is relevant evidence to prove the alleged non accreditations of voters in the 744 polling units on the election day. It is worth stating that in the event of a conflict between the record of accredited voters in the BVAS machine and ticked names in the Register of voters due to human errors in the ticking of the names in the Register of voters, the BVAS Record shall prevail.

— E.A. Agim, JSC. Oyetola v INEC & Ors. (2022) – SC/CV/508/2023

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ELECTORAL RESULT DECLARED BY INEC ENJOY PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY

Primarily, the law is well settled that the results declared by INEC (1st Respondent) in an election enjoy a presumption of regularity. In other words, they are prima facie correct. See Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, recently applied by the Supreme Court in ATUMA V. APC & ORS (2023) LPELR-60352 (SC) where JAURO, JSC held at PP 40-41 as follows: “By virtue of Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, presumption of regularity inures in favour of judicial or official acts, including those carried out by INEC. The exact words of the subsection are thus: “When any judicial or official act is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular, it is presumed that formal requisites for its validity were complied with.” See P.D.P. V.I.N.E.C. (2022) 18 NWLR (PT. 1863) 653, UDOM V. UMANA (NO. 1)(2016) 12 NWLR (PT. 1526) 179. Fortunately for the Appellant and 1st Respondent, it is only a presumption, which implies that it is rebuttable. Any person who questions the validity of an act in favour of which there is a presumption of regularity, has a duty to rebut the presumption with cogent and credible evidence. A flimsy or half-hearted rebuttal will not suffice.”

— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Atiku v PDP (CA/PEPC/05/2023, 6th of September, 2023)

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DOUBLE NOMINATION IS A PRE-ELECTION MATTER; THE BASIS OF QUALIFICATION/DISQUALIFICATION

Considering the facts pleaded above, it is clear that, the claim of disqualification or non-qualification of the 3rd Respondent is centred solely on the invalid or double nomination of the 4th Respondent. However, it is the settled law that, the issue of nomination of a candidate at an election is a pre-election matter. Therefore, the issue of qualification or disqualification can only be ventilated on the grounds enumerated in Sections 131 or 137 of the Constitution … It therefore means that, the conditions of qualification or disqualifica are those prescribed under Sections 131 and 137, in case of persons contesting for Presidential Office. That means that, where it is alleged in an election petition, that a person is or was not qualified to contest election to the office of President of Nigeria, as stipulated in Section 134(1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2022, it is Sections 131 and 137 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that are applicable. See PDP v. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (pt.1437) 525; Kakih v. PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (pt. 1430) 424-425, Ucha v. Onwe (2011) 4 NWLR (pt. 1237) 386 at 427 and Captain Idris Ichaila Wada & Or v. Yahaya Bello & Ors (2016) LPELR 41263 (CA). Thus, where election has been conducted and result declared, such election cannot be questioned on grounds of qualification save under Sections 131 and 137 of the Constitution, in the case of a Presidential election. This postulation is supported by Section 134(3) of the Electoral Act where it is stipulated that: “With respect to Subsection 1(a), a person is deemed to be qualified for an elective office and his election shall not be questioned on grounds of qualification if, with respect to the particular election in question, he meets the applicable requirements of Sections 65, 106, 131 or 177 of the Constitution and he is not, as may be applicable, in breach of Sections 66, 107, 137 or 182 of the Constitution.” As stated earlier, the applicable provisions are Sections 131 and 137 of the Constitution. It is clear from the plenitude of the pleadings in this petition, that the facts grounding the Petitioner’s claim of disqualification or non-qualification of the 3rd and 4th Respondents is hinged on double and invalid nomination of the 4th Respondent. I had pointed out earlier in the course of this Ruling that, the issue of qualification or disqualification of a candidate at an election is strictly a requirement of the Constitution. It is held by the Supreme Court in Alhassan & Anor v. Ishaku & Ors (2016) LPELR 40083 (SC) That: “…, by virtue of the provisions of Section 138(1)(a) of the Electoral Act, a Tribunal’s power to decide whether a person is qualified to contest an election is restricted to establishing the requirements of Section 177 and 182 of the Constitution against the adverse party. An Election Tribunal has no jurisdiction to inquire into the primaries of a political party.”

— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. APM v INEC & Ors. (2023) – CA/PEPC/04/2023

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