OFFER & A COUNTEROFFER

THE ILLEGAL PART OF A CONTRACT CAN BE SEVERED FROM THE OTHER LEGAL PART

This is because it is a recognized principle of law that a contract will rarely be totally illegal or void: certain parts may be entirely lawful in themselves, while others are valid. Where the illegal or void parts can be “severed” from the rest of the contract on the well-known principles of severance such will be done and the rest of the contract enforced without the void part. It is permissible for courts to adopt this course where the objectionable part of the contract involves merely a void step or promise and is not fundamental, and it is possible to simply strike down the offending part without re-writing or remaking the contract for the parties and without altering the scope and intention of the agreement; and lastly, the contract, shorn of the offending parts, retains the characteristics of a valid contract. See on these Vol. 9 Hals. Laws of England (4th Edn.) p.297 in paragraph 430. See also Commercial Plastics Ltd. v. Vincent (1964) 3 All E.R. 546, C.A.

— Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC. Adesanya v Otuewu (1993) – SC.217/1989

WHEN A CONTRACT OF SALE EXISTS

A contract of sale exists where there is a final and complete agreement of the parties on essential terms of the contract, namely the parties to the contract, the property to be sold, the consideration for the sale and the nature of the interest to be granted. Once there is agreement on these essential terms, a contract of sale of land or property is made and concluded. In a contract for sale of property, where part, payment was paid, the law is that the contract for purchase has been concluded and is final, leaving the payment of the balance outstanding to be paid, The contract for the sale and purchase is absolute and complete for which each party can be in breach for non-performance and for which an action can be maintained for specific performance.

— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) – SC.231/2006

FORMING A CONTRACT – MUTUAL ASSENT

The nature of the plaintiffs/appellants’ claim, as averred in their amended Statement of Claim, which of course they failed to prove, was that there was a subsisting contract between the parties. Whether or not there is a semblance of a legally binding agreement between the parties, that is, a situation where the parties to the contract confer rights and impose liabilities on themselves, will largely depend on whether there exists a mutual assent between them. Where there is doubt on whether the parties have concluded a legally binding agreement, the court has the responsibility to analyse the circumstances surrounding the alleged agreement and determine whether the traditional notion of ‘offer’ and “acceptance” can be distilled from the purported agreement. The mutual assent must be outwardly manifested. The test of the existence of such mutuality is objective. See Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society v Price (1943) AC 455 at 463. When there is mutual assent, the parties are said to be ad idem. Now the two items, “offer” and “acceptance”, earlier referred to, call for some explanation in order to recognise whether or not the parties are ad idem. An ‘offer’ is an expression of readiness to contract on the terms specified by the offeror (i.e. the person making the offer) which if accepted by the offeree (i.e. the person to whom the offer is made) will give rise to a binding contract. In other words, it is by acceptance that the offer is converted into a contract.

— Achike, JSC. Sparkling Breweries v Union Bank (SC 113/1996, 13 July 2001)

TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF SERVICE BRINGS TO AN END MASTER-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP

Chukuma v. Shell Petroleum Development Company (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512 at 560 where Karibi-Whyte JSC said: “In the ordinary case and following the common law principle,termination of a contract of service even if unlawful brings to an end the relationship of master and servant, employer and employee. This rule is based on the principle of the confidential relationship between master and servant which cannot continue in the absence of mutuality.”

WHAT IS A FUNDAMENTAL TERM OF A CONTRACT

Niger Insurance Company Ltd v Abed Brothers Ltd & Anor (1976) LPELR-1995 (SC), thus:- “A fundamental term of a contract is a stipulation which the parties have agreed either expressly or by necessary implication or which the general law regards as a condition which goes to the root of the contract so that any breach of that term may at once and without further reference to the fact and circumstances be regarded by the innocent party as a fundamental breach and thus is conferred on him the alternative remedies at his option”.

COURT SHOULD TREAT AS SACROSANCT TERMS OF AGREEMENT BY PARTIES

It must be reiterated here that the court must treat as sacrosanct the terms of an agreement freely entered into by the parties. This is because parties to a contract enjoy their freedom to contact on their own terms so long as same is lawful. The terms of a contract between parties are clothed with some degree of sanctity and if any question should arise with regard to the contract, the terms in any document which constitute the contract are invariably the guide to its interpretation when parties enter into a contract, they are bound by the terms of the contract as set out by them. It is not the business of the court to rewrite a contract for the parties. See Afrotech Services Nig Ltd. v. M.A. & Sons Ltd. (2002) 15 NWLR (pt. 692) 730 at 788.

— J.A. Fabiyi, JSC. BFI v. Bureau PE (2012) – SC.12/2008