It is now settled law, that it is not every mistake in a judgment or decision that can warrant the reversal of a decision. To justify a reversal of a decision, the error complained of must be of such a nature to cause real miscarriage of justice. In the instant case, the fact that a breach was considered, even if erroneously, in appeal which does not concern the appellant, cannot be a basis for the appellant to complain.
– Musdapher JSC. Gbadamosi v. Dairo (2007)
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Law is blind. It has no eyes. It cannot see. That explains why a statue of a woman with her eyes covered can be found in front of some High Courts. On the contrary justice is not blind. It has many eyes, it sees, and sees very well. The aim of courts is to do substantial justice between the parties and any technicality that rears its ugly head to defeat the cause of justice will be rebuffed by the court. See Bello v. A.G, Oyo State (1986) 12 SC P.1 Bello v. Ringim (1991) 7 NWLR Pt.206 P.675 When justice is done it brings joy to the Righteous. See Proverbs 21:15.
— O. Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. Wassah & Ors. v. Kara & Ors. (2014) – SC.309/2001
Oputa, JSC in Bello v. Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt 45) 826 at 886: “the picture of law and its technical rules triumphant and justice prostrate may no doubt have its admirers. But the spirit of justice does not reside in forms, formalities nor in technicalities nor is the triumph of the administration of justice to be found in successfully picking one’s way between pitfalls of technicality. Law and its technical rules ought to be a handmaid to justice…”
Again to be said is that it is not every error of law that is committed by a trial or appellate Court that justifies the reversal of a judgment. For a reversal to take place, the error must have occasioned a miscarriage of justice as it was material in the decision reached.
– M. Peter-Odili JSC. Adegbanke v. Ojelabi (2021)
And justice is not a one-way traffic. It is not justice for the appellant only. Justice is not even only a two-way traffic. It is really a three-way traffic – justice for the appellant accused of a heinous crime of murder; justice for the victim, the murdered man, the deceased, “whose blood is crying to heaven for vengeance” and finally justice for the society at large – the society whose social norms and values had been desecrated and broken by the criminal act complained of. It is certainly in the interest of justice that the truth of this case should be known and that if the appellant is properly tried and found guilty, that he should be punished. That justice which seeks only to protect the appellant will not be even handed justice. It will not even be justice tempered with mercy.
— Oputa, JSC. G. Josiah v. The State (1985) – SC.59/1984
Adebayo v. Johnson (1969) 1 All NLR 176 where at page 190 this Court observed: “Even if the procedure adopted by the applicant Adebayo were wrong, we think that it is now much too late in the day for the directors to complain about it. They failed to challenge the correctness of the procedure at the commencement of the proceedings or on their entry into the case and sought unsuccessfully to get the Statement of Delinquencies filed by the applicant Adebayo struck out. Clearly in those circumstances the adoption of a wrong procedure would be no more than an irregularity, and would not render the entire proceedings a nullity as was submitted by learned counsel for the director Kamson: so unless a miscarriage of justice is thereby alleged and proved, the proceedings would not be struck out. See in re Kellock (1887) 56 L.T.R. 887: also Allen v. Oakey (1890) 62 LT.R. 724.”
In the latter regard I refer to Halsbury’s Law of England, Vol. 21, page 348 para. “370.Meaning of just or convenient. The words just or convenient in the statutory provision (k) must be read just, as well as convenient (l). They do not mean that the court can grant an injunction simply because the court thinks it convenient, but mean that the court should grant an injunction for protection of rights or the prevention of injury according to legal principles (m). They confer no arbitrary nor unregulated discretion on the court, and do not authorise it to invent new modes of enforcing judgment in substitution for the ordinary modes (o).”
— Agbaje JSC. Okoya & Ors. V. S. Santilli & Ors. ( SC.206/1989, 23 MAR 1990)
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