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GENERAL TRAVERSE OF FACTS

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Anah v. Nnacho (1965) NMLR 28 at 31 the Supreme Court in considering a general traverse stated thus: “Now it seems clear that the cumulative effect of these two paragraphs is that the appellants joined issue with respondents in respect of all the lands described in the pink area of Exhibit 2. By common practice a general traverse in the form of paragraph 15 of the statement of defence has always been accepted and when employed it puts the opponent to proof of the facts stated or alleged.”

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pleadings

STATUTES ARE NOT TO BE PLEADED IN PLEADINGS

The position of the Appellant’s learned Counsel that the Appellant did not need to plead the provisions of p.4 of the Chinese Regulation concerning the transport of hazardous goods stems from the stated position that pleadings need no longer be technical and that it is no longer necessary to plead statutes and sections of statutes but that it is sufficient if the material facts only are pleaded.

– O. Daniel-Kalio, JCA. Egypt v. Abdoulaye (2017) – CA/K/540/2014

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THE IMPRECISENESS IN PLEADING NON-QUALIFICATION WITHOUT SUFFICIENT PARTICULARS

It must be noted, too, that under Section 131 of the 1999 Constitution of this country, there are as many as four different qualifications a person must possess before he can contest presidential election and another 10 different grounds that can disqualify such a candidate who has all the four qualifications of section 131. Therefore, an assertion that merely says that a person is not qualified to contest election by reason of non qualification, will leave not just the person so assailed but every other person involved, including the court, at a loss as to what the pleader has in mind. In fact, to allow such pleading will amount to upsetting the very essence of filing pleadings in a case, which is to give the adversary and the court a clear notice of the pleader’s case a point further fortified in Paragraph 16(1)(a) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act 2022.

— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Atiku v PDP (CA/PEPC/05/2023, 6th of September, 2023)

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LAW IS NOT NECESSARY TO BE PLEADED IN PLEADINGS

I concede that it is not necessary to plead law before reliance can be placed on it. It is sufficient to plead material facts which will lead to a certain legal result, and once sufficient material facts have been pleaded, the inference to be drawn from such pleaded facts and the particulars of the law to be relied upon for such an inference need not be pleaded. See Vandervell’s Trust (No.2), White v. Vandervell Trustees Ltd. (1974) 3 All E.R. 205 at 213; Anyanwu v. Mhara (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 242) 386 at 398 etc.

— Iguh, JSC. Onamade v ACB (1997) – SC.199/1990

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PLEADING, IS PLEADING FACTS UPON WHICH A LAW CAN STAND ON

While I come to the conclusion that the appellants did not plead co-ownership, I should not be taken as making the point that they should have included in their pleadings, the legal word of co-ownership or its synonym joint-ownership. That is not what I mean. As a matter of law, a party cannot plead law in his pleadings. Although there are exceptions here and there to this general principle of law, particularly as it relates to the plea of some specific defences to certain actions, the matter before me, does not extend to that. All that the appellants were expected to do was to plead enough facts upon which the law of co-ownership can stand and keep its shoulders high, awaiting the lawyer to replenish it with either statutory authorities or decided case. But that was not done here, and the trial Judge, could not have supplied it. .

— Tobi, JCA. Abraham v Olorunfunmi (1990) – CA/L/83/89

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THERE MUST BE A SPECIFIC DENIAL PLEADINGS BY THE OTHER PARTY

In the case of Messrs. Lewis & Peat (N.R.I.) Ltd. v. Akhimien ( 1976) 7 S.C. 157 at page 163-4 where he stated: “We must observe, however, that in order to raise an issue of fact in these circumstances there must be a proper traverse: and traverse must be made either by a denial or non-admission either expressly or by necessary implication. So that if a defendant refuses to admit a particular allegation in the statement of claim, he must state so specifically; and he does not do this satisfactorily by pleading thus: ‘defendant is trot in a position to admit or deny (the particular allegation on the statement of claim) and will at the trial put plaintiff to proof.” … We are, of course, not unmindful of the first paragraph of the statement of defence. Nowadays almost every statement of defence contains such a general denial. (See Warner v. Sampson (1959) 1 Q.B. 287 at 310-311. However, in respect of essential and material allegations such a general denial ought not be adopted; essential allegations should be specifically traversed. (See Wallersteins v. Moir (1974) 1 W.L.R. 991 at 1002 per Lord Denning, M.R.; also Bullen & Leake & Jacobs, Precedents of Pleadings 12th Edition 83).

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PLEADING IS NO EVIDENCE

Pleading, of course, is no evidence and a case is decided on the admissible evidence adduced before the court-see: Dumbo V Idugboe (1983) 1 SCNLR 29; (1983) 14 NSCC 22. A.S.H.D.C. v Emekwue (1996) – SC. 282/1989

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