STOP SEEING INTRUSIVE ADS, & HAVE PREMIUM FEATURES? Stop seeing intrusive ads and have a smoother reading experience, once you sign up on Judicial Poetry. Sign up now!

IN RECEIVERSHIP COMPANY DOES NOT LOSE ITS LEGAL PERSONALITY

Reach more audience. Place advert here.

It is important to appreciate the fact that the company neither loses its legal personality nor its title to the goods in the receivership.

– Karibi-whyte, JSC. Intercontractors v. National Provident (1988)

Was this dictum helpful?

SHARE ON

company

ANY OFFICIAL CAN GIVE TESTIMONY FOR A COMPANY

Comet Shipp. Agencies Ltd v. Babbit Ltd (2001) FWLR (Pt. 40) 1630, (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 712) 442, 452 paragraph B, per Galadima JCA (as he then was ) held that: “Companies have no flesh and blood. Their existence is a mere legal abstraction. They must therefore, of necessity, act through their directors, managers and officials. Any official of a company well placed to have personal knowledge of any particular transaction in which a company is engaged can give evidence of such transaction.”

Was this dictum helpful?

RATIONALE BEHIND NULLITY OF PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT

In Kelner v. Baxter (1866) L. R. 2 C.P. 174 Erie C.J. explaining the rationale of the principle [pre-incorporation contract] said: “as there was no company in existence at the time, the agreement would be wholly inoperative unless it were held to be binding on the defendant personally…where a contract is signed by one who professes to be signing as agent, but who has no principal existing at the time, and the contract would be altogether inoperative unless binding upon the person who signed it, he is bound thereby; and a stranger cannot by a subsequent ratification relieve him from the responsibility”.

Was this dictum helpful?

AT COMMON LAW, PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT IS NULL – HOWEVER

At common law a company before its incorporation has no capacity to contract. Consequently, nobody can contract for it as Agent nor can a pre-incorporation contract be ratified by the company after its incorporation -Transbridge Co. Ltd. v. Survey International Co. Ltd. (1986) 17 NSCC 1084; (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 37) 576; Edokpolo & Co. Ltd. v. Sem-EdoWire Industries Ltd. & Ors. (1984) 7 SC 119; Sparks Electrics (Nig.) Ltd. v. Ponmile (1986) 2 NWLR 579; Enahoro v.I.B.WA. Ltd. (1971) 1 NCLR 180; Kelner v. Baxter (1867) LR 2CP 174; Natal Land and Colonisation Co. v. Pauline Syndicate (1904) AC 120. The rationale for this rule was stated at page 183 of the report by Erle, C.J. in Kelner v. Baxter in these words: “………………….as there was no company in existence at the time, the agreement would be wholly inoperative unless it were held to be binding on the defendants personally. The cases referred to in the course of the argument fully bear out the proposition that, where a contract is signed by one who professes to be signing ‘as agent’, but who has no principal existing at the time, and the contract would be altogether inoperative unless binding upon the person who signed it, he is bound thereby: and a stranger cannot by a subsequent ratification relieve him from that responsibility. When the company came afterwards into existence it was a totally new creature, having rights and obligations from that time, but no rights or obligations by reason of anything which might have been done before.” The company can, however, after its incorporation, enter into a new contract to put into effect the terms of the pre-incorporation contract – Touche v. Metropolitan Railway Warehousing Co. (1871) 6 Ch. App 671; Howard v. Patent Ivory Manufacturing Co. (1888) 38 Ch D 156.

— Ogundare, JSC. Societe Favouriser v. Societe Generale (1997) – SC.126/1994

Was this dictum helpful?

RATIONALE FOR PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT NOT BINDING AT COMMON LAW

At Common Law, a pre-incorporation contract was not binding on the company because there was no principal on behalf of whom an agent could have contracted. The company was not permitted to ratify or adopt it, and it could not, after incorporation, enforce the contract, nor sue, e.g. for damages for breach of contract – Natal Land etc Co. Ltd. v. Pauline Colliery Syndicate Ltd. (1904) AC 120. These common law rules were a source of considerable inconvenience for the promotion of business.

— U. Mohammed, JSC. Societe Favouriser v. Societe Generale (1997) – SC.126/1994

Was this dictum helpful?

A REGISTERED COMPANY ACTS THROUGH AGENTS

The magisterial pronouncements in these ex cathedra authorizes, with due respect, expose the poverty of the alluring submission of the appellants counsel on the stubborn point. PW1 described himself as the chairman of the board of directors of the respondent. The respondent is a duly incorporated company under the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act. By the registration, it is a persona ficta, a juristic personality which can only act through an alter ego such as its agents or servants, directors, managers, see Kate Enterprise Ltd v. Daewoo (Nig.) Ltd. (supra); Interdrill (Nig.) Ltd. v. UBA Plc. (supra). To label the PW1s evidence as hearsay, as pontificated by the appellants, will be antithetical to the corporate personality of the respondent, a legal abstraction, devoid of blood, flesh, brain and other human features.

— O.F. Ogbuinya, JCA. Impact Solutions v. International Breweries (2018) – CA/AK/122/2016

Was this dictum helpful?

NON-REGISTRATION OF COMPANY CHARGES VOIDS IT

The effect of non-compliance with the provisions of section 94 is quite grave. Non-registration at the Companies Registry of charges created by the company, as opposed to existing charges acquired by the company, destroys the validity of the charge. Unless the prescribed particulars are delivered to the Registrar within 30 days of the creation of the charge, it will, so far as any security on the company’s assets is conferred thereby, “be void against the liquidator and any creditor of the company”. But this is “without prejudice to any contract or obligation for repayment of the money thereby secured, and when a charge becomes void under this section the money secured thereby shall immediately become payable”.

– Augie JSC. Bank v. TEE (2003)

Was this dictum helpful?

No more related dictum to show.