STOP SEEING INTRUSIVE ADS, & HAVE PREMIUM FEATURES? Stop seeing intrusive ads and have a smoother reading experience, once you sign up on Judicial Poetry. Sign up now!

INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION IS NOT GRANTED AS A MATTER OF COURSE

Reach more audience. Place advert here.

An Interlocutory injunction may be granted in all cases, which it appears to the Court to be just and convenient to do so, but it is not normally granted as a matter of course. The applicant has a duty to satisfy the Court that in the special circumstances of his case, he is entitled, on the facts presented by him to the relief. The remedy is entirely discretionally and the governing principles, depending on the facts and the issue in a given case, admit some element of flexibility. The discretion is however one that must be exercised judicially and judiciously.

— U.M. Abba Aji JSC. Agbomagbo & Anor. V. Oloku Okpogo & Ors. (CA/B/147/2000, 5 May 2005)

Was this dictum helpful?

SHARE ON

interlocutory injunction

FOR AN INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION TO BE GRANTED IT HAS TO BE PREMISED ON THERE BEING AN EXISTING CAUSE OF ACTION

A right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is not a cause of action. It cannot stand on its own. It is dependent upon there being a pre-existing cause of action against the Defendant arising out of an invation, actual or threatened, by him of a legal or equitable right of the Plaintiff for the enforcement of which the Defendant is amendable to the jurisdiction of the Court. The right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is merely ancillary and incidental to the pre-existing cause of action. It is granted to preserve the Status quo, pending the entertainment by the Court of the right of the parties and granting to the Plaintiff of the relief to which the cause of action entitles him, which mayor may not include a final injunction. See DAEWOO (NIG) LTD v. HAZCON (NIG) LTD (1998) 7 NWLR (Pt. 558) 438 at 448-449.

— U.M. Abba Aji JSC. Agbomagbo & Anor. V. Oloku Okpogo & Ors. (CA/B/147/2000, 5 May 2005)

Was this dictum helpful?

GRANT OF INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION IS STATUTORY

The principle upon which the Court acts in granting interlocutory injunction is therefore statutory.

– Uwais JSC. Sotuminu v. Ocean Steamship (1992)

Was this dictum helpful?

GRANT OF INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION DISCRETIONARY

It is quite clear from these statutory provisions that the grant of an application for interlocutory injunction is purely discretionary though the Court is enjoined to consider in the exercise of its discretion whether the grant of the discretion will be just or convenient. In other words for the exercise of the discretion to be judicial, it is sine qua non that the grant of the application should be either just or convenient.

– Uwais JSC. Sotuminu v. Ocean Steamship (1992)

Was this dictum helpful?

INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION NOT FOR AN ACT DONE ALREADY

In Ideozu v. Ochoma (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt. 970) 364 at 395, at C-E Per Tobi, JSC held thus: “In Ajewole v. Adetimo (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt. 431) 391, this Court held that when a Court is asked to restrain a party from doing an act pending the decision in a matter before it, but the act has been done, no order to restrain will be made. This is so because, what is sought to be prevented had happened. In other words, an interlocutory injunction is not a remedy for an act, which has already been carried out.”

Was this dictum helpful?

NATURE OF INJUNCTION – NATURE AND REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERIM INJUNCTION

At para. 2.10: In the case of Mr. Francis Temewei & Others V. Mr. Tom Benbai & Others (2015) LPELR-25131(CA), the Court of Appeal per Bada, J.C.A. held as follows on the conditions for the grant of an interlocutory injunction: “Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition page 714 defined “Injunction” as an order prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury. In Adenuga Vs Odunewu (2001) 2 NWLR Part 696 Page 184, the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte JSC defined “injunction” at Page 185 as follows: “an equitable order restraining the person to whom it is directed from doing things specified in the order or requiring in exceptional situations the performance of a specific act.” The preservation of the subject matter i. e. “res” in dispute or the maintenance of the “status quo” is achieved through the judicial process of the equitable order of injunction. And since injunction is an equitable remedy, it is usually granted at the discretion of the court which must be exercised judicially and judiciously. For the court to exercise its discretion in favour of an applicant, certain conditions must exist and this must be shown in the affidavit accompanying the motion on notice. The conditions for grant of interim and interlocutory injunctions are basically the same except for the element of urgency in interim injunction which is not pronounced in interlocutory injunction. The conditions include: a. Existence of a legal right; b. Substantial issue to be tried; c. Balance of convenience; d. Irreparable damage; or injury e. Conduct of the parties; f. Undertaking as to damages.”

— (Relied upon in FRN v ASUU (2022) – NICN/ABJ/270/2022)

Was this dictum helpful?

CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION

In American Cyanamid v. Erhicon Ltd. (1975) A.C. 396 made the following remarks on pp. 408H-409C thereof: “Save in the simplest cases, the decision to grant or to refuse an interlocutory injunction will cause to whichever party is unsuccessful on the application some disadvantages which his ultimate success at the trial may show he ought to have been spared and the disadvantages may be such that the recovery of damages to which he would then be entitled either in the action or under the plaintiff’s undertaking would not be sufficient to compensate him fully for all of them. The extent to which the disadvantages to each party would be incapable of being compensated in damages in the event If his succeeding at the trial is always a significant factor in assessing where the balance of convenience lies .. and if the extent of the uncompensatable disadvantage to each party would not differ widely, it may not be improper to take into account in tipping the balance the relative strength of each party’s case as revealed by the affidavit evidence adduced on the hearing of the application. This, however, should be done only where it is apparent upon the facts disclosed by evidence as to which there is no credible dispute that the strength of one party’s case is disproportionate to that of the other party. The Court is not justified to embark upon anything resembling a trial of the action upon conflicting affidavits in order to evaluate the strength of either party’s case. I would reiterate that, in addition to those to which I have referred, there may be many other special factors to be taken into consideration in the particular circumstances of individual cases.”