A person or Community that had title to a parcel of land before the coming into force of the Land Use Act, 1978 is deemed to be a holder of a right of occupancy, statutory right of occupancy or customary right of occupancy, depending on the status of the land – whether it is in urban area or in non-urban area. See Section 34(2), (3) and (6) and Section 36(2), (3) and (4) of the Land Use Act.
— Wali JSC. Onwuka & Ors. V. Ediala & Anor. (SC.18/1987, 20 January 1989)
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The court below was therefore right, in my view, in holding that this could not be so in that 2nd Respondent who derived his title from the Respondent cannot set up a root of title different from that of his Vendor. He must either sink or swim with him, it being that a Vendor can only pass to the purchasers whatever title he has. See Fasoro v. Beyioku (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 76) 263.
— Dike & Ors. V. Francis Okoloedo & Ors. (SC.116/1993, 15 Jul 1999)
“The law is settled, an appellant has the duty to prove his case based on preponderance of evidence. See Afolabi Vs Ola (2016) LPELR 40186 (CA). A plaintiff is not allowed to rely on the weakness of the respondent’s case in establishing his case. See Umeadi & Ors Vs Chibuze & Ors (2020) 3 SCM page 195 -196 para 1, A per Peter Odili, JSC where it was held
“The learned jurist and author said it is as it, and again it is, trite and quite settled that in a claim for a declaration of title of land, the onus is on the plaintiff to establish his claim upon the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the case of the defendant. The plaintiff must therefore satisfy the court that, upon pleadings and evidence adduced by him he is entitled to the declaration sought.” —
I.S. Bdliya, JCA. Umar Ibrahim v Nasiru Danladi Mu’azu & 2 Ors. (2022) – CA/G/317/2019
This court has made it clear in several decisions that if a party bases its title on a grant according to custom by a particular family or community, that party must go further to plead and prove the origin of the title of that particular person, family or community unless that title has been admitted. See on this Mogaji v. Cadbury Nigeria Ltd. (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 7) 393 at 431 also Elias v. Omo-Bare (1982) 5 S.C.25 at pp.57-58.
— Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC. Ogunleye v Oni (1990) – S.C. 193/1987
A party seeking a declaration of title to land is not bound to plead and prove more than one root of title to succeed but he is entitled to rely on more than one root of title. However, where as in this case, he relies on traditional history, and in addition acts of ownership and long possession predicated on the traditional history as pleaded, he is not entitled to a declaration of title based on the evidence of acts of ownership and long possession where the evidence of traditional history is unavailing: See Balogun v. Akanji (1988 ) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 70) 301 at 232; Eronini v. Iheuko (1989) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 101) 46 at 61. However, such evidence of acts of ownership and long possession becomes relevant where the traditional histories given by both sides though plausible are in conflict. In such a situation, it will not be open to the court simply to prefer one side to the other. To determine which of the histories is more probable, the courts have called in aid the principle enunciated in the celebrated case of Kojo II v. Bonsie (1957) 1 W.L.R. 1223 which is to the effect that the preference of one history to the other as being more probable would depend on recent acts of ownership and possession shown by the parties that the court would need to consider to make up its mind. See Ohiaeri v. Akabeze (1992) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 221) 1 at 19, Ekpo v. Ita (1932- 34) 11 N.L.R. 68, Mogaji v. Cadbury (Nig) Ltd. (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 7) 393.
— Edozie JSC. Cosm As Ezukwu v. Peter Ukachukwu Jude Ukachukwu (SC. 160/2000, 2 July 2004)
As observed by the Privy Council in Gibbs v. Messer (1891) A.C. 248 at 254, per Lord Watson delivering the judgment of the Board in regard to a similar law as to registration of title: “The object is to save persons dealing with registered proprietors from the trouble and expense of going behind the register, in order to investigate the history of their author’s [i.e. vendor’s] title, and to satisfy themselves of its validity. That end is accomplished by providing that everyone who purchases in bona fide and for value, from a registered proprietor, and enters his deed of transfer or mortgage on the register, shall thereby acquire an indefeasible right, notwithstanding the infirmity of his author’s title.”
“A certificate of occupancy issued under the Land Use Act is not conclusive evidence of any interest or valid title to the land in favour of the grantee. It is only a prima facie evidence of such right, interest or title without more, and may, in appropriate cases, be challenged and rendered invalid, null and void. Consequently where it is proved, that another person, other than the grantee of a certificate of occupancy had a better title to the land, the Court may set it aside on the ground that it is invalid, defective or spurious. See also the following decided cases by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal: Dsungwe Vs Gbishe; Ogunleye Vs Oni (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) P. 745; Saude Vs Abdullahi; Olohunde Vs Adeyoju and Lababedi Vs Lagos Metal Ind. Ltd (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 135) P. 745.”
— I.S. Bdliya, JCA. Umar Ibrahim v Nasiru Danladi Mu’azu & 2 Ors. (2022) – CA/G/317/2019
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