Documentary evidence always serves as a hanger from which to assess oral testimony.
– Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. Cameroon v. Otutuizu (2011) – SC.217/2004
Documentary evidence always serves as a hanger from which to assess oral testimony.
– Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. Cameroon v. Otutuizu (2011) – SC.217/2004
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Now, here is a man dragging another person to Court over what at best are mere discrepancies in names when he himself is a victim of some discrepancies in his name on Exhibit P2 without any legal consequences whatsoever. Was he also guilty of forgery by the differences in the spelling of his surname in Exhibits P1 and P2 as admitted by him and confirmed by the Court below? Perhaps not. In my finding, these are things which are bound to occur from time to time in human affairs and so long as no criminal intention is imputed and attributed or attributable to them they remain mere trifles tolerated by the society as mere discrepancies. It amounts to no crime of forgery and or false statement at all merely on account of such mere discrepancies. These are mere discrepancies that should not ipso facto without more invoke and ignite grave allegations capable of disqualifying a candidate in law from aspiring to ‘serve his people’. Curiously though as an aside now and no more considering issue three having concluded my consideration of issue three, as I was reading the appellate briefs of counsel, I came across the name of the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent written and signed as ‘J. I. Odibeli Esq,’ then I saw his NBA Seal in the name of ‘Ibezimako Joseph Odibeli, which translates to ‘I. J. Odibelei’ and not ‘J.I. Odibeli.’
– B.A. Georgewill, JCA. Ganiyu v. Oshoakpemhe & Ors. (2021) – CA/B/12A/2021
Long v. Millar (1879) 4 CPD 450, said Russel, J., in Stokes v. Whicher (1920) 1 Ch 411, 418, comes to this; that, if you can spell out of the document a reference in it to some other transaction, you are at liberty to give evidence as to what that other transaction is, and, if that other transaction contains all the terms in writing, then you get a sufficient memorandum within the statute by reading the two together.’
Timmins v. Moreland Street Property Co. Ltd. (1958) Ch. 110 which shows the relaxation of the earlier rules and that there need not be a specific or express reference from one document to the other document in order to constitute a memorandum required under the Statute of Frauds as is sufficient if by necessary implication there should be reference from one to the other. Jenkins L.J., (as he then was), said at page 130: “The rule has no doubt been considerably relaxed since Peirce v. Corf LR. 9 QB. 210 was decided in 1874, but I think it is still indispensably necessary, in order to justify the reading of documents together for this purpose, that there should be a document signed by the party to be charged, which, while not containing in itself all the necessary ingredients of the required memorandum, does contain some reference, express or implied, to some other document or transaction. Where any such reference can be spelt out of a document so signed, then parol evidence may be given to identify the other document referred to, or, as the case may be, to explain the other transaction, and to identify any document relating to it. If by this process a document is brought to light which contains in writing all the terms of the bargain so far as not contained in the document signed by the party to be charged, then the two documents can be read together so as to constitute a sufficient memorandum for the purpose of Section 40.”
By the combined effect of Sections 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act, 2011, documents (Public or Private) may be produced in Court by tendering either the original of the document itself or the copy thereof known as secondary evidence: but a party relying on secondary evidence of a public document must produce the certified true copy and no other copy thereof is admissible.
— C.B. Ogunbiyi, JSC. Kassim v. State (2017) – SC.361/2015
The simple and straightforward answer to this argument is that the issue of dumping of documents on court, which expression in any case suggests that the documents so dumped are already in evidence before the court, only goes to the weight to be attached to the documents by the court. On this reasoning, this ground of the objection is rejected and overruled.
— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Atiku v PDP (CA/PEPC/05/2023, 6th of September, 2023)
I must note right away, that the admissibility or otherwise of an unregistered registerable instrument depends on the purpose for which it is being sought to be admitted. – Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)
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