Choses in action were not originally assignable at Common Law to enable the Assignee sue in his own name because debts or chases in action were regarded as personal see Lampet’s Case (1613) 10 Co-rep 46b, 48. Any attempted assignment was viewed as an intrusion by a third party into a dispute between two parties. However, choses in action, which may be legal or equitable, were assignable in equity. If the choses in action were legal, the Assignee could only sue in the name of the Assignor; if equitable, he could sue in his name. By Section 25 of the Judicature Act, 1873, legal choses in action were made assignable by law; and with the Law of Property Act of 1925, the usual way of assigning the benefit of a debt or other legal chose in action is as set out in Section 136. Under Section 136 of the said Law of Property Act, the basic requirements for an effective legal assignment are as follows – Only the benefit of an agreement may be assigned: The assignment must be absolute; the rights to be assigned must be wholly ascertainable and must not relate to part only of a debt; The Assignment must be in writing and signed under hand by the Assignor debtor (no particular form of wording is necessary); and Notice of the Assignment must be received by the other party or parties for the assignment to take effect. An assignment that fails to comply with these formalities may still be effective as an equitable assignment. Thus, the effect of a legal or an equitable assignment is to put the Assignee in the same position as the Assignor, in respect of the benefits arising from the original transaction with the debtor.
— A.A. Augie, JSC. Berger v Toki Rainbow (2019) – SC.332/2009