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IT IS NOT THE BUSINESS OF THE COURT TO NOMINATE PARTIES FOR ELECTION

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It is not the business of any Court to select or nominate candidates for any political party for election. The nomination of a candidate to contest an election is the sole responsibility of the political party concerned. The Courts do not have jurisdiction to decide who should be sponsored by a political party as a candidate in an election. See Onuoha v Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244, Dalhatu v Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt 843) 310, Shinkafi & Anor v Yari & Ors (2016) LPELR – 26050 (SC) page 57 paragraphs A – D, Olofu & Ors v Itodo & Anor (2010) 18 NWLR (pt 1225) 545. The above position has been the law and has not changed because issue of selection and/or nomination of a candidate for an election is strictly within the domestic jurisdiction or power of political parties.

— J.I. Okoro, JSC. Uba v. Ozigbo, INEC, PDP (SC.CV/772/2021, October 21, 2021)

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WHEN DOES A WITHDRAWAL TAKE EFFECT – WHEN LETTER IS DELIVERED TO THE POLITICAL PARTY, NOT INEC

It is glaring from the express wordings of Section 31 of the Electoral Act 2022 that the legislative intention is that the withdrawal should take effect upon the nominated candidate personally delivering a written notice of his withdrawal to the political party and not when the political party conveys it to INEC. Section 31 states that what the party conveys to INEC is the withdrawal. The provision gives the party not later than 90 days to the election to convey the withdrawal of its candidate to INEC. Since the election held on 25-2-2022, the political party had up to 24-11-22 to convey the 4th Respondent’s withdrawal to INEC. So, it matters not if it was conveyed in 10-7-2022, 15-7-2022 or any other date, provided it is conveyed not later than 90 days to the election. The date of the conveyance within the prescribed period has no effect on the withdrawal that had already been done. Therefore, the 4th respondent withdrew as the 2nd respondent’s Senatorial candidate for Borno Central Senatorial District on 6-7-2022 when his written letter of withdrawal dated 6-7-2022 was received by his party on 6-7-2022.

— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. APM v INEC & Ors. (2023) – CA/PEPC/04/2023

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IT IS POLITICAL PARTIES THAT WIN OR LOSE ELECTION, NOT CANDIDATES

It is the political party that participated in the conduct of an election that is the winner or the loser and not the Candidates sponsored by the political parties sometimes, the goodwill of a candidate being sponsored in an election may contribute to the victory of the political party in an election. Section 221 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria does not recognize an Independent candidate contesting in our elections.

– Coomassie JSC. Odedo v. INEC (2008)

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MISTAKE OF REGISTRY WILL NOT BE VISITED ON LITIGANT

Cooperative And Commerce Bank Nig. Ltd. Plc V. Attorney General Anambra State & Anor (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 261) 528 at 561 held as follows;
“it will be contrary to all principles to allow litigants to suffer for the mistake of the Court Registry. In other words, the Court will not visit the sin of the Court’s Registry on a litigant or his counsel, unless, it was shown that the litigant or his counsel was a party thereto or had full knowledge of the sin or mistake and encouraged or condoned the said act. Therefore, on the authorities, justice, equity, fairness and good conscience, must persuade me, to hold further that this appeal deserves to succeed and it in fact does.”

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COURT IS NOT RESTRICTED TO AUTHORITIES CITED BY PARTIES

It is to be said loud and clear that a Court of law has no legal duty to confine itself only to authorities cited by parties. It can, in an effort to improve its Judgment rely on authorities not cited by parties. The Court is also under no duty to give notice to the parties that it intends to use a particular book or authority.

– M. Peter-Odili JSC. Adegbanke v. Ojelabi (2021)

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ROLES OF TRIAL COURT AND THAT OF COURT OF APPEAL

What was the Tribunal’s treatment of the witnesses and their evidence as placed before it? Before embarking on the exercise, I shall, firstly, remind myself of the role of this Court. Trial Courts, as their name suggests, try cases. To them belongs the reception of evidence. (Appellate Courts receive evidence only in exceptional cases and circumstances), the evaluation of such evidence, the issue of credibility or otherwise of witnesses adducing such evidence and the making of findings of fact based most times on the credibility of the witnesses – all these are matters peculiarly and comfortably in the exclusive province of the Court that sees, hears, matches and believes. See Chief Frank Ebba vs. Chief Wani Ogodo (1984) 4 S.C. 84 at Pp. 98/99; (1984) 1 SCNLR 372. It is quite a different matter when it is a matter of what inference or deduction to make from facts either as admitted or as found. In such a situation the Court of Appeal is in as a good a position as or even better than the trial court. See Benmax vs. Austin Motors (1955) A.C. 370 at p. 375.

— Nsofor, JCA. Ugo v Indiamaowei (1999) – CA/PH/EP/97/99

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COURT WOULD INTERFERE WHERE POWER IS EXERCISED ARBITRARILY

Congreve v. Home Office (1976) Q.B. 629. In that case, on January 29th 1975 the Home Secretary announced that the colour television licence fee would be increased from £12 to £18 on April 1st and made an order under section 2(1) of the Wireless and Telegraphic Act 1949 to effect the increase. The Home Secretary, in accordance with his administrative practice when an increase in the fee was imminent, prepared special instructions for its agents who included, post office counter clerks, telling them that anyone applying in advance for the renewal of a licence which did not expire until March 31st or later should be told to reapply on or before April 1. On March 26th, the plaintiff, whose current licence expired on March 31, applied to the post office for a £12 licence. The counter clerk did not follow the Home Office Instruction; she issued him with a £12 licence which on its face would not expire until February 29, 1976. Some 24,500 licence holders were likewise issued with overlapping licences before April 1. The Home Office wrote to each holder of a £12 overlapping licence stating that unless the additional £6 was paid the licence taken out in advance of April 1 would be revoked. The plaintiff did not pay and was one of those who received the letter dated 11th November 1975 which threatened that unless the £6 was paid by December 1, the overlapping licence would be revoked and prosecution for the use of colour television proceeded with. The plaintiff issued a special indorsed writ claiming a declaration that the revocation of his licence would be unlawful, invalid, and of no effect. The High Court refused to make the declaration holding that the Home Secretary was entitled to revoke a licence under section 1(4) of the Act of 1949 and that the Home Office letters gave the licence holder open choices. On appeal, the appeal was allowed, the Court of Appeal holding that although the Home Secretary has undoubted discretion under Section 1(4) of the Wireless and Telegraphic Act, 1949 to revoke a licence the discretion was fettered to the extent that the courts would intervene if it was exercised arbitrarily or improperly; and in view of the fact that the licence issued to the plaintiff was a valid licence on the day it was issued and that there was nothing in the Act or the Regulations which prohibited the holding of overlapping licences, it was an improper exercise of the Minister’s discretionary power to propose to revoke a licence validly obtained as a means of levying money which Parliament had given the Executive no authority to demand. Accordingly, the court could and should intervene to declare that the proposed revocation of the plaintiff’s licence was unlawful, invalid, and of no effect.

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