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IN LAND CASES THE PLAINTIFF MUST SUCCEED ON ITS OWN CASE

Dictum

In land cases that the plaintiff when claiming a declaration of title must succeed on the strength of his case. The onus lies on the plaintiff to satisfy the court that he is entitled on the evidence brought by him to the declaration of title claimed. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. If this onus is not discharged, the weakness of the defendant’s case may not generally help him and the proper judgment will be for the defendant. Where, however, the case of the defendant lends support to the case of the plaintiff, it is recognised that the court cannot ignore it in arriving at a conclusion as to which side to believe.

– Iguh, JSC. Clay v. Aina (1997)

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EVIDENCE ADMITTED IS SUBJECT TO BE TESTED AND EVALUATED

The class of witnesses described as expert witnesses is well settled. It is imperative to state that every piece of evidence that has been admitted in the course of proceedings is subject to be tested for credibility, weight or cogency by the trial court before it becomes acceptable. In effect it is not merely acceptable because the witness is described as an expert and his evidence not challenged. The primary duty of the trial court is to evaluate the evidence before it is accepted whether given by an expert or not.

– Nwodo, JCA. OLAM v. Intercontinental Bank (2009)

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CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST ADDUCING FRESH EVIDENCE AT APPELLATE COURT

Three prominent considerations tending to work against adducing fresh evidence at the appellate Court, when this Court exercises its power under Order 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of this Court in that regard, are –
i. Where issues are joined on pleadings at the trial Court no party shall be taken by surprise. Thus, the Appeal Court cannot consider the reception of new evidence without amendment of the pleadings. See ONIBUDO v. AKIBU (1982) 7 SC. 60; ADELEKE v. ASHERIFA (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.136) 94 at 111; (1990) 21 NSCC 145 at 154.
ii. It is in the interest of public policy, particularly for the purpose of efficient and effective administration of justice, to obviate prolongation of litigation that the practice of adducing evidence, which ought to have been adduced at the trial Court, should not be postponed to after judgment: See ADELEKE v. ASHERIFA (supra).
iii. Appellate Courts generally exercise their jurisdiction to correct errors of law or fact made by the Courts below, after the latter’s consideration of the totality of evidential materials before them. Accordingly, the correctness of the decision of a trial Court or Judge should not be assessed or judged on the new evidence that the trial Court or judge never had an opportunity to consider: See ADELEKE v. ASHERIFA (supra). In other words the correctness or otherwise of the judgment of the trial Judge or Court should not be assessed on evidential materials he or it never had opportunity to consider.

– Ejembi, JSC. GTB v. Innoson (2017) – SC.694/2014(R)

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PAIN SUFFERED NEED CANNOT BE ASSESSED BY MEDICAL EVIDENCE

As far as I am aware, there is no known means of medically assessing the intensity or otherwise of the pain a person is going through. When related to injury, medical evidence can only describe the nature of the injury but not the pain that goes with it. The more severe the injury the more likely the severity of the pain. Such pain can merely be imagined by a person who has seen when and how the injury occurred or who sees the nature of the injury later and was told how it happened including the medical doctor who may have treated the victim and noticed the agony he expressed by words or action or through groaning; or to whom the nature of the injury is described and the circumstances in which it occurred. For instance, a person who saw how any person’s limb, e.g. leg, was crushed by a heavy object would literally feel, pathologically, some reflexes which tend to register in him that the victim has undergone severe pain. When told about it he will likely imagine the severity of the pain. But the real nature of the pain can best be experienced or described by the victim.

– Uwaifo JSC. C & C Constr. v. Okhai (2003) – SC.8/1999

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APPEAL COURT CAN EVALUATE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

Very much aware of the findings of facts by the two lower courts in this matter, I must state, all the same, that where the evidence to be evaluated is mainly documentary as here, this court is as in good a vintage position as the trial court. – Chukwuma-Eneh JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)

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AN UNDATED DOCUMENT HAS NO EVIDENTIAL VALUE

Exhibit C3 is a letter to the Honorable Minister for Sports by Joe McCormack, Business Development Manager – Lagos of the defendant requesting an appointment with the Honourable Minister for 26th February 2013. It is not dated. An undated document has no evidential value. See Global Soaps & Detergent Ind. Ltd v. NAFDAC [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 599) 1025 at 1047 and Udo & ors v. Essien & ors [2014] LPELR-22684(CA). Accordingly, Exhibit C3 has no evidential value and so would be discountenanced for purposes of this judgment.

— B.B. Kanyip, J. Awogu v TFG Real Estate (2018) – NICN/LA/262/2013

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COURTS OF LAW DOES NOT FETCH FOR EVIDENCE FOR PARTIES

The Court of Appeal cannot collect evidence from the market overt; for example from the Balogun market, Lagos; Dugbe market, Ibadan; main market, Jos; Central market, Kaduna; Central market (former Gwari market), Minna; Wuse market, Abuja. On the contrary, the Court of Appeal, has to wait for evidence, as the court did, in the court building duly constituted as a court qua adjudicatory body. Courts of law being legal and sacred institutions do not go on a frolic or on a journey to collect inculpatory or exculpatory evidence. On the contrary, they deal only with evidence before them which is procedurally built on arid legalism. For the avoidance of doubt, I am not saying by this judgment that all was well with the conduct of the Presidential Election conducted in 2007. What I am saying is that there was no evidence before the Court of Appeal to dislodge section 146(1) of the Electoral Act.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

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