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LASPE OF TIME IS EVIDENCE OF ACQUIESCENCE

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Lapse of time is generally evidence of acquiescence but acquiescence is not just mere lapse of time. – Oputa JSC. Gbadamosi v. Bello (1985)

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THE OPERATION OF LACHES AND ACQUIESCENCE

In Kayode v. Odutola (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 659 at 684, D—F per Iguh JSC: ‘Accordingly, it has been said that if a stranger begins to build on another’s land supposing it to be his own and the real owner, perceiving his mistake, abstains from setting him right and leaves him to persevere in his error, a court of equity will not allow such real owner afterwards to assert his title to the land on which the stranger has expended money on the supposition that the land was his own. It considers that the owner saw the mistake into which the stranger had fallen and that it was the duty of such owner to be active and to assert his adverse title; and that it would be dishonest in the owner to remain wilfully passive on such an occasion, in order afterwards to profit by the mistake which such owner might have prevented. See Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) L.R.H.L. 129 at 140. One vital point has, however, been made.’

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ACQUIESCENCE IN LAND – LEAVING A STRANGER TO BUILD ON LAND

“If for instance, a stranger begins to build on my land, supposing it to be his own, and I, perceiving his mistake, abstain from setting him right, and leave him to persevere in his error, a Court of Equity will not allow me afterwards to assert my title to the land on which he had expended money on, the supposition that the land was his own. It considers that when I saw the mistake into which he had fallen, it was my duty to be active, and to state my adverse title; and that it would be dishonest in me to remain wilfully passive on such an occasion in order afterward to profit by the mistake which I might have prevented”. See Lord Cranworth in Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) 1 H.L. 140: see also Rafat v. Ellis (1954) 14WACA. 430.

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ACQUIESCENCE MUST HAVE AMOUNTED TO FRAUD

In Abbey v. Ollenu (1954) 14 WACA 567 at 568, the West African Court of Appeal adopted and quoted with approval the dictum of Fry J. in Willmot v. Barber (1880) 15 CH.D 96 at 105 thus: “It has been said that the acquiescence which will deprive a man of his legal rights must amount to fraud and in my view that is an abbreviated statement of a very true proposition. A man is not to be deprived of his legal rights unless he acted in such a way as would make it fraudulent for him to set up those rights.” See also Gerrard v. O’Reilly 3 D and WAR 414.

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ACQUIESCENCE TO DEPRIVE A MAN MUST BE FRAUDULENT TO HOLD SWAY

Willmott v. Barber (1880) 15 Ch.D 96 at p. 105 viz: “It has been said that the acquiescence which will deprive a man of his legal rights must amount to fraud, and in my view, that is an abbreviated statement of a very true proposition. A man is not to be deprived of his legal rights unless he has acted in such a way as would make it fraudulent for him to set up those rights.”

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ACQUIESCENCE MUST HAVE LED THE OTHER PARTY TO ALTER HIS POSITION

In Taiwo v. Taiwo (1958) SCNLR 244 particularly at 247 – 248, this court in dealing with the equitable defences of acquiescence and laches, stated as follows:- “Acquiescence does not bar a claim unless certain conditions are fulfilled. One of the most important is that the party who relies upon his opponent’s acquiescence must have been led by it to expend money or otherwise alter his position. There is nothing to show here that the plaintiffs or their predecessor in title, Rebecca, have been led to do anything of the sort by the defendants’ failure to assert their claim. However, the plaintiffs here do not rely, upon bare acquiescence, but upon acquiescence over a long period; I should prefer to say that they rely on the defendants’ laches. Laches is not delay alone; some other factor must exist, or at least the delay must be such that the existence of some other factors may be inferred. Laches may be evidence of the waiver of a party’s right, but waiver is incomplete without consideration in some shape or form proceeding from the other party. There is no evidence of that here; neither the plaintiffs nor their predecessor in title here acted in any way upon the defendants’ failure to assert a claim to Rosannah’s share of the rents which they were taking. Counsel for the plaintiffs speaks of the defendants’ case as a stale claim. There is a stale claim when laches has brought about the destruction or loss of evidence which might have supported or rebutted it. In the present case the rights of the parties depend on native law and custom, not on any dealings between individuals giving rise to private rights which the passage of time might have made more difficult to establish. Evidence relevant to the native law and custom governing the case is as available now as it was 14 years ago. In my view, the defendants’ inactivity, by itself and unaccompanied by any other circumstance which would make it a fraud or unconscionable on their part to maintain whatever rights they may have to a share in Rosannah’s estate, has not relieved the plaintiffs from the burden of showing positively that the native law and custom in this matter is what they assert it to be. It still rests with the plaintiffs to show that native law entitled them to succeed to Rosannah’s share to the exclusion of Fredrick’s children.” See also Solomon v. Mogaji (1982) 11 SC 1.

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