Justice of a case cannot be determined in vacuo but in relation to the facts of the case. Justice so to say, which is not done within the facts of a case is not justifice properly so called but justice in inverted commas and therefore injustice.
— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008
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EGOLUM V. OBASANJO (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt.511) 255 at 413, where the Supreme Court, per ACHIKE, JSC, held thus: ‘The heydays of technicalities are now over because the weight of judicial authorities has today shifted from undue reliance on technicalities to doing substantial justice evenhandedly to the parties to the case.”
It is said that justice delayed is justice denied. The reverse is equally disturbing. Justice rushed is a travesty of justice and a threat to the fabric that binds civilized society together. As if the rushed justice was not bad enough, the panel presented to the Taraba House of Assembly an incomplete and edited report upon which the appellant was removed on the 4th October, 2012, the day following the submission of the report. At least, the respondents did not disclaim the incomplete and edited report.
– Ngwuta, J.S.C. Danladi v. Dangiri (2014)
From a longline of decisions of this court, miscarriage of justice can be said to be such a departure from the rules which permeate a judicial process as to make what happened not in the proper sense of the word judicial procedure at all. What constitutes a miscarriage of justice vary, not only in relation to particular facts, but also with regard to the jurisdiction invoked by the proceedings in question. A finding that a different result necessarily would have been reached in the proceedings affected by the miscarriage is not required before one could reach the conclusion that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the proceedings. It is enough if what is done is not justice according to law, see Nnajiofor v. Ukonu (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 36) 505; Adigun v. Att.-Gen., Oyo State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 678; Okonkwo v. Udoh (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 519) 16.
— Onnoghen JSC. Aigbobahi & Ors. v. Aifuwa, Osabuohien & Ors. (SC. 194/2001, 3 Feb 2006)
OLADEJO ADEWUYI AJUWON & ORS VS FADELE AKANNI & ORS (1993) 12 SCNJ 32 AT 52 this Court held “It is not every error of law that is committed by a trial or appellate Court that justifies the reversal of a judgment. An appellant, to secure the reversal of a judgment, must further establish that the error of law complained of did in fact occasion a miscarriage of justice and/or substantially affected the result of the decision. An error in law which has occasioned no miscarriage of justice is immaterial and may not affect the final decision of a Court. This is because what an Appeal Court has to decide is whether the decision of judge was right and not whether his reasons were, and a misdirection that does not occasion injustice is immaterial. The error in law in applying the doctrine of lis pendens complained of did not occasion any miscarriage of justice. The erroneous application of the doctrine of lis pendens notwithstanding, there was no other course that was open to the Court of Appeal in the appeal than to invalidate the sale in issue and to dismiss the appeal before it”.
The decision is not at large but is carefully qualified by the expression “miscarriage of justice”. The court used the expression twice. Miscarriage of justice is simply justice miscarried. I do not think I have said much. I should go further to say that miscarriage of justice is failure of justice. It is the failure on the part of the court to do justice. It is justice misapplied, misappreciated or misappropriated. It is an ill conduct on the part of the court which amounts to injustice. See Onagoruwa v. The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 303) 49. Miscarriage of justice arises in a decision or actcome of legal proceedings that is prejudicial or inconsistent with substantial right of a party. See Joshua v. The State (2000) 5 NWLR (pt. 658) 591; Sanusi v. Ameyogun (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 237) 527.
— Niki Tobi JSC. Pam & Anor. V Mohammed (2008) – SC.238/2007
In the latter regard I refer to Halsbury’s Law of England, Vol. 21, page 348 para. “370.Meaning of just or convenient. The words just or convenient in the statutory provision (k) must be read just, as well as convenient (l). They do not mean that the court can grant an injunction simply because the court thinks it convenient, but mean that the court should grant an injunction for protection of rights or the prevention of injury according to legal principles (m). They confer no arbitrary nor unregulated discretion on the court, and do not authorise it to invent new modes of enforcing judgment in substitution for the ordinary modes (o).”
— Agbaje JSC. Okoya & Ors. V. S. Santilli & Ors. ( SC.206/1989, 23 MAR 1990)
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