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MEANING OF “ANY PERSON” AS USED IN SECTION 36(1) OF LAND USE ACT MEANS ANY NIGERIAN

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It is my firm view therefore that the words “ANY PERSON” under section 36(1) of the Act refer to and mean ANY NIGERIAN. The Act has not abrogated any law which limits the rights of aliens to own property. I will however share the views of Omololu-Thomas, J.C.A. that any foreigner who has validly owned or occupied any land before the act is deemed to be an occupier under the act. This however must be in conformity with the definition of occupier under section 50 of the Land Use Act.

— Olatawura, JSC. Ogunola v. Eiyekole (1990) – SC.195/1987

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DAMAGE TO CROP GROWING ON LAND

It is a misconception to regard damage for crops growing on land as not belonging to a claim for trespass to land. Quic quid plantatur solo, solo cedit.

– Obaseki, JSC. Ekpan v. Agunu (1986)

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NOTICE OF POSSESSION OF LAND – ACTS DONE ON LAND

In Mogaji and Ors v. Cadbury Fry (Export) Ltd. (supra) at p. 88, Madarikan, JSC, delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court said: “Possession of a parcel of land means the occupation or physical control of the land either personally or through an agent. As stated by Lord Fitzgerald in Lord Advocate v. Young (1887) 12 App. Cas. 544 at p. 556, by possession is meant possession of that character of which the thing possessed is capable. Thus, if a person adduced evidence that he or his agent or servant were cultivating a farmland that would be evidence sufficient to establish that he was in possession of the land. Similarly, if a person erects on a parcel of land a signboard bearing his name, he hereby gives notice to all and sundry that he is in possession of the land.”

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NAME OR ETYMOLOGY OF THE LAND IS NOT INDICATIVE OF OWNERSHIP

The trial court found in favour of the respondents but that finding is neither here nor there, because the name or etymology of the name of a piece of land is not necessarily indicative of the ownership thereof. In the case of Alhaji Aromire and 2 ors v. J.S. Awoyemi (1972) 1 A.N.L.R (Pt. 1) 101 at 113, this Court, per Coker J.S.C., held that no reliance can be placed on the differences in the names ascribed to the same portion of land in the vicinity. The difference in names will be immaterial if the identity of the land in dispute is otherwise not in dispute. In the same vein, the Court of Appeal, per Nnaemeka-Agu J.C.A., as he then was, in the case of Onwumere v. Agwunedu (1987) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 62) 673 expressed the following opinion – “Now it has been decided by a long line of decided casesboth by this Court and the Supreme Court that when parties base their claims to land upon evidence of tradition and the evidence of tradition called by both sides to the suit is in conflict, the best way to decide which of the conflicting stories is the more probable is to test them from the background of facts within living memory. See on this Agedegudu v. Ajenifuja (1963) 1 All N.L.R. 109 at p. 115 to 117; Ogboide Aikhionbare and ors v. Omoregie and ors (1976) 12 SC 11. It is not a matter, which can be resolved on the credibility of witnesses or as the learned Judge has done by mere etymological approach when the names themselves and the ownership of the surrounding lands and some of the features on the land in dispute are parts of the conflict …”

— Edozie JSC. Cosm As Ezukwu v. Peter Ukachukwu Jude Ukachukwu (SC. 160/2000, 2 July 2004)

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LAND: WHERE DEFENDANTS ARE UNKNOWN

In a case where the landlord does not know the names of the illegal occupiers of his land or cannot even physically identify all of them, the requirement that the persons be made defendants to the action would result in great injustice and hardship to the landlord or land owner thus giving rise to the procedure under Order 50 – Nnodi v. Thanks Investment Ltd (2005) 11 NWLR (pt 935) 29.

– Abiru, JCA. Okoli v. Gaya (2014)

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OWNER OF LAND UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW REQUIRES CONSENT OF GOVERNOR TO ALIENATE

Land is still held under customary tenure even though dominium is in the Governor. The most pervasive effect of the Land use Act is the diminution of the plenitude of the powers of the holders of land. The character in which they hold remain substantially the same. Thus an owner at customary law remains owners all the same even though he no longer is the ultimate owner. The owner of land, now requires the consent of the Governor to alienate interests which hitherto he could do without such consent.

— Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Ogunola v. Eiyekole (1990) – SC.195/1987

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RENT INCLUDE THE IMPROVEMENTS MADE ON THE PREMISES

✓ Ponsford v. H.M.S. Aerosols (supra). Here there was lease dated August 19, 1968 of factory premises in Barking for 21 years and the revision of rent was to be referred to a surveyor under an arbitration clause where the parties disagree on the revised rent. In 1969, the premises were burnt down and rebuilt out of the proceeds of insurance. The licence for the improvements which were in fact made was contained in a document dated November 14, 1969, where in clause 1 it provided: “The landlords hereby grant unto the tenants licence to execute in and upon the demised premises the several alterations and works indicated in the plan annexed …. It is hereby agreed and declared that all the lessee’s covenants and conditions contained in the lease which are now applicable to the premises demised thereby shall continue to be applicable to the same when and as altered and shall extend to all additions which may be made thereto in the course of such alterations.” The lease of August 19, 1968 indicated, inter alia, that the rent would be assessed “as reasonable rent for the demised premises”. The trial judge. held that a reasonable rent for the premises should be assessed without taking account of the improvements made by the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed on the ground that the judge was wrong in his construction of the rent review clause. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, by a majority of 2:1, reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that the revised rent would include the improvements made on the demised premises.

✓ Cuff v. J. & F. Stone Proper Ltd. (supra) provided that improvement on the land should not be wholly disregarded. Cuffs case is different from the case before us in the sense that the improvements on the land had been made prior to the execution of the lease. Accordingly the improvement, unless expressly excluded, must be taken into account in computing the revised rent. In the instant case there was not improvement on the bare land at the time of the lease, and the subsequent improvement did not form part of the demised premises. Without doubt, the improvements in the Cuff case formed part of the demised premises.

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