It is now settled that a mere deposit of title deeds as security for a loan constitutes an equitable charge over the land or property.
– Oguntade JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)
It is now settled that a mere deposit of title deeds as security for a loan constitutes an equitable charge over the land or property.
– Oguntade JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)
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This is because, in my respectful view, it is settled that a transaction created by a deed will not come into effect prior to the delivery of the deed. In other words, a deed only becomes effective upon its delivery. So, until the time specified had arrived or the condition had been performed or the Governor has given his consent, the instrument, will not be a deed so to speak, but is a mere escrow.
– Ogbuagu, JSC. Brossette v. Ilemobola (2007)
I think Professor Kasunmu S.A.N., counsel for the appellant was right when he submitted that the Court of Appeal relied on the recital to the deed to control the operative clause in Exhibit A. It is well settled that in interpreting a deed, an unambiguous operative part cannot be controlled by the recital. The clear and unambiguous operative part must be given full expression and effect. See IRC v. Raphael (1935) AC 96, 135 Dawes v. Tredwell (1881) 18 Ch.D 354, 388-9.
— A.G. Karibi-Whyte, JSC. Olowosago V. Adebanjo (SC.134/86, 29 Sep 1988)
It cannot be disputed that where two competing deeds are registered, each takes effect as against the other from the date of registration and the benefit of earlier registration is preserved.
– Iguh JSC. Kayode v. Odutola (2001)
Vincent v. Premo Enterprises Ltd. (supra) at p. 619 Lord Denning, M.R.: “The law as to “delivery” of a deed is of ancient date. But it is reasonably clear. A deed is very different from a contract. On a contract for the sale of land, the contract is not binding on the parties until they have exchanged their parts. But with a deed it is different. A deed is binding on the maker of it, even though the parts have not been exchanged, as long as it has been signed, sealed and delivered. “Delivery” in this connection does not mean “handed over” to the other side. It means delivered in the old legal sense, namely an act done so as to evince an intention to be bound. Even though the deed remains in the possession of the maker, or of his solicitor, he is bound by it if he has done some act evincing an intention to be bound, as by saying “I deliver this my act and deed.” He may, however, make the “delivery” conditional: in which case the deed is called an “escrow” which becomes binding when the condition is fulfilled.”
It was common ground that the relationship between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant is contractual and governed by exhibit B, the Deed of Legal Mortgage. That being so, extrinsic evidence will generally not be acceptable to vary the terms agreed upon (see for example U.B.N. v. Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385). – Kutigi JSC. Okonkwo v. Cooperative Bank (2003)
It has to be stressed however that the term delivery, in law, is not synonymous with the physical exchange of signed and sealed documents between the parties thereto. It does not also mean the handling over of a document to the other side. It does mean and has been judicially interpreted to connote an act done so as to evince an intention to be bound. Even though the possession of such deed still remains with the maker, or his solicitor, he is bound by it if he has had it delivered in law by doing some unequivocal act whether by words or action evincing an intention to be bound. – Iguh JSC. Awojugbagbe v. Chinukwe (1995)
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